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ABSTRACT 
JOSEPH L. WILTBERGER: Sueños Salvadoreños: Struggles to Build Other 
Futures in El Salvador’s Migration Landscape 
(Under the direction of Arturo Escobar) 
 
Since El Salvador’s 1980-1992 civil war, the Salvadoran state has embraced a 
discourse and political economic strategy that favor international migration and 
remittances for development. Born out of El Salvador’s long history of inequality, 
memory erasure, and exclusion of marginalized populations, this state-led project of 
“migration and development” assumes that the economic changes and identities linked to 
international migration and remittances are a sign of “progress,” as long as migrants and 
their communities appropriately engage with global capitalist flows to benefit 
development, mainly through “productive” remittance investment in places of origin. 
This dissertation examines how this project, and the developmentalist and neoliberal 
logics and practices that guide it, are contested and challenged in networked and 
community-based ways. It uses a networked ethnographic lens that follows the 
experience of one rural community in northern El Salvador and its migrants in the United 
States, who come from a region known for both community organizing and displacement, 
to highlight the existence and potentiality of diverse logics and practices linked to 
migration and development, including those that take on non-capitalist, collectivist, and 
communal forms. This research shows how people continue to make and reconstitute 
community, by networking across borders, engaging in communal practices, and rooting 
iv 
community in place and in a sense of collective history, even as they navigate conditions 
of international migration and displacement that are not of their choosing. These practices 
and logics of community, this dissertation argues, challenge the state’s developmentalist 
framework on international migration, and they make way for other kinds of futures than 
undocumented emigration and remittance-led development. Based on engagements with 
cross-border networks of political actors and migrant-community activists, this study 
suggests that these practices are tied to a broader political shift recently to push for 
alternatives to undocumented emigration, to rework the state’s approach to migration and 
development, and to rethink the meaning of Salvadoran migration in national discourse. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
On a typical warm, dry February afternoon in Guarjila, the community in northern 
El Salvador that is the fieldwork base for this project, I crossed paths on the road with 
Juan, a local 18-year-old. He had just graduated from high school in 2009, a few months 
earlier. Our conversation drifted toward his thoughts about the future. Juan felt a sense of 
uncertainty about it; with a high school degree in a rural, marginalized region in a country 
where most people struggle to make ends meet and where many migrate to the United 
States, he was not sure of what would be possible. That day he told me that he sometimes 
wished he had been born elsewhere: in Sweden, in California, somewhere where life 
would be easier, in a country without so much violence. 
Juan lives alone in his house because he is the only one in his family who has not 
migrated to the United States.  For most of his life, he has been on his own. He has some 
relatives in neighboring communities, and his aunt who lives nearby often prepares him 
meals, but his mother, father, brother, sister, and several of his cousins, aunts and uncles 
live in the United States, mainly in New Jersey. Of his immediate family that previously 
lived in Guarjila, his father was the first to leave, thirteen years earlier, and his brother 
was the final one, seven years earlier. I met Juan when he was twelve, when his parents, 
both in the U.S., bought him a freight truck. They told him that he could use it to start a 
business, but Juan was not able to drive it until he was fourteen, when his feet could 
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finally reach the pedals. Or perhaps their intention was to show Juan, and the community, 
that they loved him, and show that their own sacrifice of going to the United States and 
leaving him behind might be worth it. 
Months later, I invited Catalina, a friend and colleague from the capital, to 
Guarjila. Raised in San Salvador, educated abroad, and now an activist-artist and teacher 
at the bilingual school she had attended growing up, she was curious about Guarjila. She 
wanted to learn more about its famous history of organizing and resistance as a 
community that was a key site of FMLN activity situated at the heart of the 1980-1992 
civil war.
1
 As an artist whose images reflected the realities of Salvadoran migration, she 
was interested in seeing and hearing about the life of a community that had been reshaped 
through its experience of large-scale undocumented emigration after the civil war. 
We went to visit Juan at his house. Meeting someone who was the youngest and 
the last remaining in El Salvador of a family of emigrants, Catalina expected him to 
represent what she had long heard and believed to be true of rural Salvadorans who 
depended on the remittances that their migrant family members send back. Someone like 
Juan was likely to have little ambition in life. If he was still in El Salvador and had not 
yet emigrated to become part of the labor force of twelve million or so undocumented 
Latino immigrants in the United States, then he must be living on remittances as a sort of 
“welfare check”, spending his money on beer and video games, possibly even involved in 
a gang. 
But Catalina met someone with much different practices and character than she 
                                                          
1
 The FMLN, or Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí National 
Liberation Front) was the coalition of guerilla armies during the civil war and today is a Leftist political 
party in El Salvador. 
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had expected. Like many young people in the community, Juan was full of ambition and 
maturity. He spoke impeccable English and was a talented musician. He was highly 
involved in the community: he was a leader in the local youth group, he had just been 
hired as the ambulance driver at the community-based health clinic, and he played in a 
local band. He was contemplating pursuing a college education, but his deepest passion 
was for music. He hoped that the band, which was already traveling to San Salvador for 
gigs, would keep moving up.  
Despite the steady stream of emigrants that had been leaving Guarjila for the 
United States throughout the 1990s and well into the first decade of the 2000s, and 
despite the trajectory of his own family, Juan was working to make a future possible for 
himself in El Salvador. This was a personal and political struggle shared by many of his 
generation in Guarjila, whose drive to stay in El Salvador represented a remarkable turn 
away from the wave of older siblings and relatives who just a few years earlier had gone 
to the United States because they did not see any viable options for a dignified future in 
El Salvador. 
Catalina was impressed by Juan’s engagement with the community and his will to 
make staying and building a future in El Salvador possible. Inspired, she painted a piece 
that depicted the colorful mix of images and objects in his house that reflected the 
entanglement of both transnational and more local, rooted identities that mattered to him. 
On the walls hung posters of iconic American musicians and his favorite soccer teams, 
along with local artisan wood crafting typical of the region. There were pictures of his 
family living afar, as well as of Archbishop Romero, who was martyred for speaking out 
against military repression during the civil war, and Father Jon Cortina, who was a key 
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figure in Guarjila’s local history of community organizing during and after the war. His 
drum set sat in the corner. Juan’s band mixed lyrics with a “revolutionary” edge to the 
sounds of modern punk and ska. Above his bed, amid the graffiti he had painted all over 
the wall, were the lyrics of a song by one of his favorite American pop singers, Avril 
Lavigne: “I’m not stupid.” 
Figure 1: I'm Not Stupid. 
Art by Catalina del Cid, San Salvador, 2011 
 
Juan’s struggle to stay in El Salvador is remarkable, given that nearly three 
million Salvadorans have emigrated from El Salvador, which itself has a population of 
just over six million.
2
 The vast majority of its migrants reside in the United States, 
representing the third largest Latino immigrant group there. Hundreds of thousands of 
                                                          
1  The U.S. Census most recently (2008) estimates that 1.5 million Salvadorans live in the United States, 
now ranking them as the third largest among Latino immigrant groups and fourth largest among all U.S. 
Latino groups (to include Puerto Ricans). However, this figure is disputed by the Salvadoran government’s 
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Relations), which suggests that U.S. Census 
figures are undercounted and estimates that Salvadoran-born immigrants in the United States number 
around 2.5 million.
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Salvadorans fled the devastating U.S.-supported counter-insurgency war that ravaged the 
country for twelve years and left more than 75,000 Salvadorans dead. After the war, a 
new stream of migrants followed their forerunners as conditions of inequality and 
marginalization deepened for many Salvadorans as the state pushed ahead with 
aggressive neoliberal reforms. Recognizing their economic value, the Salvadoran state 
has worked to harness migrants’ remittances, putting them at the heart of its neoliberal 
development strategies, through political and economic policies and through a discourse 
that frames migrants as key players in constructing a better future for El Salvador. 
Figure 2: Map of El Salvador with inset of northeast Chalatenango 
Courtesy of Smith-Nonini (2010). Map drawn by Roque A. Nonini 
 
6 
In communities like Guarjila, migration became a way of life during the postwar 
period, (re)shaping subjectivities, practices, community dynamics, and landscapes. In 
particular, for Guarjila and other communities in the eastern region of Chalatenango 
department (a department in El Salvador is like a state or province), community members 
were concerned about the extent to which the community’s emigration and new flood of 
remittances constituted an abandonment not only of a place that they had worked hard to 
build as resettled refugees, but of the history of revolutionary struggle, collective action, 
and community organizing that contributed to a valued sense of community and regional 
identity.  
This is understandable given that communities in a region once characterized by 
utopian visions and a legacy of collective action must now navigate the exclusionary 
effects of state-sponsored neoliberal reforms and a new set of neoliberal duties and 
responsibilities that come from actors demanding “participation” in local development. 
Many scholars have emphasized how in El Salvador and in other areas that were formerly 
sites of revolutionary activity, hopes for social change and a collective spirit are 
dismissed as people embrace individualism, driven by capitalism and disillusioned with 
their persistent conditions of marginalization in a new moment of neoliberal peace 
(Nygren 2003; Silber 2004; Kowalkchuk 2004; McElhinny 2004). Anthropologist Irina 
Silber refers to the war and displacement that characterized the lives of those in the 
former revolutionary region of Chalatenango as “entangled aftermaths,” suggesting that 
“with the broken promises and bankrupt dreams of revolution and postwar, new 
constrained dreams emerge.” Constrained, disillusioned, and frustrated by the postwar 
condition, she highlights the thoughts of a local resident saying “the only option, the only 
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dream that awakens is to come to the United States.” (2010: 175). 
Indeed, in the aftermath of war and out of the failure of postwar development, 
migration has taken control of many people’s aspirations and has had fragmenting effects 
on community cohesion. Revolutionary imaginaries formed during times of war no 
longer make sense in a neoliberal present characterized by cross-border flows of people 
and capital. But are communities like these merely shaped by the effects of neoliberal 
globalization? Are dreams reduced to a singularity by the constraints and “last say” of 
capitalist forces? How do we explain the politics of hope that characterizes Juan’s vision, 
shared by many other young people in the community, for making a different kind of 
future? 
Theoretical Contributions 
This dissertation is about the remarkable power of community and the politics of 
possibility it opens. I argue that the work of making and re-making community is a 
meaningful political project in people’s lives, and especially for those navigating 
conditions not of their choosing, in this case the circumstances of displacement and 
migration. Produced through particular practices and logics, communities get redefined in 
different contexts and reconstituted in dynamic ways across borders. For people of 
Guarjila and elsewhere in eastern Chalatenango, who now reside in the United States and 
in El Salvador, community-making continues to be a resource and an important source of 
meaning and strength, an enduring political project that goes deeper than the 
revolutionary struggle for which the region has been known. Rooted in place and a 
history of collective struggle, the community-making work of Chalatecos (people of 
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Chalatenango), which is tied to mobility, place, and cross-border networks, entails 
practices and logics that make way for other possibilities that go beyond capitalist and 
developmentalist frameworks for understanding migration and transnational processes, 
for conceptualizing and practicing community, and for making the future. 
Communities have long been at the heart of anthropological debates and analysis. 
Conventionally, anthropology treated communities, places, and cultures as though they 
were fixed, bounded units of analysis. Reactions to this framework emerged through 
anthropology’s gravitation toward post-structural approaches and discourses of 
globalization, which began to theorize cultures and peoples in less essentialist ways. By 
the 1990s, anthropologists began to emphasize the fluidity, hybridity, and unboundedness 
of places and communities, and started using such terms as “global ethnoscapes” and 
“deterritorialization” (Appadurai 1991; Gupta & Ferguson 1992). Along this vein, initial 
theories that pointed to international migration’s transnational characteristics stressed the 
hybrid and unbounded nature of communities that existed in a “transnational social 
field,” largely untethered from any particular territorial place (Basch et al. 1994; Kearney 
1995). 
The surge in theories of globalization drew reactions from those concerned that 
“place” was largely erased in these debates. In their view, these debates were 
asymmetrical, and a renewed attention to place was called for, in part because place often 
works as an important site of politics as people encounter and even defend places against 
new forms of globalization (Prazniak & Dirlik 2001; Escobar 2001; Harcourt & Escobar 
2005). A complex task is to discover how places that have been transformed through 
migrations and cross-border flows, which now might be thought of in part as 
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“transnational communities,” can also be the site of the “politics of place” (Harcourt & 
Escobar 2005).  We know that communities-in-place have used grassroots resistance to 
defy the displacement forced by unwelcome development initiatives (see Oliver-Smith 
2010). But rural communities like Guarjila, and, in a parallel way, the national 
community of Salvadorans as a whole, which are divided between place of origin and the 
diaspora, face other sorts of dilemmas as they navigate the shifting conditions of 
globalization both in and out of place. Their mobility and potential for social movement 
and political organizing is constrained by state restrictions on migration. This dissertation 
explores the complex ways in which those of Guarjila have worked to resist migration in 
order to defend a sense of community at the same time that they have also engaged with 
international mobility to make possible the meaningful work of building and 
reconstituting community in place and across borders. 
This dissertation explores this work of community-making in a context of 
international migration, and it looks at the political implications of this work.  Following 
the line of thinking in geographer Doreen Massey’s (1994, 2005) conceptualization of 
“place”, it is clear that communities (whether physically located in a certain place, or 
stretched across borders, or both) are also made in practice, relationally constructed, and 
produced out of contingencies. They are always a work-in-progress, changing, and 
interpreted and experienced differently according to diverse subjectivities. Communities 
may be unbounded and “imagined” (Anderson 1991), but they are also real, meaningful, 
and political in people’s lives. 
My research focuses on the practices and logics of making, or building, 
community and collectivity. Through this lens, we can see how the work of making 
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community endures, even as it is adapted to new contexts and changing conditions. The 
people of northern El Salvador that are the focus of this research have a long history of 
collective action, community organizing, networking, and alliance-building. Throughout 
this historical trajectory, in order to navigate harsh conditions of marginalization, war, 
and displacement, they have developed and depended on what can be conceptualized as 
communal systems, logics, and practices (Patzi Paco 2004; Zibechi 2010). For those of 
this region who fled to refugee camps in Honduras during the civil war and later resettled 
in rural communities eastern Chalatenango, communal systems, logics, and practices 
conditioned the work of community-making as refugees and later as repatriated settlers. 
In the community-building work and migration that characterize the postwar context, 
communal logics and practices continued to be important, even as they adapted to new 
contexts, involved mobility and stretched across borders.  
A core assumption in my work is that the practice and logic of community-
building is political. “Communalizing,” as Zibechi (2010) puts it, has an emancipatory 
potential. It is work that challenges, destabilizes, and works around existing practices and 
logics that are universalizing, rationalizing, and individualizing, which includes, by 
extension, liberalism and neoliberalism, capitalism and globalization (Gutiérrez Aguilar 
2011; Zibechi 2010; Patzi Paco 2004).
3
 This approach to community-building does not 
                                                          
3
 I agree with Castree (2010) that although “neoliberalism” is a varied term with a range of meanings (like 
the term “globalization,” which I also employ throughout the text), it can be generally understood as a 
policy discourse, a set of policy measures, and a philosophy, which are always being honed and 
rearticulated. I refer to these dimensions all together as a work-in-progress “project”. At its core, 
neoliberalism encompasses “a theory of political economic practices proposing that human well-being can 
best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework 
characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade” (Harvey 
2007). As with developmentalism, neoliberalism emerges from a Western framework and assumes a socio-
spatial imaginary in which global capitalism brings prosperity to all in a “flat world” of equal possibility 
(Sheppard and Leitner 2010). Although it has been advanced by powerful actors including governments, 
banks, multilaterals, and institutions tied to the Washington Consensus, this dissertation posits that 
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depend on reverting back to an older conception that views communities as fixed entities 
that are oppositional to globalization processes, or that “communalizing” can no longer 
function in capitalist contexts. Communities are profoundly heterogeneous, historical, 
and crossed through with power dynamics. As political work that is relational, the 
making of communities, collectivities, and communal systems is not a throwback to 
romanticism or essentialism. It is mobile, networked, shifting, subjective, and inclusive of 
a multiplicity of voices, visions, practices and logics that come, go, and are transformed. 
Thinking and positioning relationality and lo comunal politically “opens a space that 
responds to modern liberal, state, and capitalist forms of social organization” (Escobar 
2012).  
We can see the deeply political work of communal practice in a diversity of 
settings and operations. We can turn to the long-standing communal logics and practices 
in certain indigenous communities, but we can also look to more recent emergences in 
both urban and rural environments, and the activities of cross-border, networked 
collectives and communities that engage in practices of reciprocal support and care 
(Gutiérrez Aguilar 2011). As a political project that stands against a neoliberal, capitalist, 
or developmentalist ordering of things, community-making also engages the work of non-
capitalist, cooperative, and community economic practices (Gibson-Graham 2006). These 
                                                                                                                                                                             
neoliberalism represents a particular and contingent logic and set of practices (evident in policies), which 
are often contested in the community-making work driven by other sorts of logics and practices.  I 
sometimes employ the term “(neo-)liberalism” in this text to remind readers that the neoliberal project is 
tied to a logic of liberalism that prioritizes individual rights, rationalism, and capitalist activity in its 
commitment to “progress.” Throughout the text, I also emphasize that a “(neo-)liberal” or “neoliberalist” 
logic is closely tied to a “developmentalist” and “capitalist” logic, all of which have tended to be advocated 
in state-led discourse and policies in El Salvador as they have been elsewhere in Latin America and around 
the world. I rarely use the term “neoliberal globalization” as the globalizing aspect of neoliberalism is 
already implied. I use “globalization” to refer in a broader sense to globalizing processes in recent years 
generally linked to neoliberalism and global capitalism, including international migration and other 
transnational processes. 
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sites of politics are found in worker cooperatives, community gardens, social centers, and 
other projects that re-socialize economic relations and insert the collective into the fabric 
of everyday life. Working with networks of community members in place and across 
borders, the people of Guarjila reconstitute and refashion community in varying 
“everyday” ways. 
The political work of community-building is also rooted work, grounded in a 
place, shared experience, or sense of identity that drives political action, even as it is 
relational. For those from Guarjila, this work is tied to the territorial place of Guarjila 
itself, a place that they have been working hard to (re-)build from the ground up since its 
1987 repopulation, and to the long-range experience of collective struggle in the face of 
repression and marginalization. I suggest that migrants, who we should remember are 
always moving between real territorial places (Lawson & Silvey 1999), use community 
networks to take part in the active work of rooting. As geographers Diane Rocheleau and 
Robin Roth (2007) suggest, networks themselves are rooted; they do not “float free from 
territory.” I suggest that the concept of rooted community networks is a useful way to 
interpret how people continue to build community in rooted and networked ways, even 
across international borders.  
The cross-border practices and logics of building and rooting community, I 
suggest, help to make visible a different way of understanding and practicing migration 
and transnational processes than what appears according to the widely accepted 
developmentalist framework. Even as a later stream of research on transnational 
migration emphasized that we cannot ignore the extent to which the heavy hand of state 
sovereignty is a constraint on the potential for migrant cross-border agency (Baker-
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Cristales 2004; Guarnizo & Smith 1998; Heyman 1994; Ong 1999), those interested in 
development took a particular interest in earlier theories of transnational migration that 
emphasized the enduring attachments of migrants to their place of origin and the potential 
for cross-border (in this case, capitalist economic) practices. Motivated out of an interest 
in the potential for migrants’ remittances to contribute to development, a particular, 
celebratory version of “transnationalism” has been appropriated in a contemporary 
discourse of “migration and development” led by multilateral development agencies, 
lending institutions, governments, and scholars (Hermele 1997; Kapur 2004; Delgado 
Wise & Castles 2007).  
This developmentalist logic and political project on international migration was 
embraced by the Salvadoran state. As I suggest in Chapter 2, the understanding that 
migration and remittances would lead El Salvador on a path to progress and development 
not only fit the recent neoliberal project favored by the state, but it was tied to a much 
longer trajectory of modernist and colonialist practices and logics. According to the logic 
of modernity/coloniality (Quijano 1991; Mignolo 2000), the postwar nation-state project 
has sought to homogenize national identity and erase troubled histories as it looked 
toward “transnational” futures built on the promises of capitalism and modernity. I see 
emancipatory and decolonial potential in the work of visibilizing the excluded histories, 
identities, and experiences of social struggle that contribute to a valued sense of meaning 
and rootedness for Chalatecos and other marginalized and subjugated groups and 
communities. 
By recognizing how the developmentalist logics and practices of the state have 
been constructed in relation to events, actors, and processes over a long historical 
14 
trajectory (the rooted, communal logics and practices of Chalatecos were also constructed 
in a similar relational and historical way), we can see them in their particularity. Neither 
side holds more “expert” authority than the other. They are distinct, but not necessarily 
always in opposition. By acknowledging that they are each contingent, the door is opened 
for new kinds of potentialities. For people of Guarjila and others in Chalatenango, other 
imaginaries than undocumented emigration are made possible out of their own contingent 
understandings of what collective well-being means and what a better future should look 
like. As I describe in Chapter 6, at the current conjuncture of political, social, and 
economic change, a broader network of activists and political actors are also challenging 
the state-led developmentalist strategy in a direct and intentional way, by demanding an 
alternative framework to build other futures than one that favors the “expulsion” of its 
population in the name of progress. Their demands signal a widespread disillusionment 
and frustration with the failure of the two decades of neoliberal development that has 
been influential on state policies in El Salvador and elsewhere in Latin America. 
Toward other Possibilities 
The theoretical work of identifying what people are already doing to build a 
different kind of present and future entails what geographers Katherine Gibson and Julie 
Graham (J.K. Gibson-Graham 2006) have referred to as “a politics of economic 
possibility.” This approach guides the principal theoretical and analytical approach used 
in this dissertation. A politics of economic possibility calls upon us to go beyond the 
tendency of critical theory to privilege capitalism as the macro-context and structure that 
frames all hypotheses and conclusions about our social reality. Such a “capitalocentric” 
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lens, in focusing on the determinants of inequality, erases the political promise of 
economic and cultural diversity as capitalism is understood to be the prime mover and 
“last instance.”  In this way, theory constrains politics, as “alternatives” and the 
possibilities for changing the world are dismissed as naive and credible discussions of 
such are viewed as romantic or essentialist.  My research employs critical theory, an 
important tool for recognizing injustice, inequality, and unsustainability, to recognize the 
contingent and particular nature of capitalist, developmentalist, and modernist logics, 
practices, and projects. But this critique alone is insufficient. At the same time, following 
the lead of J.K. Gibson-Graham, my research demonstrates how alongside the critique 
there also exist diverse non-capitalist, non-individualist, collectivist, and communal 
logics, practices, and projects. Through this lens, I aim to challenge fundamental 
assumptions and open new political horizons. This work is connected to a similar kind of 
politics, a politics of hope. In Gibson-Graham’s words, “another world is not only 
possible, it already exists.”4 
 Another guiding approach of this project has been to visibilize geopolitical 
perspectives that are anchored in Latin America and to put them at the heart of my 
theoretical lens. On one hand, this is part of an effort to shift the geopolitics of knowledge 
away from the Eurocentrism of mainstream Western social theory. It fits into my 
commitment to a broader effort to move more marginalized world anthropologies from 
the periphery to the center of anthropological research coming from U.S. institutions and 
to integrate diverse perspectives that move anthropology in a trans-disciplinary direction. 
I draw from scholarship coming from the Andes, Mexico, Central America, and El 
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 To discuss their implications for my work, in addition to my reading of J.K. Gibson-Graham (2006), I 
borrow from Burke & Shear’s (2013) well-crafted interpretation and phrasing of how J.K. Gibson-
Graham’s theoretical lens can take us “beyond critique.” 
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Salvador. On the other hand, my use of a more balanced theoretical lens is unintentional. 
I found that the rich theoretical ground I encountered in Latin America itself simply 
resonated well with the social reality I was witnessing and trying to make sense of “in the 
field.” These were perspectives that are not always able to (or may not choose to) 
penetrate the borders of American academia: literature that is only available in Spanish 
language, hard copy files only found in libraries in El Salvador, projects that were 
executed without the privilege and “credibility” of prestigious funding awards, 
conversations with scholars and activists who could not get visas or could not afford to 
travel to expensive international conferences in enormous U.S. hotels. Part of the reason 
these perspectives were useful to my project is because they tend to broaden the scope of 
analytical possibility beyond critical theory, placing value on engaged scholarship and the 
emergent knowledges coming from social movements and communities themselves.
5
  
Contributions to Salvadoran Studies 
I understand such a geopolitical shift to be particularly important to studies of El 
Salvador for the creation of a politics of hope and possibility. Like elsewhere in the 
                                                          
5
 A note on the title of this dissertation. The decision to have a portion of the title in Spanish is in part 
motivated by this political commitment to shift the geopolitics of knowledge. It is more suited to a project 
that is anchored in perspectives coming from Latin America. Pragmatically, it may make this work easier 
for Spanish-speakers to find through the Internet once it is electronically published for on-line searching. 
Sueños Salvadoreños counters the assimilationist assumption that migrants have and follow “the American 
dream,” and it reminds us that there is a plurality of dreams. “Sueño salvadoreño” is an emergent term 
being used by activists and political actors in El Salvador to refer to the idea that collectively building 
dignified futures is an important political project so that Salvadorans can find alternative paths other than 
undocumented emigration. Also, I refer to “Other Futures” in the plural. I capitalize the “O” to stress that 
these “Other Futures” is an idea as a whole that can represent the diverse possibilities of future-building, 
and to remind readers that these Other Futures often are envisioned by and belong to groups and individuals 
whom anthropologists would classify as “the Other”: those who have experienced multiple forms of 
subjugation and marginalization. 
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South, El Salvador gets characterized by pervasive poverty and its status in what was 
long referred to as the Third World. But El Salvador in particular conjures images of 
notorious massacres, an atrocious war, and gang violence. Salvadorans have suffered and 
been traumatized from these (hi)stories of violence time and again, in layered and 
recursive ways.  As Moodie (2010) reveals in her carefully crafted ethnography of 
Salvadorans’ experiences of the often indistinguishable line between “political” and 
“common” crime and violence, many describe the postwar condition of violence as 
“worse than the war.” Perceptions and interpretations of the Salvadoran experience, 
including those internalized in the subjectivities of Salvadorans themselves, get linked 
not only to the everyday forms of marginalization experienced by Salvadorans in El 
Salvador and by its subalternized and illegalized migrants, but to the violence 
experienced by Salvadorans historically and in the present day. 
A recent wave of books published on El Salvador coming from American 
anthropology has made valuable contributions to our understanding of the postwar 
context in relation to such politically-charged questions as violence, migration and 
remittances, nation-state building, and reconstruction processes (Moodie 2010; Zilberg 
2011; Pedersen 2013; DeLugan 2012; Silber 2010). This emergent body of American 
anthropological literature, along with earlier works that help to deconstruct some of the 
state-led discourses and policies that engender emigration (Baker-Cristales 2004; Coutin 
2007), was important to informing the critical theoretical side of my analysis.
6
   
 El Salvador has long been, and continues to be, a site of remarkable community-
                                                          
6
 Additionally, among this recent body of anthropological literature on El Salvador is Smith-Nonini’s 
(2010) book on popular health and collective mobilization against health care privatization, which 
particularly contributed to my discussion of community-building in Chalatenango. 
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building. Throughout the country, there is an abundance of grassroots organizing 
initiatives, women’s groups and youth programs, cooperative work environments, 
community-based gardening and food production, collectivist forms of mobilization, and 
so forth. In any short visit to El Salvador, one can easily draw a powerful sense of hope 
and inspiration from the spirit of political possibility present in these types of collective 
projects. In putting renewed attention on the least studied nation-state in Latin America 
(Lauria-Santiago & Binford 2004), one that has been stigmatized by a global fixation on 
its violence, I hope to do more to make visible this spirit and the reality of hope and other 
possibilities that Salvadorans themselves are constantly constructing. The research I 
present in this dissertation has this goal in mind. 
 With its relatively small national territory and its indigenous presence hidden 
from view behind the experience of mestizaje, scholarship has also traditionally tended to 
treat El Salvador as a relatively homogeneous population mainly worthy of national-scale 
analysis. This approach has left from view more nuanced analyses of the regional 
experiences of particular groups (Lauria-Santiago & Binford 2004). With an elite class 
that educated their children in foreign universities, a critical Left in El Salvador has had 
free reign over much of the country’s scholarly production. Of El Salvador’s relatively 
little historical and anthropological works (the government did not invest in these 
programs until 2002), a good portion resonates with the Marxian perspective grounded in 
the 1980s revolutionary vision of the University of El Salvador, and so structural and 
materialist theories that use class as the primary category to analyze inequalities are 
prevalent.  
 In this project, I highlight the regional experience of resettled and “organized” 
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communities of eastern Chalatenango, with a focus on the community of Guarjila.  While 
the categorical terms I must use to identify them are of course imperfect (identities are 
always relational and shifting), they are intended to move beyond flatter conventional 
representations of a rather homogeneous national-scale population of “peasants” or “labor 
migrants,” which also happens to be how they tend to be understood in developmentalist-
centered thought.
7
  Even if we were to take these fixed and bounded categories for 
granted, the complexities of transnationalism and globalization force us to rethink 
conventional categories like the “peasantry” (Kearney 1996). The question of diversity is 
further complicated given El Salvador’s racialization of indigenous peoples and identities 
(Tilley 2005; Ronsbo 2004), which has largely removed various forms of diversity from 
national self-perception. Those from Chalatenango who are part of the story I tell here do 
not belong to a particular ethnic group nor is their experience a local one. However, as 
owners of their own (traveling) history, they open a window onto El Salvador’s rich, if 
masked, diversity. Similarly, learning of their experience also enriches our understanding 
of U.S. diversity, where the term “Latino immigrants” has come to be laden with 
homogenizing, assimilationist, and discriminatory ideas. 
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 The long history of mobility and changing contexts that characterize their experience sheds light on the 
always imperfect categorical terms we are forced to use to identify people in relation to others. I refer to 
those whose experience is the focus of this study as “campesinos” (sometimes as “peasants” when I am 
referring to the way they were categorized by others rather than how they tend to speak of themselves), 
“refugees”, “Chalatecos”, “Guarjileños,” “migrants”, among other categorical terms at different points 
throughout the text. Furthermore, my use of the terms “immigrant”, “emigrant” and “migrant” vary at 
points of the text. While I agree with De Genova (2005) that the term “im-migrant” reinforces 
assimilationist assumptions, I select “immigrant” at times to emphasize the way Salvadorans are 
categorized in relation to other Latinos in the United States and U.S. immigration policy. I may use 
“emigrant” at times to emphasize the migrant-sending capacities and outflow intentionally advocated by the 
state or the general trend that many of El Salvador’s migrants will not return. I use “migrants” the most 
frequently as many of those who are the subject of discussion do and will travel back and forth and around. 
But I use the term cautiously so to not overemphasize migrant agency and underplay the hardships and 
constraints that Salvadorans face. 
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 This attention to El Salvador’s diversity is also important in the continued 
struggle to broaden knowledge of the presence of communal logics and practices in non-
indigenous and even in trans-border settings. Much of the emergent research that 
proposes a communal systems framework has come out of analysis of the practices and 
logics of indigenous groups in the Andes (Patzi Paco 2004; Zibechi 2010), but there is a 
growing interest in using the framework to analyze a range of other settings, including in 
non-indigenous contexts. Scholars working in Mexico have identified how trans-border 
communities knitted together by a shared sense of ethnic or indigenous identity have 
maintained communitarian practices and mobilized for collective interests (Kearney 
2000; Stephen 2007; Fox & Rivera-Salgado 2004). Through a lens that focuses on El 
Salvador’s regional diversity, we can see how communal logics and practices work 
across borders and can be rooted in a shorter-range history and attachment to place-based 
identities. 
In “the Field” 
I have had a long-range and sustained engagement with the Chalatecos who 
collaborated to make this research possible, generously welcoming me to their 
communities, opening their homes, offering me warm meals, and engaging in rich 
conversation. I first went to El Salvador in 1999 as an undergraduate student through an 
international community-based learning program to spend the summer in Guarjila 
working with a local youth group. This trip initially sparked my interest in this project 
and in anthropology as a whole. I decided to return on two more occasions the following 
year for my first shot at an ethnographic research project. It was for a Latin American 
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studies thesis paper about the international emigration of young people from the 
community, which was an entry point into a much broader range of questions that have 
developed since then. Between 2001 and 2003, I returned to Guarjila to continue to work 
with young people and to teach at the high school that served Guarjila and the 
neighboring community of Los Ranchos. This school had just seen its first graduating 
class the year before. I returned each year for visits between 2003 and 2005. I conducted 
preliminary dissertation research in El Salvador in the summers of 2006 and 2007, and 
returned to El Salvador for full-time dissertation research from October 2008 to June 
2011.  
By 2003, I began visiting those young people and their families whom I had come 
to know quite well, but by that point they were in new homes in the United States. I have 
regularly visited and kept in touch with a number of families and individuals since then 
who reside in Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, and elsewhere, and I spent extended 
periods of time in these areas for several months in 2009 and in 2011 for ethnographic 
research to inform this dissertation. I therefore reached the field of Latino studies by first 
starting in Latin America and following the trajectories of migrants traveling north 
(through their life stories and in a literal sense, since on several occasions I also worked 
and slept in migrant shelters in Mexico and hiked migrant trails in the Sonoran desert). 
The path I took never let me forget that migrants’ struggles in the United States are also 
grounded in real places in Latin America.  
 My dissertation fieldwork drew from the networks and relationships I cultivated 
in El Salvador and in the United States, and my analysis builds on the perspectives and 
ideas that came out of this long-range experience. I am fortunate to have earned the 
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rapport and trust of the communities with which I work. I therefore chose to make the 
experience of the resettled community of Guarjila the focus of my dissertation, knowing 
that in many ways it is representative of the experience of other communities in the 
region (though in other ways it is very unique).  Several communities in the region, 
including Guarjila, were repopulated by refugees toward the end of the civil war, most of 
who had been living in camps in Honduras for several years. These communities 
therefore share a similar regional experience and history, and they are highly networked 
through kin and politics, as it is rare to find an individual or family that is originally from 
the community where they resettled.  
My investigation was therefore in some ways was a “classic” community-based 
ethnography, but it was also necessarily a networked ethnography, since community 
members were connected to others in neighboring communities and in the United States. 
During ethnographic immersion in Guarjila, I attended a range of community events and 
activities, from general assembly meetings to soccer games to fiestas. I interviewed and 
regularly conversed with community leaders, organizers, elders, as well as returned and 
deported migrants and young people who had contemplated migration.  
I also regularly engaged with a set of several extended families that were 
stretched between the United States and El Salvador, with whom I have developed a 
close rapport. Through regular conversation, social events, and visits to their homes in 
both countries, I was able to closely follow the practices and trajectories of individuals 
and collectives that traveled along and worked with family networks, community 
networks, and the blurring of the two (what we could refer to as family-community 
networks, or those with membership that includes individuals who have close 
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community-based relationships and may or may not be connected through blood 
relations). 
Through this latter dimension of my research, I often found myself playing the 
role of an international ambassador or liaison of sorts. I carried gifts, news, and hugs 
between family and community members who did not have the privilege of holding a 
U.S. passport. I could be spotted in videos taken in El Salvador that only I had the 
privilege of later seeing in the United States, or vice versa. As ethnographer and friend of 
my “collaborators”, I am also privileged to be able to visit the micro-spaces in the United 
States in which the place of Guarjila is reproduced; I don’t have to travel far to get to 
their communities on the East Coast. I got to enjoy community company at weekend 
barbecues and play with children who grandparents may not ever get to meet. 
The wave of young migrants that I got to know most closely left El Salvador 
between 1999 and the mid-2000s. By the mid to late 2000s, emigration from Guarjila had 
tapered off. The immigration status of this wave of migrants is important to understand, 
as this research concentrates on their particular experience, which is significantly 
conditioned by their legal status. Those who arrived to the United States in the 1990s and 
up to 2001 were generally granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS). TPS is a legal 
immigration status that was granted to Salvadorans on the pretext that migrants during 
this period were leaving unstable conditions produced by the earthquake that shook El 
Salvador in January 2001, by Hurricane Mitch in 1998, and prior to that, by the civil war 
(it was first offered to Salvadorans in 1991). TPS allows migrants a limited set of rights 
(a driver’s license, a work permit, a Social Security number, travel to El Salvador with 
special permission, among others). It has an 18-month term before expiration, but so far it 
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has continued to be renewed by the U.S. government for those who arrived at the time it 
was initially offered and have applied for renewal.
8
 Those migrants who arrived to the 
United States after 2001 were generally not eligible for TPS or any other legal status, 
meaning that the vast majority of them navigate conditions of illegality.
9
 By contrast, 
those from an earlier wave of migrants, who arrived during the war, are much more likely 
to have temporary or permanent residency, and in some cases U.S. citizenship, due to a 
number of legislative initiatives and concessions during the 1980s. With the exception of 
public figures, I use pseudonyms instead of actual names to protect the identities of those 
whose stories and words are presented here. 
The other side of my networked fieldwork entailed engagement with 
organizations working with migrants and their communities, development specialists, 
government officials, and others researching migration. This was mainly based in San 
Salvador, where I attended meetings, presentations, forums, and conferences, but it also 
led me to a handful of forums and meetings in Washington DC, Mexico City, and Los 
Angeles. I reviewed relevant literature coming from these actors, and I conducted 
interviews with contacts that continued to unfold through these engagements. Through 
this part of the ethnography, I examined the way migration and its relationship to 
development is understood and how these understandings inform various projects led by 
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 About 250,000 Salvadorans in the United States are holders of TPS. They must regularly apply for 
renewal of this status. 
9
 Throughout the text, I avoid referring to those who were not granted legal immigration paperwork as 
“illegal” immigrants due to the unnecessary stigma of blame it conjures. I do, however, remind readers that 
“illegality” characterizes the conditions they navigate as undocumented migrants. I also sometimes refer to 
them as “illegalized” migrants to remind readers that it is a partial and imbalanced U.S. immigration system 
that criminalizes and excludes certain populations by denying them the possibility of legal immigration 
paperwork. 
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state and non-state actors. I was also an active participant in the conversations and 
debates on the table at these events. In San Salvador, I co-organized a working group on 
Salvadoran migration studies, which included Salvadoran and international scholars, 
NGO practitioners, a photographer, and an artist. I therefore treated what anthropologists 
refer to as “the field” as an opportunity to productively engage with various kinds of 
practitioners and other scholars.  
Road Map 
 The following chapter of the dissertation traces the long historical trajectory in El 
Salvador from which the state’s developmentalist politics and discourse on migration and 
transnationalism emerged. It discusses how the historical trajectory of oligarchical rule 
and imperialist interventions are tied to its political and economic formations, which 
more recently favor neoliberalism, expelling migrants, and harnessing remittances for 
development. The postwar nation-state project, following this longer 
modernist/colonialist logic and trajectory, has excluded and uprooted particular histories 
and populations while emphasizing that its version of “transnationalism” and a nation of 
heroized migrants are a path to progress. Through these events and formations, and 
through its engagement with multilateral development agencies, the state has more 
recently embraced a discourse of “migration and development” that operates according to 
a neoliberal, capitalist, universalist, and individualist logic. This chapter therefore serves 
a dual purpose: it offers national and transnational history and context that shape the 
conditions that people of Chalatenango must navigate, and it also discusses the particular 
developmentalist logic and project of migration and transnationalism with which the state 
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operates, which, as I will suggest, stand apart from the communal and rooted logics and 
practices employed by people of Chalatenango communities. 
 The third chapter discusses the complex history out of which collectivism and 
communal logics and practices have developed among Chalatecos. It explores how these 
logics and practices have been strategically and tactically used to navigate conditions of 
marginalization, displacement, and military repression in varying contexts and situations. 
It stresses that mobility and networks have long been linked to this collectivist and 
community-making work. The chapter first discusses the collective action that took form 
through alliance-building and rural organizing since the early twentieth century. 
Culminating in the tensions in the late 1970s out of which the civil war unfolded, 
Chalatecos were forced to flee, since the region was at the heart of the civil war. The 
chapter analyzes how the organized flights from the region, the years of displacement in 
Honduran refugee camps, and the organizing of a massive repatriation back to El 
Salvador all entailed the development of collectivist and communal work. The last part of 
the chapter discusses the experience of those who resettled in the community of Guarjila 
in 1987. It explores the initial community-making work that began and the use of 
communal systems that were needed for survival amid five more years of civil war. 
 Chapter 4 explores the changes and dilemmas that people of Guarjila confront 
during the postwar period, which began with the 1992 Peace Accords. Feeling the effects 
of neoliberal globalization in the aftermath of war, migration to the United States from 
the community began to pick up and remittances flowed into the community. This 
chapter examines the complex way that people understand and practice the work of 
building a meaningful, rooted community-in-place, but in a context of extensive 
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international migration. Here I draw on a more complex conceptualization of community-
making to emphasize that this work, and the meanings associated with it, are relational, 
ever-changing, diversely understood and practiced, and can be tied to mobility and cross-
border networks. Nonetheless, I suggest that this work is given meaning in large part 
through a sense of rootedness in both the territorial place of Guarjila and in a shared 
history of collective struggle. By conceptualizing community-building as rooted even as 
it is changing, mobile, and relational, this chapter suggests that Guarjila’s international 
migration contributes to this work at the same time that it has fragmenting and divisive 
consequences, which, as we will see, becomes a politically charged concern as they 
confront new postwar dilemmas. 
 Chapter 5 explores the way community is reconstituted across international 
borders in communal, rooted, and networked ways. Based on logics and practices that 
come out of its longer history of collectivism and community-building, people turn to the 
work of reconstituting and rooting community as a source of strength and as an important 
resource in their lives as they navigate conditions not of their own choosing. This chapter 
first highlights the trajectories and logics of migrants that have voluntarily chosen to give 
up stable jobs in the United States to return to Guarjila, emphasizing the value they place 
on communal resources and a sense of rootedness in community. The discussion then 
turns to various types of non-capitalist practices that often involve migrants’ remittances, 
which work to communally take care of others, contribute to the meaningful work of 
rooting community in place, and work toward the individual and collective project of 
building an option to not migrate for a younger generation in Guarjila. Throughout the 
chapter, I juxtapose ethnographic detail of Guarjila’s experience against the assumptions 
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and scenarios coming from San Salvador-based development specialists to suggest that 
the sorts of communal practices and logics at work destabilize various mainstream 
assumptions about migration and development. 
 Chapter 6 returns to a discussion of El Salvador as a whole in an analysis of the 
way networks of activists are directly challenging the state’s developmentalist framework 
on migration, motivated in response to the shifting conditions of undocumented migration 
that Salvadorans (as reflected in the experience of Chalatecos) are facing, and motivated 
by a moment of leftward political change. Among other challenges that would modify the 
government’s neoliberal character, they are demanding that new sorts of policies and 
programs be implemented that would work toward “an option to not migrate” for status 
quo Salvadorans. As a struggle that is emerging out of the current conjuncture, these 
activists are dismissing developmentalist logics and calling for the revaluation of the lives 
of migrants and the well-being of their communities. 
 The conclusion chapter first briefly reviews some of the primary theoretical 
implications of this dissertation. It then turns to a discussion of the significance of these 
implications and the potentiality for other kinds of futures as the social and political 
conditions of international migration between the United States and El Salvador, and 
elsewhere, continue to change.  
 
  
CHAPTER 2 
Destierro 
A familiar ritual was unfolding. Inside one of the air-conditioned banquet rooms 
of the Radisson Plaza Hotel located next to an under-construction high-rise called the 
Torre Futura in San Salvador’s business district, people watched Power Point 
presentations, debated at round table sessions, and mingled at coffee breaks in black suits 
and skirts. Since I had arrived in El Salvador six months earlier, I had already been 
invited to attend several similar events involving development specialists, government 
officials, diplomats, and non-governmental organizations working with migrants and 
their communities. This time it was the April 2009 session of the Regional Conference on 
Migration, which was dedicated to a workshop on Temporary Migrant Worker Programs, 
sponsored by the governments of El Salvador and Canada and several international 
organizations.  This meeting had particularly formal proceedings, with government 
representatives from several Central American and Caribbean countries seated in a semi-
circle like a United Nations meeting. Just a few representatives from non-governmental 
organizations that worked with migrants and their communities were invited. They were 
seated on one side of the room, looking at the backs of suit coats; it was an arrangement 
that pushed them to the periphery of the conversation. Discussions ensued around the 
merits, consequences, best practices, policies, and models of potential temporary migrant 
worker programs. Those on the periphery tended to express a more critical view, while 
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those in the center circle tended to emphasize the positive outcomes of temporary worker 
programs and advocated for the expansion of programs with placements in Canada. The 
keynote speaker, hailing from the Philippines, concluded the event with a Power Point 
loaded with bar graphs, statistics, and bullet points that were evidence of the “progress” 
the Philippines had made in building state-sanctioned migrant worker exportation 
programs. After he boasted that more than 14 billion dollars of his country’s annual 
revenue came from the remittances of migrant laborers sent to work abroad, his 
presentation was received with a roaring applause.  
 The Salvadoran state has embraced the idea that sending migrants to work abroad 
and harnessing their remittances is good for development and progress. This logic did not 
develop in a vacuum. Rather, it has been worked out over a long history, in relation to 
various events, actors, and processes coming from within El Salvador and from the 
outside. This chapter offers history, background, and context on El Salvador’s political, 
economic, and social conditions. These are the conditions that have engendered migration 
and have led to a particular state-led political project and discourse that frame migration 
and remittances as a key dimension of economic and social development. With its 
relatively small national territory and its concentration of power and wealth yet to be 
untethered from its oligarchical past, El Salvador has long been a place of 
experimentation, and it has come to exemplify an extreme case of the conditions that 
arise out of a development strategy dependent on migration and remittances in a free 
market economy. 
I argue that the development of this political project and discourse is tied to a long-
range experience and logic of modernity/coloniality (Quijano 1991; Mignolo 2000). 
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According to this logic, migrants and their communities are made into a “development 
category” (Escobar 1985, 1995; Shrestha 1995), understood as belonging to a sea of 
people of the “Global South”. Salvadorans are understood as belonging to a country that 
is in need of development and that demographers have long labeled “overpopulated” 
(Durham 1979). In Foucauldian terms, their subjectivities are able to be governed and 
their “docile bodies” can be moved and employed in favor of development, “progress”, 
and modernity.  
First, I will discuss El Salvador’s political and economic developments over a long 
history, which has led the state to look favorably on neoliberal economics. This 
discussion centers on how El Salvador’s recent neoliberal formations are linked to a 
legacy of oligarchical governance, inequality, and imperial interventions and forces. I 
then highlight how, as emigration grew during the war and postwar period, migrants’ 
remittances were quickly recognized and viewed as beneficial to the neoliberal economic 
development project. New political practices were developed to support the stability of 
migrants abroad, and the state began to strategically employ a discourse that framed 
migrants as key heroic and sacrificial actors for El Salvador’s progress and development. 
Second, I discuss the question of national identity and debates over a sense of 
rootedness in El Salvador. The project of “expelling” migrants and harnessing 
remittances is part of a longer history of exclusion and erasure. The postwar nation-state 
building project has sought to promote universalist values, migration, and a 
transnationalist identity in order to create a more “modern” and “progressive” El 
Salvador. In so doing, it has continued to bury and keep silent the troubled histories that 
are meaningful to diverse, excluded populations. 
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Finally, this chapter looks at how these processes are connected to the more recent 
move of the state to embrace a discourse of “migration and development” that has global 
reach and is advocated mainly by multilateral development agencies. Often couched in 
terms of “human development”, this discourse, along with the political projects that 
accompany it, is guided by a logic that assumes a particular form of development driven 
by capitalist activity through transnational processes. 
The Coffee Republic 
According to a popular Salvadoran narrative, fourteen families of the Creole 
economic elite are said to have been the primary holders of wealth, land, and power since 
the colonial period. If you ask Salvadorans today who they were, the slew of names you 
will receive will vary, but they tend to include the surnames of a number of former 
presidents and the country’s wealthiest business owners (whose names are tied to major 
real estate developers, department stores, notable former coffee exporters, and so forth). 
The legendary fourteen families is symbolic (there is one for each of the country’s 14 
departments, like states) but it reflects a popularly-held belief and the reality that many 
families who are understood to belong to what Salvadorans refer to as the élite, like 
elsewhere in Latin America, trace their lineage to those who arrived during the colonial 
period between the sixteenth century and Central America’s independence in 1821.  
Several families made their fortunes from coffee production at the end of the 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Sugar, indigo, and coffee production had 
been the most important crops for colonial estate owners, but by the 1880s, coffee 
became the crop of choice when its market suddenly began to boom.  As fortunes grew, 
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those who were able to work their way into a select group of leading coffee exporters by 
the 1920s solidified into an economic and political elite that would maintain their hold on 
state power throughout the twentieth century (Lindo-Fuentes et al. 2007). 
Under their tight control, the state’s formations and practices shifted significantly. 
El Salvador had previously been viewed as one of the more “progressive” of the small 
Latin American republics, mainly for its state reforms that stabilized its economy through 
diversification, increased taxes, modernized infrastructure, and a lack of military 
presence in local governance. By the 1920s, these experimental reforms ended as an 
agro-financial oligarchy took control of banking and put policies in place that engendered 
repressive labor conditions. Already by the 1880s, the state had privatized communal 
ejido lands, which dispossessed indigenous campesinos from their land and source of 
livelihood, turning them into wage-earning seasonal agricultural laborers. As the agro-
financial elite opened the country to foreign investment and disinvested in El Salvador by 
putting their holdings in foreign banks, new monetary flows made way for corruption. 
Concentrated control over wealth and power in El Salvador’s relatively small territory 
was further facilitated as the government’s ties to particular families tightened; between 
1913 and 1927, for example, the presidency was held by three members of one extended 
family (Gould & Lauria-Santiago 2008).
10
 As I will discuss later, the élite’s hegemony 
was certainly met with waves of contestation, including the 1932 uprising of indigenous 
campesinos, and decades of rural organizing through the 1970s that actually benefited 
from state-led efforts to pacify resistance through rural reforms during this period. 
However, the upper crust of the grower and export élite class were able to insulate 
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 The presidency was held three times by members of the Melendez-Quiñonez family dynasty.   
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themselves from the realities of “ordinary” people and lead a transnational and 
cosmopolitan lifestyle. They mingled behind the walls of well-guarded country clubs, 
lived in luxurious San Salvador homes and country estates, sent their children to private 
schools, and intermarried. They vacationed and did business abroad, sent their children to 
be educated in Europe, played international music at their parties, and aided 
modernization projects in El Salvador at least to the extent that these would directly 
affect their quality of life. They attributed their acquisition of wealth and their role in 
transforming El Salvador into “productive” territory to their own hard work and 
intelligence (Gould & Lauria-Santiago 2008). 
While El Salvador’s national economy diversified to some extent throughout the 
middle of the twentieth century, the vast majority of its foreign exchange revenue still 
came from agricultural exports up until the 1970s. From the 1950s through the 1970s, 
major exports also included cotton, shrimp, and sugar. There was also a rapid 
industrialization of consumer goods, through import substitution and exports to the 
Central American Common Market. A small middle class began to emerge, but the coffee 
and agro-financial élite maintained its position at the top of the class strata. The top tier 
had become a cohesive and well-solidified group. By 1930, an estimated 1,000 of about 
300,000 total families in El Salvador, much less than 1% of the population, had 
established their status by sharing a closely knit web of business, political, and kinship 
ties (Gould & Lauria-Santiago 2008).  Of the 63 wealthiest families at the end of the 
twentieth century, only four of them had made their fortune after the 1950s (Colindres 
1977). Salvadoran economists commonly referred to El Salvador’s economy as an 
“oligarchical capitalism” (Arene 2011). 
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Introducing Neoliberalism 
By the end of the 1970s, El Salvador’s economy began to change in character as 
civil war engulfed the country and as neoliberal political, economic, and ideological 
apparatuses took hold. By 1982, the right-wing Alianza Republicana Nacionalista 
(Nationalist Republican Alliance, or ARENA) was formed and had taken control of 
parliamentary elections in El Salvador. Linked to El Salvador’s notorious “death squads”, 
the party was founded in 1981 at the onset of the civil war, just after the Frente 
Farabundo Marti para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí National Liberation 
Front, or FMLN) was formed among five guerrilla organizations in 1980. ARENA’s 
membership drew from the most conservative of the oligarchical élite, with an ideology 
that was anti-communist and built on the ideals of nationalism, capitalism, and 
individualism. According to its ideological statement, “the individual is recognized as the 
fundamental base of the nation”.11  
Given the party’s ideology, it is not surprising that by 1989, when ARENA again 
held the presidency, the Salvadoran government embraced neoliberalism.
12
 Similar to 
many other Latin American countries at the time, the Salvadoran government, with 
incentives and pressures from the Washington Consensus, sought to encourage foreign 
investment, reduce barriers on international trade, and privatize what had been national 
goods and services. Beginning in 1989, structural adjustments aimed to reduce 
government and gain access to international loans on improved terms.  Policy changes 
included pro-corporate tax codes, the sale of national goods and services to private 
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 The party held the presidency from 1982-1984, and then the more moderate Christian Democratic Party 
held the presidency from 1984-1989. ARENA again secured the presidency from 1989 to 2009. 
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investment, import duty reductions, and intellectual property protections. In a little more 
than a decade, the implementation of neoliberal reforms of the 1990s had transformed El 
Salvador into one of Latin America’s most open market economies. 
The imperialist hand of the United States, of course, played an enormous role in 
El Salvador’s shift toward a free market economy. Aside from the forces of structural 
adjustment coming from the Washington Consensus, the counter-insurgency operations 
of the devastating 12-year civil war that left at least 75,0000 dead were carried out by a 
military that was funded, trained, and equipped by the United States. El Salvador-U.S. 
political and economic connections became intimately tethered throughout the 1980s, a 
product of the Cold War-inspired faith that market democracy would help bring political 
and economic stability and quell communist insurrection. Essentially, the Salvadoran 
government by then had been compromised by the United States in a type of neo-colonial 
relationship. 
A handful of extra-governmental organizations were founded during the 1980s 
and 1990s that facilitated the government’s neoliberal agenda. Their leadership came 
mainly from wealthy national business owners with famous last names, some of whom 
moved in and out of formal government positions. These included the Fundación 
Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social (Salvadoran Foundation for 
Economic and Social Development, or FUSADES), a think tank that originally 
contracted one of Chile’s “Chicago Boys” to orient its mission, the Asociación Nacional 
de la Empresa Privada (Association of Private Enterprise), and the Agencia de 
Promoción de Exportaciones e Inversiones de El Salvador (Export and Investment 
Promotion Agency of El Salvador, or PROESA). Their offices are concentrated in a 
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wealthy neighborhood of San Salvador near the U.S. Embassy (now one of the largest 
embassies in the world, it was reconstructed out of anti-communist preoccupations after 
the 1986 earthquake to have a Taj Mahal-like presence in San Salvador). Advertising El 
Salvador’s free trade zones and “hard working” labor force to potential foreign investors, 
publicity from PROESA in 2000 boasted that foreigners could set up a business in El 
Salvador “in two hours.” 
Liberalizing trade benefited foreign corporations, but it also benefited El 
Salvador’s wealthiest.  The government sold off formerly nationalized services 
(telecommunications, electricity, and so forth) to foreign companies and to wealthy 
nationals.  Free trade was part of a regional globalization strategy to economically 
integrate Central American countries, facilitated by the signing of the United States-
Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) in 2004.  In 
a 2004 special monograph issue of Estudios Centroamericanos, Salvadoran economist 
Alexander Segovia carefully charts the strategic alliances forged by no more than 28 
principal “powerful economic groups” in Central America that now operate in such 
sectors as banking, construction, commerce, transportation, tourism, agro-business, and 
real estate. He makes the familial concentration of wealth very clear, offering the well-
known family names linked to the ownership of each group. 
Sending Emigrants, Harnessing Remittances 
The intense wave of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s to 2000s contributed to El 
Salvador’s dramatic economic shift away from agricultural exports toward industry, 
construction, financial services, communications, and other sectors, but also key to this 
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transformation was the rise in migrants’ remittances since the 1980s. In 1975, more than 
80 percent of exports were from the agricultural sector. By 2005, more than 70 percent of 
foreign exchange came from remittances. Migrants’ remittances have become the 
mainstay of El Salvador’s national economy ever since emigration grew in the postwar 
period, following the hundreds of thousands of migrants that were displaced during the 
more than a decade-long civil war. The Salvadoran government now estimates that nearly 
three million people live outside of the country, with about nine of every ten émigrés 
living in the United States. The country’s Central Bank (an entity that no longer regulates 
interest rates or a national currency, since the country uses U.S. dollars, but is now 
responsible for carefully tracking international money transfers and macro-economic 
trends) calculates that in recent years, more than three and a half billion dollars in average 
annual remittances account for about three-fourths of the country’s foreign exchange and 
sixteen percent of GDP.
13
 
Widespread emigration has come to characterize quotidian Salvadoran life, in 
large part a product of displacement during El Salvador’s 1980-1992 civil war and the 
failure of reconstruction and development strategies in its aftermath. As emigration grew, 
the extraordinary economic impact of migrants’ remittances was quickly recognized and 
moved to the heart of the neoliberal ARENA-led government’s free market-oriented 
economic development strategies throughout the postwar period. With roughly a quarter 
of its population abroad, remittances now constitute El Salvador’s largest source of 
revenue. The country ranks number one in remittances as a share of GDP in Latin 
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frequently updates its website with reports on remittance flows http://www.bcr.gob.sv/esp/ (last accessed 
7/19/2012) 
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America and the Caribbean and tenth in the entire world. It follows that El Salvador has 
arguably the most entrenched dependency on migration and remittances in the region.
14
 
 By some measures, neoliberal reforms and the influx of remittances in the 
postwar period have produced slow but steady economic growth and a drastic reduction 
in overall poverty in El Salvador, and in many cases they have opened channels for 
families and individuals to pursue education, professionalization, and work opportunities 
that might have been unimaginable just a few years ago. However, the developmentalist 
discourses linked to remittance-sending has hidden the way El Salvador’s entrenched 
dependency on emigration and remittances has by other measures actually exacerbated 
negative economic conditions, deepening inequality and producing new forms of 
precarity and instability. Salvadoran economists emphasize that in the neoliberal 
landscape, remittances have buffered severe economic instability by substituting for 
exports and balancing foreign accounts as public debt surged (Vega 2002; Gammage 
2006; Segovia 2006; Arene 2011). When the country dollarized in 2001, the dollar was 
locked in at an overvalued exchange rate, inflating prices. While relatively unchanged 
national wages have remained low, the soaring consumption power lent by remittances 
may be contributing to a “Dutch Disease” effect in the national economy, further inflating 
prices and building dependency on imports (González Orellana 2008). Even as 
remittances appear to have steadily expanded the economy and reduced the poverty rate, 
the “real income” of the average Salvadoran — the buying power to pay for basic, non-
transferable goods — is calculated to be only half of what it was a decade ago (Góchez 
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countries.” 
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Sevilla 2011). In sum, in El Salvador’s lauded economy, displacement has been 
reproduced and dependency on the remittances of foreign migrants has grown, as many 
Salvadorans find it more difficult today to make ends meet. 
Despite deepening inequality and foreign dependency, the stream of remittances 
was understood to be working harmoniously with the state’s neoliberal project. An 
expanding economy, a burgeoning urban middle class, and a new affect of consumerist 
modernity have come to be commonly understood as tell-tale measurements of 
“progress” in a country struggling to move on from its troubled histories of violence and 
“underdevelopment.” The conservative ARENA-led government, believing that the rising 
consumption power of remittances was working harmoniously with neoliberal reforms to 
grow the economy, has branded El Salvador as “a meeting place” for international 
businesspeople, and the Ministry of Tourism boasts that the country has Central 
America’s most expansive shopping malls and modern highway system outside of 
Panama.
15
 Along with free market consolidations, key to the state’s political economic 
strategy has been to encourage emigration and harness remittances. “Exporting people”, 
to use the words of Salvadoran economists and activists, fit the neoliberal logic of 
opening flows of capital and flexible labor.  
The growing value of migrants’ remittances first began to draw the interest and 
intervention of the state during the war, and by the 1990s it began playing an active role 
in Salvadoran immigrant rights advocacy in the U.S. Initially, the government of El 
Salvador did not support the recognition of a refugee status for exiled Salvadorans 
arriving to the United States, arguing that human rights in El Salvador were being 
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certifiably upheld in order to maintain U.S. funding for counter-insurgency military 
operations. However, in 1987, Salvadoran president José Napoleon Duarte asked the 
United States to protect Salvadorans from deportation with the reasoning that remittances 
from Salvadorans were vital to maintain stability in El Salvador (Coutin 2007: 80). 
Leaders of the Salvadoran diaspora, working alongside Sanctuary and Solidarity 
Movement organizers and other Central American activists, continued to push forward 
with immigrant rights advocacy. By the mid-1990s, the Salvadoran government had 
made some initial advocacy moves in favor of Salvadoran immigrants in the United 
States, building on the accomplishments of activists that had been fighting for their 
legality. Salvadoran activists in Washington D.C. that I interviewed said that it was not 
until 1997, with the passing of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief 
Act (NACARA), that the government of El Salvador “suddenly saw the light,” and 
recognized the potential that collaborative involvement in U.S.-Salvadoran immigrant 
rights advocacy could have for remittance-driven economic growth.
16
 According to Susan 
Coutin (2007), NACARA was effectively campaigned for by the government of El 
Salvador and U.S.-Salvadoran activists in a joint effort with advocates representing 
Guatemalan, Nicaraguan, and Cuban immigrants. The legislation extended immigrant 
legal protections to these groups on the basis that they had fled unstable situations, which, 
as Coutin points out, ironically marked a reversal in the Salvadoran state’s prior stance 
that Salvadorans who had fled the war did not merit asylum. 
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Erasing Troubled Histories 
In an animated conversation at a Salvadoran-founded organization serving 
Washington D.C.’s immigrant community, activists referred to the state’s attempt to send 
away part of its population and to co-opt immigrant rights activism as a politics of 
destierro. By its most common definition, destierro translates to “exile”. As a verb, 
desterrar can mean to “exile”, “banish”, “expatriate”, “get rid of”, “deport”, or “cast 
out”. Broken down to examine its Latin origins, des-terrar would literally mean to “de-
earth”; this resonates with other Spanish language definitions of the term: “to take away 
the earth from below the roots of a plant or something else”, or “to throw away a use or 
custom.” Beyond referring to the state’s flipped political stance toward those exiled by 
the war or by poor economic conditions, the politics of destierro could thus also be 
thought of as banishing of the undesirable, or removing the earth that feeds life and gives 
meaning to one’s roots. 
In the most densely populated country in the Americas, the government’s lauding 
of the widespread departure of marginalized Salvadorans as undocumented emigrants 
might be understood as a convenient strategy to try and heal El Salvador of social and 
economic problems, evoking a haunting resonance with El Salvador’s history of state-led 
repression and elimination of problematized populations on the margins of Salvadoran 
society. I now move from a discussion of the political economic history behind El 
Salvador’s trajectory of migrant “expulsion” and remittance-led development to an 
exploration of some of the meanings and discourses tied to this project. The section that 
follows explores how, following a longer history of excluding and silencing troubled 
histories and populations, a postwar nation-state building project has emerged that 
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promotes a celebratory discourse on migration and transnationalism. This discourse, I 
suggest, is tied to a longer-range history of destierro and memory erasure, and the 
advancement of particular ideas about progress, development, and what it means to be 
Salvadoran. 
La Matanza of 1932 is one astonishing example of the extremely violent 
repression sanctioned by El Salvador’s political class. Discontent with the government 
and conditions of inequality had been brewing since the 1920s. When indigenous 
campesinos in the western coffee region, who had already been dispossessed of their 
communal lands, faced near-slavery conditions after their wages were cut during the 
collapse of the international coffee market from the depression, they followed Agusto 
Farabundo Martí and other communist party revolutionary figures’ lead and took part in 
an uprising against government forces. Within a few days after the fighting broke out on 
January 22, 1932, they had taken control of several towns and killed a few dozen wealthy 
planters, government officials, and security forces personnel. Once they were arrested, 
General Maximilio Hernández Martínez’s government responded by systematically 
killing somewhere between 10,000 and 30,000 people in western coffee towns. Anyone 
carrying machetes, with Indian features, or dressed in traditional campesino clothing was 
targeted. Documentation of the event was thereafter destroyed by the government (Lindo-
Fuentes et al. 2007). 
Scholars continue to piece together the puzzle and debate the implications of the 
massacre (Gould & Lauria-Santiago 2008; Peterson 2007; Tilley 2005; Lindo-Fuentes et 
al. 2007). Generally speaking, La Matanza was responsible for a legacy of Salvadorans’ 
suppression of expressions of indigenous identity out of fear of being labeled 
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“communist”, which has translated to the popular belief today that there are few, if any, 
Indians in El Salvador. Of course, when defined by other terms, Indians abound in El 
Salvador. Nonetheless, the belief that El Salvador is populated by a mestizaje population 
has been used by the state to support the claim that El Salvador is a more progressive and 
modern country in the international political sphere, one where development is received 
with welcome, in comparison to other more “Indian” countries in Latin America, such as 
its neighbor, Guatemala (Tilley 2005).  
La Matanza had uprooting effects; it marked efforts to do away with people and 
identities considered backward and barbaric. The government made efforts to erase its 
memory from formal history, and those targeted made conscious efforts to keep from 
view certain “Indian” practices that came from a long-range history of custom and 
tradition. Even so, the intimidation and trauma that it produced was not enough to quell 
rural organizing and resistance. As we will see in the next chapter’s discussion of 
campesino organizing in northern El Salvador, ground-up organizing, collective action, 
and alliances continued to take form in the decades that followed leading up to the 
violence of the civil war.  
The twelve-year civil war from 1980 to 1992, of course, was also remarkably 
characterized by destierro. More than 75,000 people were killed, an unknown number 
disappeared, and more than a half million fled the country. The Salvadoran military 
employed Vietnam-style counter-insurgency tactics with training, arms, and billions of 
dollars of aid from the United States. The notorious Atlacatl Battalion, trained on U.S. 
turf, was blamed for committing some of the war’s most atrocious acts of violence, 
including the 1981 massacre of some 600 civilians at El Mozote, which was immediately 
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covered up by U.S. media and officials (Binford 1996). At the war’s end, the United 
Nations Truth Commission Report attributed 85% of the acts of violence to state agents 
and only 5% to the FMLN.
17
 
One afternoon in June 2009, I went with two others to visit the Puerta del Diablo 
(Devil’s Door), a scenic site advertised in the Salvadoran government’s tourism literature 
for its breathtaking view. Atop a hill just south of San Salvador, near the town of 
Panchimalco (one of the few places in El Salvador recognized for manifesting indigenous 
identity), one can sit on the edge of a cliff and peer out between two towering rock 
formations and, when the fog clears, see the lush green valley below. Young couples, 
embracing, sat and took in the view, while children flew by on a zip line. The national 
tourists were happy to escape the hustle and bustle of the city and spend a weekend 
afternoon there. Yet this is an eerie place. What some Salvadorans will remind you is that 
it was a dumping ground that death squads filled up with murdered and tortured bodies 
during the war. We could find no monument, plaque, or sign to memorialize what had 
happened there. It was yet another case of an official attempt to hide the violent histories 
that haunt the country.   
For some, this lack of a monument is a way to move forward after the war via an 
active project of forgetting, of erasing certain memories. After all, the war had dragged 
on, and Salvadorans had been longing to embrace peace and make it last. Neither side 
“won” the war; the 1992 Peace Accords called for a cease fire. Amnesty further 
contributed to the work of erasure, freeing from accountability those responsible for what 
“had happened” during the war. And the state sought to exclude certain histories to 
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reconstruct the way El Salvador’s past, present, and future would be understood. 
To “move on” from the war, a new postwar nation-state building project was 
crafted that erased certain memories while constructing a future built on universalist 
values and a common national identity. This project is also linked to a broader state-led 
celebratory discourse on migration and transnational flows that frames these processes as 
fundamental to Salvadoran existence and as a pathway to development, progress, and 
modernity for individuals, families, and the nation. As I will discuss, this discourse has 
been strategically constructed by state and development actors, linked to a broader belief 
in constructing what could be called transnationalist modernity. The idea that 
“transnational” identities are an exemplary sign of progress and modernity has come to 
be internalized in Salvadoran subjectivities in quotidian ways.  
As anthropologist Robin DeLugan (2012) argues, state-sponsored museums 
constructed after the war, which included the National Museum of Anthropology and the 
National Museum of Art, did not commemorate the civil war; only privately and 
grassroots-funded museums did.  There was also a lack of formation of people who could 
investigate and analyze El Salvador’s past, demonstrated by the fact that there were no 
opportunities for Salvadorans to get a degree in history or anthropology from the 
University of El Salvador until 2002, when it inaugurated a joint program in these 
disciplines. The state’s efforts to redefine national belonging, drawing from the influence 
of the United Nations, emphasized universally accepted human values aimed at fostering 
a “culture of peace” that would supposedly help reduce crime and violence, unify a 
highly polarized society, and promote democratization and stability. A new “Values 
Program” was implemented in public schools and relayed through the media. Indigenous 
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groups were finally acknowledged, but this was at least in part motivated by the reality 
that the recognition of “multiculturalism” was now important to any nation-state that 
seeks respect in the international political sphere. Nonetheless, society was built on a 
common mestizaje ideology that was expected to contribute to a sense of national unity. 
Indigenous cultural identities were mainly portrayed in national discourse in relation to 
pre-Columbian ancestry, which was advantageous to the government in that it had the 
potential to benefit archaeological tourism.  
In its narrative of El Salvador’s long-range history, the National Museum of 
Anthropology showcases how recent international migration is a part of life for 
Salvadorans; it is part of what it means to be Salvadoran. The depiction of Salvadoran 
migration offered by the museum suggests in a positive way that modern technologies 
and mobility maintain Salvadorans’  transnational connections, but it makes no mention 
of the perilous journey across Mexico’s borders that undocumented migrants undertake 
en route to the United States. By silencing certain experiences, characteristics, and 
meanings associated with Salvadoran migration, the museum’s narrative privileges a 
positive, celebratory view of migration that frames migrants and their communities as 
being transformed into more modern subjects through their mobility.  
Certainly, migration has long been a part of life for Salvadorans. In fact, at the 
time of the conquest, the area that is now El Salvador was largely populated by the Pipils, 
who are believed to have migrated there from what is now Central and Southern Mexico 
in several waves between 700 and 1350. Throughout the colonial period and following 
independence, agricultural labor necessitated migrations. Campesinos began engaging 
more readily in migratory seasonal labor among coffee and other agricultural estates once 
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they were dispossessed of their land in 1882. As I discuss in the next chapter, others were 
also traveling to neighboring countries (particularly Honduras) for agricultural work. 
Domestic labor also increased after the 1950s, when small farmers were further displaced 
from their land as a result of agricultural diversification efforts that emphasized cash 
crops and mechanization and as rural to urban migration grew with industrialization since 
the 1960s. Some of the earliest Salvadoran working-class immigrants in the United States 
worked as west coast shipyard employees in the early twentieth century, but migration 
was negligible until the social unrest of the late 1970s, when the mass exodus of migrants 
began and continued to grow after the civil war (Menjivar 2000, Cordova 2005). Today, 
one in four Salvadoran families is estimated to have family members living in the United 
States.  
The élite’s long-range engagement with transnational migration has also 
conditioned the meanings and perceived value of migration and transnationalism in the 
national public eye, as their “transnationalized identity” gets associated with higher class 
status. Salvadorans from the elite class have been in the United States since the end of the 
nineteenth century (Cordova 2005), and they have long gone to the United States and 
Europe for education, international business, and residence. The American School 
exemplifies the most exclusive (and expensive) of several bilingual private schools in San 
Salvador that cater to the privileged, grooming them for college education abroad. It 
reinforces the modernist and colonialist logic linked to transnational migration and class 
status. Students learn American history, operate on a U.S. school year calendar, and, 
prohibited from speaking Spanish in classes, acquire impeccable American accents and 
English writing skills that tend to exceed their Spanish writing abilities. Of the majority 
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who go to the United States for their college education, some are drawn back to El 
Salvador to carry on their parent’s successful businesses or by other opportunities, but 
today most American School graduates are likely to remain in the United States to pursue 
careers there upon completing their degree. The expectation that El Salvador’s most 
privileged young people will emigrate mirrors the visions that many students of the 
working class also have for futures in the U.S., but on much different terms (Dyrness 
2012). Pervasive transnational migration thus transcends El Salvador’s class strata. 
Depending on how Salvadorans are able to engage with it, exuding a more 
“transnational” identity (speaking English, going abroad for education or to work and 
join family, wearing clothes sent from the United States, eating at American-owned 
restaurants, etc.) can be an expression of privilege and class status, though this of course 
takes diverse forms and is subjectively interpreted. 
As neoliberalism and remittances have shifted El Salvador’s economy toward 
services and consumerism, its landscape has also changed with the construction of spaces 
and architectures that exemplify an illusive feel of transnationalist modernity. El 
Salvador’s migration landscape is evident in the Western Union and English-language 
billboards found along rural roads that pass by homes reconstructed with remittances, but 
the sense that migration has transformed El Salvador into a more modernized place is 
perhaps best exemplified in San Salvador’s cityscape, where new high-rises and 
glistening high-end shopping malls have come to symbolize the sense of modernity and 
high status associated with transnationalist consumerism and style. One such place is the 
Torre Futura (the “Future Tower”), the high-rise glass office building I mention at the 
beginning of the chapter that opened in 2010, with its adjacent outdoor plaza that lights 
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up at night with shows and events while well-dressed patrons enjoy outdoor seating at 
international restaurants. Another such space, constructed in 2005, is La Gran Via, an 
outdoor mall (dubbed a “lifestyle center”) featuring international stores and restaurants, a 
hotel, gym, mini-golf, and a movie theatre. Named after the famous La Gran Via at the 
heart of Madrid, Spain, El Salvador’s counterpart connotes cosmopolitanism while its 
aesthetic transports those walking the length of it to a shopping space reminiscent of 
CocoWalk in Miami, a long-time favorite weekend shopping destination of the élite. 
While these spaces appear to be public and common, they are actually high-security 
private zones that offer a false aura of safety. They become modern spaces to see and be 
seen, to get your picture taken to post on Facebook, even though the expensive imported 
clothing and goods for sale are inaccessible for most Salvadorans. The consumption 
power lent by remittances has conflated what used to be more defined expressions of 
class, now that types of environments that were once only for the élite are more 
accessible. Nonetheless, in a city where people count on the transient income of 
remittances and precarious employment in the services sector, where people emigrate to 
escape unmanageable credit debt, and where malls are built across the street from ravines 
that are home to squatter settlements, the aura of “progress” and modernity that comes 
from these architectural symbols (and the spending practices that they encourage) is 
highly illusive. 
But, as one young anthropology student from the University of El Salvador 
pointed out to me, what archaeological remnants are under La Gran Via? We do not 
know for sure, but the neighborhood of Antiguo Cuscatlán, where the mall paved over the 
expansive coffee plantation of El Espino, was at the heart of one of the most important 
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settlements of the Pipil Indians. Salvadoran scholars have long been debating the struggle 
to define Salvadorans’ “roots”, which they refer to as a “crisis of Salvadoranness”. 
Stigmatized by violence, Salvadorans often describe their sense of national identity in 
relation to their famously hard-working and friendly character, and their delicious 
national specialty, the pupusa. It is perhaps in part out of this sense of a void, of not 
knowing, of having buried histories and uprooted populations, that the postwar nation-
state building project has looked toward transnationalism and migration for a sense of 
meaning in defining Salvadoranness. As Lauria-Santiago & Binford put it:  
El Salvador seems to be a nation without history—that is, its people, institutions, 
and government have only a weak and fragmented sense of their own past. Yet El 
Salvador often appears to be deeply, even overly, engaged with its ‘rootedness,’ 
with a sense that where it is now and where it has been lately are all tightly 
determined by its past, a past in which things are known to have occurred but 
remain for the more demanding observer elusively ambiguous and vague.” (2004: 
2) 
 
And even as migration has given new meaning to Salvadoranness, the dispersion 
of Salvadorans around the world has complicated the question of El Salvador’s deeply 
embedded and felt, but largely buried and undiscussed, “roots.” Salvadoranness gets 
redefined through migrants themselves and in the (re)encounters with and 
(re)constructions of national history. Noted Salvadoran cultural theorist Amparo 
Marroquín Parducci (2009) refers to El Salvador as a Nación en Fuga: a nation of 
outflow, reconstructing itself based on multiple, fragile narratives of violence, an 
uncertain past, and contemporary migration.  
Heroizing Emigrants 
Since the 2000s, when the state began taking a more active role in advocating for 
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U.S.- Salvadoran immigrant legality by forging precarious alliances with community 
organizations led by the U.S.-Salvadoran diaspora, it also began developing a wider 
apparatus through which to construct discursive and political techniques to channel 
emigrants and remittances. A notable move was the 2004 creation of the Vice Ministerio 
para Salvadoreños en el Exterior (the Vice Ministry for Salvadorans Abroad), now a key 
actor in the articulation and execution of the state’s migration-remittance development 
strategy. Under the administration of then president Tony Saca, the agency’s stated goals 
were to support “migratory stability and family reunification” by overseeing consular and 
legal services for migrants abroad, extending advocacy efforts for emigrant legalization 
and guest worker programs, and by allying with multilateral agencies, non-governmental 
organizations, and foreign governments interested in improving conditions for 
“trafficking” victims and other “irregular” migrants in transit. Beyond these efforts to 
“regularize” migration by advocating for safe passage and migrant legality, it also 
prioritized the “economic integration” of migrants in development processes in El 
Salvador by encouraging migrants to fund local “hometown” development projects with 
their remittances and to engage in transnational investment and “nostalgic” businesses. 
Finally, acting on the preoccupation that if migrants, and the children of migrants, do not 
continue to feel a cultural and patriotic attachment to territorial El Salvador then 
remittances will wane, the Vice Ministry set out to “strengthen national identity” by 
showing support for patriotic festivities abroad and cultural exchanges such as immersion 
trips to El Salvador for the children of Salvadoran immigrants.
18
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 These strategic objectives and their terminology used by the Vice Ministry for Salvadorans Abroad are 
based on publications the agency distributed to the author and the author’s interview with a representative 
of the agency on March 2, 2009 in San Salvador. 
53 
The state has also promoted certain discourses that help cohere El Salvadoran 
identity around the idea of the heroic migrant.  In this powerful state-led discourse on 
“transnationalism”, El Salvador’s emigrant is constructed as a celebrated figure of 
heroism, whose loyal service, via remittances, are the key to making a new, better El 
Salvador (Baker-Cristales 2004; Coutin 2007). The heroic, committed emigrant is hailed 
in el hermano lejano (the distant brother), the national monument that greets visitors 
coming from the airport to thank migrants for their service and remind them they should 
feel a sense of belonging to patria.  
Another common concept used by the state is the notion of deterritorialization.  
The concept of an inclusive transnational population in deterritorialized El Salvador is 
consistently employed in state-led discourse, and emphasis is placed on the idea that 
migrants are crucial “participants” in the transnational populous of an “El Salvador 
without borders.” Former Salvadoran President Tony Saca (2004-2009) put it this way in 
his November 2004 speech to emigrants during the Presidential Forum with Salvadorans 
Abroad:  
“…Out of this immense current of Salvadorans, who have extended themselves 
throughout the world, the borders of our fatherland today are very distinct from 
what they traditionally were. If we look at the map, El Salvador is a country 
geographically very small: but if we take as our parameter the spirit, will power 
and love for fatherland of our people, El Salvador is without doubt, one of the 
largest countries in the world… You all, friends who live outside, are those who 
are inside, from that El Salvador without borders… You all gave the example of 
reconstructing your lives before any other process of national reconstruction. You 
have laid out the way, like never before in our history, with loyalty and devotion, 
of being the most loyal and devoted to service to the country.” 
 
The spatial imaginary of an El Salvador without borders can be seen in the national 
newspaper.  A section of the paper devoted to news affecting Salvadoran migrants is 
titled Departamento 15 (15
th
 Department), as though the deterritorialized space of 
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migrants and in El Salvador’s exterior is an addition to the country’s division into 
fourteen departments (Rodriguez 2005). By heroizing emigrants and placing value on 
their contributions, the state-led discourse paints this space of “the exterior” as a place of 
“progress” for El Salvador (Coutin 2007: 88). 
The Project of Migration and Development 
The state’s particular version of the meaning of Salvadoran “transnationalism” 
follows a developmentalist logic; it gazes toward the outside as it celebrates emigration 
and encourages remittances as the most promising path for a future of progress and 
modernity for El Salvador. This view is situated within the much wider, global camp of 
interest in “migration and development” led by governments, some scholars, and 
multilaterals such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-
American Development Bank, who emphasize the role that international migration and 
remittances play in local and national development processes (Hermele 1997; Kapur 
2004; Delgado Wise & Castles 2007; Delgado Wise et al. 2010). Such agencies 
emphasize the magnitude of remittance flows and their potential to replace foreign aid, 
relieve foreign debt, subsidize key imports, reduce poverty, and contribute to various 
forms of national and local development. At play in the research debates led by these 
institutions is the question of the role remittances have in reducing poverty when 
channeled to more “productive” uses that could generate employment and contribute to 
local development. The positive spin these agencies put on the development power of 
undocumented and marginalized migrants disguises the reality that their own structural 
adjustment policies have been responsible for producing displacement in the first place 
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(Delgado Wise et al. 2009). 
Following the path of other migrant-sending states in the Global South, most 
notably the Philippines, with its highly developed infrastructure to send away emigrant 
labor (Constable 1997), El Salvador has pursued the “migration and development” 
dream. By the 1990s, the neoliberal government began to embrace the policy 
recommendations and support emerging in the world of multilateral development 
agencies. Research on remittances began in the country as early as 1991, which inspired 
ensuing research and reports with policy and program recommendations. In 1994, 
FUSADES, a prominent think tank that has promoted neoliberal policies in El Salvador, 
reported that remittances were mainly spent on “family consumption,” and recommended 
that remittances be a regularized capital transfer that could more steadily be drawn into 
the Salvadoran financial system. The Fundación Nacional para el Desarrollo (National 
Foundation for Development)  also sponsored several research projects on remittances in 
the 1990s, advocating for programs to encourage “productive” uses of remittances 
through local and small-scale development projects benefiting from cooperative savings 
and community reinvestment (Pedersen 2013). 
The highlighted “success case” of small town development through migration and 
remittances is Intipucá, a town in eastern El Salvador characterized by the presence of 
banks, transnational businesses, large homes, and well-maintained community 
infrastructure. Its transformation typifies the way inflows of remittances have come to 
shape particular conceptualizations of value, development, and “progress” in El Salvador 
on local and national scales (Pedersen 2002). Debates over the actual effects of 
remittances in rural communities have ensued in anthropological research in neighboring 
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areas (Binford 2003; Cohen et al. 2005), and the topic has received much attention in 
(and arguably dominated) migration studies research coming from El Salvador (Andrade 
Eekhoff 2003). Consistent throughout the region, El Salvador has hardly seen effective 
employment-generating local development from remittance-based “co-development” or 
“three/two for one” programs (where the state provides matching funds for collective 
remittances). 
Indeed, the discourse and actors that guide hegemonic perspectives on “migration 
and development” have been influential in shaping the way migration is understood in El 
Salvador. More recently, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been 
one of the most significant funding sources for research, political initiatives, and public 
projects and presentations on migration issues in El Salvador. The agency’s widely cited 
2005 country report, titled “A Look at the New ‘Us’,” presented a nuanced analysis of 
migration’s impact in El Salvador and marked a critical discursive turn against the state’s 
laissez-faire approach to economic growth through emigration and remittance flows. It 
affirmed El Salvador’s “transnational” national identity and called on the state to take on 
new planning measures that would turn El Salvador’s “migration economy” into a source 
of “opportunity” to improve the country’s “human development” (UNDP 2005: 9-13, 20-
22). A series of initiatives supported by the agency’s “Human Development and 
Migration” project directed years of ensuing research and public discussion toward the 
question of migration-development. Even as it has made way for a more critical 
discussion of the state’s neoliberal migration politics, the UNDP’s optimistic focus on the 
role that migration can play in promoting more equitable forms of development has 
nevertheless contributed to a rather presumptuous global discourse on migration and 
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development that has tended to cast aside the human cost of emigration in order to 
emphasize migrants and their cross-border communities as entrepreneurial agents in local 
development processes. 
The shift in development paradigms from an orientation toward achieving mainly 
macro-economic growth toward an interest in “human development” has marked a more 
humanistic approach in the logic and practice of development by focusing on such 
questions as democratic process, multiculturalism, sustainability, and overall living 
conditions. Harnessing remittances, from this view, should no longer be about their 
capture in financial institutions and in corporate growth so that they can “trickle down” 
and have multiplier effects. Even so, the UNDP’s use of “human development” assumes 
that it can be measured according to four reductionist indicators and three “dynamics”, by 
regions and countries that can be ranked according to their overall “human development 
index”. By making these generalizations, the school of thinking on migration and “human 
development” fostered by the UNDP’s programs in El Salvador followed a set of 
assumptions grounded in a capitalist and developmentalist logic on migration that assume 
that migrants tend to travel to more “developed” places and in so doing, remit capital and 
knowledge that will help their places of origin, which are assumed to be in need of 
development. 
The idea that migrants should be participants and funders in local development 
“back home” assigns to them new neoliberal duties and responsibilities, and fixes blame 
on those of the “rural poor” who engage in what development specialists view as 
“wasteful” consumption spending, rather than re-investing in “productive” activities  that 
can generate employment, usually through micro-entrepreneurial initiatives. A “popular 
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version” of the UNDP’s 2005 country report was widely distributed, reaching rural 
communities. It offered cartoon illustrations and easy-to-follow blurbs that summed up 
the report’s findings and made recommendations on how people could use remittances 
“productively” and to improve their quality of life.  
 This approach offers a very limited perspective on the forms and contours that 
development might take. By privileging cross-border capitalist activity as the only real 
path to improved conditions, it leaves out the possibility that people might have a 
different concept of collective well-being, that they may not wish to be “entrepreneurs,” 
and that they may not see promise in this form of development. The experience of 
Chalatecos, which will be discussed in the next three chapters, speaks to these other 
possibilities.  
 Second, it fixes blame on migrant subjects and their families when not 
appropriately using their capital for this version of development. By placing these duties 
and responsibilities on families and individuals (who are assumed to be the primary 
actors responsible for making development work), it reinforces a neoliberalist logic. As 
we will see in the discussion of the experience of Chalatecos, a collectivist path to well-
being and making a better future is emphasized. 
 And finally, the emphasis on rational individualism, a universalist vision for 
development, and the positive value of migration, despite its costs, for development and 
progress, fits the modernist/colonialist logic of the nation-state project and its practices of 
destierro, which were described in this chapter. This is a particular imagination of the 
present and the future; one that buries diverse histories and possibilities through 
universalism and faith in a transnationalist modernity. As we will see in the stories and 
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trajectories of Chalatecos, place, history and a sense of rootedness are powerful forces 
that drive collective action and life projects. 
  
CHAPTER 3: 
Making lo comunal 
In October 2002, I accompanied buses full of people from resettled communities 
in northern El Salvador to the former refugee camp in Honduras where they had lived for 
seven years while civil war continued to devastate the rural region they had initially fled 
in the early 1980s. It marked the fifteenth anniversary of their 1987 repatriation to El 
Salvador. Their trip marked the largest repatriation in Latin American history, comprised 
of more than 4,000 refugees who self-organized their own return, crossing over the 
mountainous Honduras-El Salvador border region in buses and by foot, defying the 
interests of Salvadoran authorities. For the majority of those on the buses, it was their 
first time returning to the abandoned site that more than 11,000 refugees had once 
inhabited. The day was one of meaningful commemoration. In the shadow of one of 
Honduras’s highest peaks, the area that they had last seen dotted with row after row of 
wooden structures was by then little more than a vast landscape of lush, rolling grass and 
farmland. The visitors began to meander about in exploration, seeking out the locations 
of the communal gardens, kitchens, and workshops where they had once spent years of 
their lives working, the makeshift classrooms where they taught and learned from one 
another, and the improvisational wooden homes they had worked together to build. Not-
so-distant memories were suddenly recultivated and translated into remarkable stories of 
communalism that characterized everyday life in the camp. Families and friends spent the 
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day gathered around wood-fired soups, chicken, and pupusas, chatting and enjoying one 
another’s company, and reliving memories. 
This chapter charts out of the historical trajectory of collective action, mobility, 
and community-building involving people of eastern Chalatenango, a department in 
northern El Salvador where several communities were resettled by refugees during the 
civil war. Those who came to repopulate these communities, including the community of 
Guarjila where I focus my research, originally hail from Chalatenango and elsewhere in 
El Salvador’s northern region. They share a lived experience and longer historical 
trajectory of social struggle. Out of this shared historical experience, Guarjileños (people 
of Guarjila) and other Chalatecos have developed and honed particular logics and 
practices, which they strategically draw upon to navigate circumstances of 
marginalization, military repression, and displacement. These are communal logics and 
practices. They value and privilege lo communal: the work of communal systems based 
on shared resources and cooperation, and the work of community organizing and 
community-building. I tell these stories of communitarianism, cooperation, community 
organizing, and collective action because the logics and practices cultivated through this 
history, as we will see in the next two chapters, continue to condition the way those who 
share in this trajectory of social struggle go about their lives today even in a postwar 
period characterized by neoliberal peace, a lasting legacy of marginalization, and 
international migration.  
First, I will lay out this chapter’s theoretical and analytical contributions and 
conversations, framed around the idea of lo comunal. I will then turn to a discussion of 
some of the foundations of collective action and organizing in Chalatenango and 
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elsewhere around the northern region of El Salvador, since the mid-twentieth century 
through the 1970s, when more radicalized campesino associations and communities 
began to form. My discussion then turns to the experience of displacement to highlight 
how community-building and communal work were cultivated and counted on as many 
Chalatecos fled the region and took refuge in Honduras. The final part of the chapter 
explores the story of the resettlement and (re)building community through communal 
systems and collective action, by honing in on the community of Guarjila, where I have 
centered my ethnographic work. 
The historical details from this chapter draw from several sources, but two works 
stand out in their careful documentation of a dynamic regional experience that has until 
recently tended to get relatively homogenized with a broader analysis of the experience 
of Salvadoran “peasants” and “revolutionaries.” First, I turned to historian Molly Todd’s 
(2010) regional historiography, which offers a thorough account of the practices of 
collective action that campesinos from northern El Salvador drew upon in Honduran 
refugee camps and while in flight from El Salvador’s 1980s civil war, as well as the 
longer history of regional organizing and networking in which these practices are rooted. 
She convincingly argues that campesinos were not submissive victims of displacement or 
passive recipients of humanitarian assistance from “outside” actors, but rather were active 
agents of social change who, drawing from a long-range experience of collective action 
and mobility, used international assistance and “displacement” to their advantage and on 
their own terms.  
The second notable source is Salvadoran anthropologist Carlos Lara Martinez’s 
work on what he refers to as the Movimiento Campesino de Chalatenango (the 
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Campesino Movement of Chalatenango), based on an extensive collection of oral 
histories with residents of the repopulated community of Guarjila and its neighbor, Los 
Ranchos. Lara Martinez argues that the communal systems that came to characterize the 
“micro-region” in eastern Chalatenango, rooted in a longer regional trajectory of 
collective action, stand in contrast to “the dominant national capitalist system” (Lara 
Martinez 2011, 2004, 2003). 
Other scholarly sources that offer regionalized evidence and are especially useful 
are political scientist Jenny Pearce’s (1986) analysis of campesino organizing in 
Chalatenango from the front lines of the war, and Sandy Smith-Nonini’s (2010) thick 
descriptions from her first-hand experience as war reporter and anthropologist working in 
Guarjila and with regional promoters of the popular health movement during the civil 
war.  
While these sources were useful in gathering details and filling in the gaps, much 
of the consolidated and focused history I offer here is representative of a set of stories 
that are very familiar to people of Guarjila. As anthropologist Irina Silber (2010: 43) puts 
it, these Chalatecos are “owners of their own history.” In this sense, it is not a singular 
history, and it does not belong to a particular ethnic or regional experience. Rather, this 
trajectory is comprised of multiple histories that have long been mobile and networked 
across borders. I have heard these (hi)stories time and time again in conversations and 
encounters with Guarjileños since my arrival there for the first time in 1999. My final 
sources, therefore, are from Guarjileños’ themselves, based on my own interviews and 
notes from my sustained engagement with the community. My intention here is to tell 
this story in a way that conveys the familiar discourses, values, and lived experiences of 
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social reality to which Guarjileños find themselves attached. 
Theorizing lo comunal 
To frame and interpret the series of projects and activities that unfolded among 
those from northern El Salvador who repopulated communities in Chalatenango, 
including Guarjila, from the early 20
th
 century through the end of El Salvador’s civil war 
in 1992, I draw upon an emerging body of literature around communal systems, practices, 
and logics. My discussion is in conversation with theoretical perspectives on this topic 
that are anchored in Latin America. Whereas conventional analysis of the dynamics of 
“community” and “community-building” tend to assume a rather fixed, bounded  space, 
and whereas “collective action” tends to be applied as a broader term that is not 
necessarily assigned to “community,” I find the lens of lo comunal to be especially useful 
because it lends itself to visibilizing this sort of work as a political project that is flexible 
and fluid, always in the making, and shaped through particular kinds of collective 
practices and logics. The story of communal work and community building in northern El 
Salvador and among its displaced people has necessarily been a mobile, cross-bordered, 
and networked project that has adapted and changed in various temporal and geographic 
contexts.   
This lens visibilizes how community-making, organizing, and communal 
practices work together with mobility and networks in orchestrating larger collective and 
political projects. In this view, community-building, or community-making, entails a 
coming together; it is a coalescence of these logics and practices. As we will see, people 
from Chalatenango came together to build community through networked resistance 
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efforts prior to the war, while in flight from El Salvador’s violence, in refugee camps in 
Honduras, and more recently, in the case of Guarjila and other resettled communities, in 
the enduring project of (re)building a community attached to a particular place.  The 
(re)making of Guarjila since its 1987 resettlement necessarily entailed the strategic 
formation of communal systems for survival amidst five more years of civil war. 
Regardless of what goals the region’s “revolutionaries” were able to achieve, the 
community-building work that was shaped through the recent civil conflict was arguably 
a lasting and valued political project that stands in contrast to that of the (neo)liberal 
state. Communities are made in practice and to political ends, and they carry with them 
deeply affective relationships. 
To consider how Guarjileños have engaged with the practices, logics and politics 
of (mobile) community-making, I draw from Aymara sociologist Felix Patzi Paco’s 
(2004) concept (and political proposal) of the communal system. Such a lens makes it 
possible to revision community as a networked system, without clear boundaries, that is 
actively made through political and economic practices coming from a communal logic. 
It thus functions as a different political project than the liberal (and neoliberal) capitalist 
framework and has a decolonizing potential. 
Patzi Paco emphasizes the importance of certain kinds of political and economic 
practices in communal systems. Communitarian social organization, in large part, 
depends on the political and economic management of resources and the appropriation of 
work for collective ownership and production. Natural and cultural resources are 
collectively shared and managed, obligatory labor is expected in order to favor the 
collective good, and people participate in spaces for collective economic production. In 
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Patzi Paco’s view, political organization in a communal system should rest on the 
rotation of voluntary representative posts and collective deliberation, rather than on the 
decision of elected individuals.  
By introducing lo comunal, I want to use the history I present here to further open 
a conversation with Patzi Paco’s conceptualization of communal systems. His proposal 
comes from his experience with Aymara and Quechua indigenous systems of life in the 
Bolivian Andes, in which communal practices and logics are to a significant extent rooted 
in the indigenous family-based system of community, or allyu. The concept he presents 
offers a way of theorizing other contexts with which it resonates, and he makes clear that 
communal systems apply in both rural and urban contexts, but his perspective is closely 
tied to Bolivia’s experience. According to Argentine literary theorist Walter Mignolo, the 
idea of the communal system should not be limited to Bolivia. Rather, it has a global (but 
not universalist) scope. As a decolonial project, we should respond to “an invitation to 
organize and re-inscribe communal systems, all over the world, that have been erased and 
dismantled by the increasing expansion of capitalist economy” (Mignolo 2011: 324). 
Uruguayan political theorist Raúl Zibechi and Mexican sociologist Raquel Gutiérrez 
Aguilar also contribute to this conversation. Even as their work also centers on the 
indigenous experience of Bolivia, these authors build on Patzi Paco’s proposal and 
remind us through their analyses of various contexts that we can find communal systems 
in the syndicates, neighborhood organizations, and cooperative work environments in 
urban life. 
This chapter adds to the conversation the relevance of including more recent 
histories of communal work than those tied to a longer trajectory of indigenous ways of 
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life, and by stressing the broader relationships between communal systems, community-
building, and communal logics and practices. The sorts of political and economic 
practices that Patzi Paco describes became important in the community-building work in 
the struggles of Chalatenango’s campesinos in the second half of the 20th century and 
especially during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Through what she terms entramados comunitarios, (communitarian meshworks), 
Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar offers another way to conceptualize the various sorts of 
collectivities that engage in communal practices and activities, in a range of contexts. She 
refers to these as “the multiplicity of worlds of human life that populate and generate a 
world with patterns of respect, cooperation, dignity, love and reciprocity… who are not 
fully subject or immersed in the logic of accumulation value, in order to address the 
satisfaction of multiple and varied common needs of very distinct kinds” (2011: 4) 
Stating that this is a “general enough, but not universal, term,” she emphasizes the 
diverse ways in which communitarian meshworks can be constituted: 
“Some such communitarian meshworks are older and others have a closer 
temporal origin – contemporary – and are in the world in various formats and 
designs: from indigenous communities and peoples, to extended families and 
networks of neighbors, relatives and migrants in urban and rural environments; 
from mutual support and affinity groups to plural networks of women for the 
reciprocal support in reproduction, to just mention some “variants” of such 
meshworks.”(2011:4) 
 
Her emphasis on the great diversity of forms that collectivities with 
communitarian and communal interests and activities can take offers a productive, and 
hopeful, perspective that broadens Patzi Paco’s more contextualized interpretation of 
communal systems. Gutiérrez Aguilar’s term, representing a similar and overlapping 
idea, helps to open the dialogue to consider the many and always changing forms of 
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communal systems, or communitarian meshworks, and how they extend to various 
contexts, including those that constitute shorter-range histories of social struggles to forge 
community and communal systems. 
The idea of thinking about communalism as a system or meshwork – as a set of 
networked practices and logics that link people to people – is useful in recognizing the 
unbounded, fluid, and relational character of (making) community. My work is based in 
the school of thought that communities are made in practice, and are always being made 
and remade. As philosopher Jean Luc Nancy (1991) reminds us, we have to be wary of 
the idea of looking back toward some original community or identity; communities are 
always fraught with politics and interpreted differently according to different 
subjectivities. Still, even though communities can be critically deconstructed to a point 
without end, and are indeed imagined (Anderson 1991), they are, nevertheless, real. 
Without doubt, they have a felt political and personal significance in people’s lives. The 
community-making work of Guarjileños and others of Chalatenango has been relational 
and political; it has been a networked and mobile project tied to a long history of 
organizing and collectivism. 
Raúl Zibechi (2010) extends Patzi Paco’s and Gutiérrez Aguilar’s ideas to his 
analysis of El Alto, Bolivia, in which he stresses the practiced and political dimension of 
communal systems and collectives. The making of “community-based relations,” Zibechi 
suggests, have “enormous power.” Their formation is central to the making of social 
movements, having the potential to disperse consolidated power, including that of the 
state and social movements. According to Zibechi, the work of building social bonds with 
a communitarian character, or “communalizing,” has an emancipatory potential. He 
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suggests that this potential to “set free” through community-making operates in the way 
that Marx initially understood it – through self-activity and initiative – rather than 
through the promise of transforming the state that was taken up later in Marxist-Leninist 
ideology.  
Zibechi’s emphasis on the politics and practice of community is useful in 
considering the experience of Guarjileños and others of Chalatenango. Even though the 
state was not transformed according to revolutionary promises, a different political 
project has endured and remains active in the region (and across international borders). 
The trajectory of communal systems and community-based projects within the region 
stand in contrast to the neo-liberal capitalist orientation of the national state, just as 
communal logics and practices stand in contrast to the logics and practices of capitalism. 
As this chapter discusses, popular health care and popular education movements 
stemming from the region were influential in shaping wider movements and thinking 
against neoliberal state policies. 
Enduring logics and practices tied to community-making thus emerged out of a 
shared historical experience, and work toward a (largely unrecognized) and different 
political project than the vision of overhauling the capitalist state.  Rather, they operate in 
confluence with, around, and against the forces of global capitalism, the state, and 
(neo)liberalism. As Patzi Paco suggests, communal logic works as an alternative to 
liberal and capitalist logic, but communal systems can coexist and function with and 
within broader surroundings (the entorno) characterized by formations of liberalism and 
capitalism (Patzi Paco 2004: 183). 
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Roots of the Campesino Movement of Chalatenango 
Molly Todd (2010) argues that campesinos in El Salvador’s northern region were 
not passive victims of displacement and recipients of outside assistance, but were the 
principal and most active agents of organization. They used international actors 
strategically to their advantage in order to drive social and political change, in contrast to 
the modernist imaginations of a submissive and complacent peasantry. Todd’s emphasis 
that mobility and communal organizing worked hand in hand is especially useful in 
elucidating the formation of communal logics and systems, even in contexts of 
displacement, among people in El Salvador’s northern department of Chalatenango. 
Drawing from her outline of the trajectory of peasant organizing and the movements of 
campesinos across borders, in what follows I highlight the forms of communal 
organization that emerged in the region through various kinds of networks, events, and 
movements.  
Todd stresses there is a long history of peasant organizing in northern El 
Salvador, and that even as liberation theologians and other ‘outside forces’ did influence 
organizing in the 1970s and 1980s, but many scholars have unfairly represented peasants 
in the region as “waking up from a lengthy stupor” until this time. Even as Chalatenango 
was once called la tierra olvidada (the forgotten land) for its marginalization and 
isolation, this also made it a place of “opportunity” for its trajectory of peasant 
mobilization (2010: 29).  
The 1932 Matanza, in which tens of thousands of peasants in western El Salvador 
were massacred after an uprising, is generally framed as an event that, out of a climate of 
fear that it produced, suppressed the recognition of indigenous identities and rural 
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organizing far into the future. However, out of an effort to solve the agrarian crisis and 
pacify the potential for future insurrection, government legislation from the 1930s 
through the 1970s created a number of reforms and programs for the rural sector. Todd 
argues that some programs, especially the promotion of rural cooperatives and rural 
education programs, actually paved the way for campesino organizing. Campesinos were 
trained in organizing through cooperatives, which came to be legally recognized. Other 
rural reforms during this period advanced rights, resources, and benefits to both landless 
agricultural laborers and rural smallholders, even as they also benefited wealthy estate 
holders.  
Government-sponsored agricultural cooperatives led to the formation of the 
Unión Comunal Salvadoreña (Salvadoran Communal Union, or UCS), an association of 
campesinos that bridged government programs with local rural projects. This 
organization, formed in connection with the government in part to keep campesinos 
under government control, was generally non-critical of the government programs and 
policies. Nevertheless, it contributed to the promotion of rural organizing through 
workshops and training in cooperativism and community organizing, built political 
involvement and awareness among campesinos, and it paved the way for future 
campesino associations that were more progressive and critical of the government. 
Even as the UCS had the strongest presence in the country’s southern and central 
export regions, communities in Chalatenango and other parts of the north developed 
various kinds of grassroots short and long term projects of their own throughout the 
1950s and 1960s. These included informal and formal labor cooperatives as well as 
community-based councils, or directivas comunales. The directivas began by operating 
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as work committees to oversee community projects and eventually grew to more 
comprehensively organize community initiatives.
19
  
Networks and alliances were forged between communities and regions through 
seasonal labor connections and trading, out of which the two campesino associations that 
were most prominent in the northern region developed: the Federación Cristiana de 
Campesinos Salvadoreños (Christian Federation of Salvadoran Campesinos, or 
FECCAS) and the Unión de Trabajadores del Campo (Rural Workers Union, or UTC). 
As was the case with the UCS in other regions, these associations, combined with the 
local organizing underway through cooperatives and directivas present in the northern 
departments of Chalatenango, Cabañas, and Morazán, fomented organizing efforts and 
heightened campesino political involvement and awareness of the marginalized 
conditions in which they lived. Even though these new organizations took inspiration 
from the UCS, they were distinct in that they were more critical of the government and 
maintained more independence from it. Both FECCAS and the UTC drew from Christian 
doctrine that emphasized the importance of campesino consciousness of forms of 
exploitation and subordination. The UTC, born in 1974 from campesinos in 
Chalatenango and San Vicente, had the strongest roots in the north and was the more 
radical of the two. Both organizations expanded their membership and grew during the 
1960s and 1970s, and by the mid-1970s were organizing national strikes and protests to 
support the rights and interests of rural smallholders and landless campesinos.  
In the 1960s, campesinos from the northern departments of Chalatenango and 
Cabañas were the first to begin developing networks with San Salvador-based 
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 According to Todd’s (2010) review of documented and oral regional histories. 
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organizations, including labor unions, teacher and student unions, political parties, and 
militant Leftist groups that eventually came to form part of the FMLN. Liberation 
theology was also introduced and became influential in community organizing, in part 
through the Acción Catolica Universitaria de El Salvador (University Catholic Action of 
El Salvador), which began outreach projects and community-based training in rural areas. 
By the 1970s, liberation theology had significantly grown in influence in El Salvador. 
Progressive-minded Catholics began starting regular small group reflections in rural 
communities, in which campesinos made connections between Biblical readings and 
issues and conditions of social concern and injustice they faced, and how to overcome 
those problems. Training from pastoral teams, or catechists, that arrived in rural areas 
promoted the idea that the conditions of the “poor” should not be understood as 
predetermined. Out of these groupings, Comunidades Eclesiales de Base (Christian Base 
Communities, or CEBs) were developed, further cultivating consciousness about 
conditions of inequality and advancing organizing efforts in defense of campesinos. 
Catechists and CEBs, which had been building a presence elsewhere in Latin America, 
established a number of campesino training centers in the region which advanced 
liberation theological perspectives along with pragmatic training in organizing and 
cooperativism. As their work continued to extend to more remote rural areas, they 
worked to strengthen community directivas, and helped build local alliances with 
FECCAS and the UTC.  
Campesino organizing among Chalatecos and other northerners was thus 
intertwined with networking and mobility across regions, to urban areas, and among rural 
communities. Chalatecos have a long history of interregional and international mobility. 
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The northern region could also be conceptualized as “an extended space of livelihood” 
(Todd 2010). Peasants established important networks with urban zones, to areas for 
seasonal labor such as in the western coffee estates, and they moved regularly across the 
Hondurans border. Throughout the twentieth century, Salvadorans traveled to Honduras 
for farming and agricultural labor migration. Informal mobility, trade, and kin networks 
extended the northern region into Honduras. The national political boundaries were 
further blurred given that only three official legal border crossings existed and that the 
delineation of the border was not agreed upon by the two governments. By 1969, with 
around three hundred thousand Salvadorans then living in Honduras, unresolved political 
tension around the border resulted in the infamous “Soccer War”.20 
By the 1970s, prominent national unions and campesinos began employing more 
contentious practices, including protests, marches, strikes, and occupations, since the 
government was rigging elections and was largely unresponsive to their attempts to 
legally negotiate for better labor conditions and access to land.  Contentious practices and 
protest were met with violent reprisals by government-led military and paramilitary 
forces. Public discontent escalated throughout the country after the military supported a 
fraudulent presidential election in 1972. In July 1975, more than thirty University of El 
Salvador students participating in a march were massacred by the military, their bodies 
immediately swept away by soldiers (Smith-Nonini 2010). In response, tens of thousands 
took to the streets of San Salvador in protest and began forming a rural-urban coalition 
called the Bloque Popular Revolucionario (Revolutionary Popular Block).  
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 The so-called Soccer War, which ensued after a soccer game between the national teams of El Salvador 
and Honduras, was actually linked to long-standing border disputes and tensions that were building around 
Salvadoran migration to Honduras (see Durham 1979). 
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In Chalatenango, the National Guard began establishing posts in local 
municipalities. As the presence of the National Guard and paramilitaries expanded in the 
region, by the late 1970s, Chalatecos had made alliances with the Fuerzas Popular de 
Liberación, (Popular Liberation Forces, or FPL), a militant organization born in San 
Salvador in 1970, that by 1980 was one of the largest of five established factions that 
eventually coalesced into the FMLN. This more radical alliance with the region was 
facilitated by CEB activists, and introduced a more militant political ideology to the 
organizing and contentious work underway in the region.  By the early 1980s, the FPL 
had gained control of twenty-eight of thirty-three municipalities in Chalatenango.
21
  
Encouraged by the FPL, in 1983 these municipalities began electing new 
leadership referred to as Poderes Populares de Liberación (Popular Powers of 
Liberation), which constituted an exercise in participatory and collective democracy 
(Pearce 1987; Smith-Nonini 2010; Lara Martinez 2011). They were juntas of campesinos 
elected for six month periods, which replaced the region’s former middle-class municipal 
leadership who generally fled to urban areas. During their short terms they would address 
urgent concerns and work to organize the community, but the most important decisions 
were made at popular assembly meetings with the whole community.
22
 
This shift toward a peasantry in Chalatenango that was more radicalized and 
invested in grassroots organization thus coalesced by the 1970s through the series of 
historical events, processes, networks, and coalitions that I have described. According to 
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 The most significant paramilitary organization was ORDEN (Organización Democrática Nacionalista). 
It began in 1968 and by the 1970s was increasingly being recognized as a death squad. It is important to 
note that, offered government benefits, such as employment, resources for farming, health care, and 
protection from police repression, many campesinos were also joining ORDEN at this time. 
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 See Pearce (1986) for detailed documentation of Poderes Populares de Liberación operations.  
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Lara Martinez (2003, 2004), this time marked the initial makings of “the campesino 
movement of Chalatenango.” 
Guindas 
By the late 1970s, the growing paramilitary attacks forced Chalatecos to abandon 
their villages and hamlets in search of refuge elsewhere. During the military sweeps of 
the scorched earth campaign of the early 1980s, Chalateco civilians saw their homes 
burned, family members raped and murdered, and villages bombed in brutal areal and 
ground attacks. The early 1980s were the most intense years of conflict of El Salvador’s 
civil war and Chalatenango was at the heart of the military’s target zone.  
The fleeing of people, in groups, from Chalatenango and El Salvador’s northern 
region were known as guindas. Out of the need to survive, the initial guindas were 
relatively disorganized, as people were forced to seek refuge in the hills, to other parts of 
El Salvador, to Honduras, or elsewhere. The groups sometimes consisted of a few 
families and sometimes entire communities, and on other occasions guindas were flights 
of thousands of people.  
Particularly memorable to Chalatecos who fled to Honduras and later resettled in 
repopulated communities (including Guarjila where I centered my ethnographic 
fieldwork), was the guinda of May 1980. More than six thousand people were fleeing to 
escape one of the first scorched earth operations in the region. More than 600 of them 
were murdered by Honduran and Salvadoran military forces in an attack while crossing 
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the river to Honduras.
23
 
Over time, the guindas became more organized and formalized. Todd refers to the 
communities and groups of people in flight as “mobile communities”. They drew upon 
communal organizational strategies and they continued the work of (re)making 
community in resettled locations — in sites of refuge and later in community 
repopulations. Recognizing how people come together in organized, strategic, and 
communal ways, even while in exodus, is not to idealize the dire situation out of which it 
developed, or to suggest that inequality, violence, and sacrifice did not exist in the 
process. However, many scholarly accounts, in depicting “peasants” and refugees as mere 
victims of displacement, tend to erase from view the agency, and in this case, 
community-making, of mobile populations.  
Guindas became more formalized with the help of community directivas. While 
some guindas were long-range (the wave of people who came to repopulate Guarjila were 
gone for several years in refugee camps in Honduras, for example), others were short 
distances and temporary. Mobility became part of important systems of community 
security. Families constructed underground shelters, called tatús, in strategic locations, 
where they would wait and hide when soldiers invaded their communities. Community 
members would stand post on hilltops to warn of incoming soldiers and aerial raids.
24
 
During longer treks to other sites of refuge, a set of tactics were developed and honed. 
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 Survivors who now reside in Guarjila have shared their accounts of this massacre with me on several 
occasions. The massacre is commemorated in an annual event in which community members pilgrimage to 
the site at the river where it occurred. 
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 In accounts of community history, Guarjileños have described to me how these organized tactics 
involving hilltop lookouts and community bell alerts were also employed in the resettled community 
following their return from Mesa Grande. 
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Communities in guindas organized food preparation, camouflaged their clothing, 
developed techniques to move as quietly as possible, and traveled at night.
25
 
FMLN combatants also sometimes played a role in formalizing guindas. They 
encouraged and organized guindas, and they sometimes guided or offered protection to 
civilians in guindas. Temporary shelters  and FMLN encampments that were constructed 
became strategic sites of refuge and resting points, some of which became populated 
centers. The FMLN was already influential in organizing communities, who, referred to 
as comunidades organizadas (“organized communities”), were careful to differentiate 
themselves as civilian non-combatants but sympathetic to the FMLN. 
In 1981 and 1982, the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) 
officially established refugee camps in Honduras. Throughout the 1980s, tens of 
thousands of Salvadorans were housed as refugees in camps at sites including Mesa 
Grande, Colomoncagua, La Virtud, and El Tesoro. During the guindas, humanitarian 
workers roved the border region in search of hiding campesinos to be able to offer 
assistance and to escort them to the camps. There were extreme risks undertaken in 
making the trek across the border to Honduras. Between January 1980 and July 1981, an 
estimated 2000 campesinos were assassinated along the border (Todd: 94). 
The scene of the Honduran border crossing in the early 1980s is a familiar one for 
those who have crossed the US-Mexico border illegally. Those in guindas, and those 
moving illegally to the US, driven out by the structural violence of economic inequality 
as well as by various forms of political and physical violence, employ similar tactics 
(moving at night, using camouflage, traveling in groups, following guides, stopping at 
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 My synthesis of guinda organization in this section is based on Todd’s (2010) in-depth documentation of 
guinda practices, tactics, and strategies. 
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points of refuge) and encounter similar kinds of actors (military personnel, a border 
patrol, “illicit” guides, aid workers).  
Although it may not be fair to assume that the communal organizational tactics 
adopted during the guindas were directly appropriated to a different context and long into 
a later time period, there is, nevertheless, a remarkably similar logic guiding each set of 
activities.  Mobility, in guindas, was a resource that was adapted from the much longer 
range history of migration and networking coming from peasant organizing, and from the 
use of the northern region into Honduras as an extended space of livelihood. Mobility 
took on a new significance during the time of conflict. In her words, “mobility became a 
conscious act of moral and political resistance… it comprised a combative mass 
movement… both physical mobility and a collective, organized effort toward specific 
goals.” (2010: 80-81) In each scenario, mobility is tied to a conscious political act of 
resistance as well as an act of desperation, and it is linked to varied forms of collective 
action, organizing, and community-building.  
Mesa Grande 
I focus on the experience of displaced campesinos who arrived in refugee camps 
in Honduras. Those who repopulated the community of Guarjila and four other 
communities in northern El Salvador in 1987 came from the camp called Mesa Grande. 
During the 1980s, Mesa Grande was populated by thousands of refugees, mainly from 
Chalatenango and Cabañas. Some Guarjileños lived there for as long as seven years up 
until the 1987 repatriation.  
Within the UNHCR refugee camps in Honduras, including Mesa Grande, a strong 
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organizational system and sense of community developed among refugees. Todd (2010) 
compiled and analyzed a host of oral histories and documented evidence of these 
systems. In what follows, I will highlight some of her relevant findings and expand upon 
them with a handful of other scholarly sources and my own knowledge from my 
conversations with Guarjileños.
26
  
She suggests that the enclosure of the camps made it a space in which refugees 
were forced to define themselves as a community in relation to outsiders and others. They 
used song and slang to differentiate themselves from Hondurans who they felt mistreated 
Salvadorans. Even as they appreciated and took advantage of their resources and 
assistance, refugees maintained a degree of autonomy from humanitarian aid workers and 
relied on their own organizational strategies and systems. Also, community was formed 
in defense against a common enemy; they were conscious of military operations around 
them and they were on the lookout for covert infiltrations in the camps by members of the 
paramilitary organization, ORDEN. A common sense of struggle rooted in the regional 
experience of repression and marginalization further drew people together as they defined 
community within the camps. 
Refugees developed various systems of resource sharing, cooperative labor, and 
community organization in the camps. They formed several work crews. Construction 
crews were formed to work on building and improving shelters, classrooms, latrines, and 
water systems. Cleaning crews worked cooperatively to maintain conditions of sanitation 
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 Experiences of organizing in Mesa Grande were described to me in several oral histories gathered in 
Guarjila from community members in July 2007 and April 2011, and from my general knowledge 
accumulated through several accounts community members shared with me and others during my work in 
the community from 1999 to 2002. My summary here draws from more detailed descriptions of these 
organizational systems in Todd’s (2010) work, which draws from multiple sources.  
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and cleanliness at the camps. Kitchen teams, usually comprised of women, took on the 
essential task of acquiring, preparing, and distributing food. In spite of the Honduran 
government’s mandate to rely on donated food supplies, they planted and worked 
cooperatively in communal gardens around the perimeter of the camps to augment food 
production, using terracing to plant on the steep hillsides. Other cooperatives and 
workshops included such trades as tailoring, shoemaking, and carpentry. In another 
example of resourcefulness, in one camp a welding workshop was started to make 
kitchen utensils and pots from recycled cans. They started other kinds of workshops that 
rotated in new students to cooperatively learn and produce for the camps in skills and 
trades, such as knitting and making clothing and shoes. 
They established and continued to expand and improve upon a camp government 
system that entailed a range of committees to develop and manage various operations and 
projects. Mesa Grande, which eventually reached a population of around 11,000 refugees, 
was divided into seven subdivisions, each with its own directiva or committee (Lara 
Martinez 2011). Stressing egalitarianism, they oversaw distributions, work crews, 
workshops, and cooperative labor and shared resources such as libraries and child care. 
Democratic elections, majority votes on issues and negotiations were made at general 
assembly meetings. Refugees self-organized in the camps and saw it as important to not 
“give in to asistencialismo, a term the adopted to describe passive acceptance of and 
reliance on international aid. Rather they embraced the collective way of life that was in 
many ways encouraged (or perhaps forced) by the very nature of the closed refugee 
camps.” (Todd 2010: 162-163) 
Refugees also orchestrated their own systems of communal justice and security. 
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Men formed grupos de vigilancia to patrol the perimeter of the camp and to keep an eye 
out for suspicious behavior and the activity of troops surrounding the camp. In Mesa 
Grande, women formed an all-women security patrol, which monitored for men who 
engaged in abusive behaviors against women. Public identification by name and songs 
were used to publicly scorn individuals who were not abiding by moral codes. 
Assassinations are arguably the least discussed and least documented aspects of 
community justice within the camps; Guarjileños who lived in Mesa Grande have rarely 
spoken with me of this more violent side of the community justice system. 
Community systems of justice have existed in many parts of the world, including 
in indigenous and rural communities in Latin America. Assumed to be setting a more 
relativist set of disciplinary standards, they spark debates around the way injustices, 
violence, and inequalities are embedded in vernacular moral codes as much as they are in 
universalizing and state legal systems. Zibechi reminds us that community justice is 
locally, temporally, and spatially conditioned and is dependent on the social context out 
of which it arises. It constitutes an autonomous and non-state system of conflict 
resolution (Zibechi: 2010: 98). Based on his analysis of El Alto, he argues that such 
allyu-based and Aymara systems cannot be judged by Western standards. El Alto has a 
justice system inspired by community practices, and an autonomous method of self-
defense, each of which takes the place of work that state authorities and others will not 
do. Like in the case of refugee camp systems of justice and security, these were necessary 
systems in the absence of state’s regulation of legality and security. UNHCR 
representatives rarely intervened in disputes, nor were Honduran authorities or military 
personnel to intervene. As Zibechi suggests, the issue of communal justice nevertheless 
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“deserves deeper discussion, and requires the capacity to grasp without prejudice or 
compromise practices that should not be justified by state hostility or dangerous 
situations.” (2010: 99). 
For displaced people of northern El Salvador, communal justice was therefore one 
of many systems that developed out of communal logics and practices, which were at 
their core driven by the need to overcome or to simply survive in extremely difficult 
conditions. In contexts of conflict and displacement (from the longer trajectory of 
campesino organizing, to collective action during wartime, to the communitarian work of 
refugees, and beyond) collective practices had to be learned, honed, and improved as 
people navigate harsh circumstances. They were not without internal tensions and 
divisions, selfish interests, and forms conflict and even violence that were at times 
worked out and at other times not. In Smith-Nonini’s (2010: 65) words, “these histories 
suggest that to understand origins of the ethic of solidarity in the repopulated villages, 
one must begin with the harsh lessons of the conflict and the process that campesinos 
went through of learning to trust their neighbors under fire. This, combined with a deep 
distrust of state authorities, helped to create conditions for much larger collective 
projects.” 
One collective project that was initiated and developed in the refugee camps that 
had a far reaching and long lasting impact was the popular education movement. With 
family members and neighbors, often with very little formal education, educating their 
peers, popular education brought literacy and an educational system to refugees who 
otherwise would not have access to one. Embedded in the teaching and learning modules 
was another purpose, however, which was to cultivate a political consciousness by 
 84 
narrating a shared history of struggle, experience of collective action and organization, 
and imagination of future social change. The history offered in popular education 
narratives stood in contrast to the version sanctioned by the state taught in public schools 
throughout El Salvador. In popular narratives, key moments of Salvadoran history (La 
Matanza of 1932, the Soccer War of 1969, among others) positioned campesinos as 
central agents of social change and emphasized the power of organizing and the 
leadership of revolutionary figures such as Jose Martí, whereas state narratives depicted 
them as violent rebels or passive victims (Todd 2010: 175-183). Popular education also 
went beyond nationalist narratives by raising students’ awareness of the lasting 
consequences of Spanish Conquest, the impact of U.S. imperialism and military 
intervention in shaping their circumstances, and by emphasizing a pan-Latin American 
solidarity. (Todd: 186)  
The popular education model was carried over and expanded in Chalatenango 
following refugee resettlements, filling the void of accessible state-sponsored public 
education in the region. While the region was still being targeted in military sweeps 
through the end of the war in 1992, teachers would sit with students under trees in case of 
bombardment, ready to retreat to safer areas and tatús at the warning of aerial raids and 
military invasions.
27
 Classroom infrastructure was gradually built, and even as popular 
schools were eventually put under the auspices of the Ministry of Education years after 
the war ended, the historical narratives and political conscious-building infused in local 
curriculum and in the styles of local teachers carries a lasting effect for Chalatecos. Its 
effects are especially powerful considering that the project of cultivating an alternative 
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 Several such wartime experiences of popular education were shared in my interviews with community 
members collected in Guarjila in January 2001. 
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historical memory of social struggle has consequently conditioned subjectivities, 
memories, and knowledges that diverge from those that the state has sought to cultivate 
through the postwar nation-state building project. As I discussed in chapter 2, the postwar 
nation-state project, in looking toward an imaginary of a transnationalist modernity, 
emphasized universalist values and an erasure of indigenous identities and those 
historical memories that rekindled troubled times of conflict and volatility. 
A collective political consciousness was also expressed through the creative 
production of poetry, theatre, and music, and these served as a different form of 
community education in the refugee camps. Many were expressions of sentiments of 
solidarity, of discontent with the Salvadoran government, and of commemoration of 
events and experiences important to them. The massacre at the Sumpul River, for 
example, became an annual day of commemoration in Mesa Grande. Other creative 
works expressed refugees’ longings to return to El Salvador for times of peace.28  
Todd suggests that popular education, together with the collective organizing 
practices that they developed in the refugee camps, served a “dual purpose:” 
“…first, to improve the quality of life in the camps and in the border region in 
general; and, second, to prepare for their eventual return to El Salvador. ‘The 
experiences with community management that we are acquiring here,’ explained 
the popular teacher’s manual, ‘will serve us well when we return to El Salvador. 
There, we will have many duties of popular participation. That is why we should 
practice here our own participation and collective responsibility.’ A Mesa Grande 
poet agreed: ‘What we are experiencing and learning here at Mesa Grande / we 
know that it will help us…/ when we return to our country, because working 
[together, collectively] / we become better organized.’ As these lines indicate, 
Salvadoran campesinos continued to view communal organization and collective 
labor as crucial steps toward a more promising and productive future in El 
Salvador.” (2010: 162-163) 
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 See Todd’s analysis of narratives expressed through creative work and popular education (2010: 165-
179) 
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Refugees had grown tired of refugee life and had been longing to return, and 
began forming plans for repatriation.
29
 They had hoped to wait until peace had returned 
to El Salvador, but instead returned even as the war continued. With a lower intensity 
conflict than when they had fled in guindas and with President Jose Napoleon Duarte in 
power, who had at least initiated peace talks and promised to end the death squads, they 
hoped the conditions of the conflict had changed. UNHCR had entertained the idea of 
repatriations in a couple of meetings with Salvadoran and Honduran officials in 1986, but 
the refugees’ return to El Salvador ended up being initiated and orchestrated by refugees 
themselves. 
The series of mass repatriations of thousands refugees to northern El Salvador 
were a carefully organized and risky endeavor. The Salvadoran government vehemently 
opposed the idea, arguing that the repatriations were supported by the FMLN and that it 
would not be in national interest given that the war continued. Refugees formed a 
committee that decided on terms and strategies for repopulation. Appealing to UNHCR 
representatives, they demanded that the Salvadoran government recognize their status as 
Salvadoran nationals, not force them to join the military, and not bomb or occupy their 
civilian-populated communities.  
Without approval from the UNHCR or the Salvadoran government, the refugees 
already began preparing for the return of thousands of refugees at a time in a series of 
trips. Salvadoran officials finally began negotiating directly with refugee commission 
from Mesa Grande, who insisted on the massive rather than gradual and small 
repatriations favored by the government. Despite resistance from military officials, 
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 People of Guarjila commonly narrate their motivation for return as being motivated by a general 
sentiment of feeling “tired of being refugees.”    
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President Duarte ultimately used his executive authority at the last second to approve of 
the repatriations. An earlier Central American accord allowed for it and it would have 
reflected poorly on the government in the international spotlight. (Under President 
Duarte, El Salvador was receiving as much as a million dollars a day in military aid from 
the United States on the pretext that it was upholding a certifiable human rights record.)  
In October 1987, more than 4,000 refugees returned to El Salvador to repopulate 
five communities they had collectively and strategically chosen in the departments of 
Chalatenango, Cabañas, and Cuscatlán. It marked the largest repatriation in Latin 
American history. This initial repatriation, which included the repopulation of the 
community of Guarjila and its neighbor, Los Ranchos, was the first of what would be 
seven total repopulations over the following two years. The refugees were ready to make 
the trek on foot when UNHCR came through at the last minute with buses to transport 
them. At the border, the line of buses stretched more than two miles, while 25 Salvadoran 
military officers interrogated and registered individuals crossing into Salvadoran 
territory. Guarjileños tell of that day at the border as memorably hot, of seeking shade 
under the buses —  some of them sleeping under them during the night — but also of the 
great joy they felt in returning to their home country. At the border that night they 
celebrated Catholic Mass, set off fireworks, and kissed the ground upon reaching 
Salvadoran territory. Guarjileños suggest that the sympathetic international organizations 
and individuals — who they simply refer to as la solidaridad internacional (the 
international solidarity) — who accompanied them at the border drew international 
attention to the repopulation movement and facilitated the return by demanding 
accountability from officials. The road into the abandoned hamlets of Guarjila and Los 
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Ranchos was impassable, and so returnees finished the final stretch of the trip on foot, 
chopping away the monte (tall grass and brush). Upon arrival, they found Guarjila to be 
surrounded by soldiers.
30
 
Making Community in Guarjila  
When some two hundred families coming from Mesa Grande repopulated 
Guarjila, it was in ruins and overgrown with monte. Abandoned during the war, the 
hamlet had been home to just a few families. Only a handful of relatively dispersed 
homes made of adobe and bahareque (a mix of clay, mud, stones, cane, logs and 
bamboo) were standing, some of which had by then been bombed out and were missing 
roofs and walls. The new arrivals began to make quickly built champitas (improvisational 
shelters) and dwellings of bahareque. Without any electricity or potable water in the 
community, several families would sleep under a single shelter. This was the beginning 
of the relatively recent work of (re)building Guarjila: of carving out a place to live and of 
creating another kind of community, even amid military invasions and sweeps in a war 
that would continue for more than four more years until the Peace Accords were signed 
in January 1992. 
Making and remaking Guarjila was necessarily a collective project during the 
war, just as it continues to be such a project in different and varying ways in the postwar 
context (this will be explored in the next chapter). Some of the knowledge and practices 
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 I draw from Smith-Nonini’s (2010: 93) account from her first-hand experience of the return, Lara 
Martinez’s (2011) record of oral histories, and the way the story is commonly narrated by people of 
Guarjila in my conversations with them and in Aparicio’s (2006) compilation of local stories related to Jon 
Cortina’s life. 
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employed and honed in Mesa Grande, which developed out of the northern region’s much 
longer history of organizing and collective action, were applied, developed, and reworked 
in a new setting. They began to harvest food through communal farming and gardening. 
They formed new work crews and committees to coordinate different areas of collective 
labor, including communal agricultural production, food preparation at the comedor 
communal (communal kitchen), community-based education and health care, and a range 
of cooperatives for productive activities including carpentry, embroidery, among others. 
Teachers from Mesa Grande and others moved ahead with the popular education model, 
meeting with students under trees, without any classroom infrastructure until 1989. The 
popular education movement in the region grew to include some 45 schools and 200 
teachers after the war (Lara Martinez 2011). Those who were nurses in Mesa Grande, 
together with doctors working in regional FMLN encampments, helped plant the 
foundations for what would become a long-lasting and wide-reaching popular health care 
system in the region (see Smith-Nonini 2010). 
After the resettlement, the directiva communal (the representative board that was 
formed to solve problems and coordinate projects in Guarjila) became part of a larger 
association that oversaw community directivas in the region: Coordinadora de 
Comunidades y Repoblaciones (Coordinator of Communities and Repopulations, or 
CCR).
31
 Born with membership from repopulated community members, the association 
has come to represent the interests and projects of FMLN-sympathetic communities 
mainly in eastern Chalatenango. Community leaders from Guarjila and other repopulated 
communities have been very active in the organization. The CCR’s presence contributed 
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 After the war, the association was later renamed Asociación de Comunidades para el Desarrollo de 
Chalatenango (Association of Communities for the Development of Chalatenango, or CCR). 
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to the formation of a regional identity characterized by shared community interests (Lara 
Martinez 2011). 
Salvadoran anthropologist Carlos Lara Martinez’s forthcoming book extensively 
documents the campesino movement of Chalatenango through oral histories from 
Guarjila and the neighboring community of Los Ranchos. According to Lara Martinez, 
while under siege between 1987 and 1992, the communities of Guarjila and Los Ranchos 
developed a strong sense and practice of community, conditioned by their experience in 
Mesa Grande: 
“Upon arriving to Guarjila and to Los Ranchos, the repopulation committees 
constituted the directivas comunales of these populations, developing more or less 
the same social organization that they were maintaining in the Mesa Grande 
refuge. This gave the revolutionary semi-campesinos a strong sense of 
community, which allowed them to face in a cohesive way the constant 
harassment of the military and of Salvadoran authorities…. 
 
But, the social organization that had been inherited in the Mesa Grande refugee 
camp not only helped them to face the military and Salvadoran authorities, but it 
also constituted the base to satisfy the basic needs of these communities, 
fomenting the participation of all of the returnees in the solution of problems and 
of the most urgent necessities. With its base in this social organization of a 
participative kind, the social project of these communities was developed, 
promoting a sense of community of a collectivist character in which the interests 
and needs of the collective were more important than those of its individual 
members.” (2011: 140) 
 
As Martinez mentions, harassment by military officials and personnel necessitated 
collectivist efforts in the project of (re)building. Guarjila and eastern Chalatenango 
continued to be at the heart of the civil war and were considered enemy territory. The 
region, by then heavily deforested from aerial sweeps, had already endured years of the 
U.S. government-led and Vietnam-motivated counter-insurgency strategy of “draining 
the sea,” of displacing and murdering those who inhabited the area on the pretext that 
they were assumed to be FMLN combatants or their sympathizers. Bombings and attacks 
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continued in the region as FMLN combatants maintained a presence in the hills. 
Organizing the community (or simply getting by in Guarjila) could only be advanced 
with the rotation of community members at hilltop posts to warn Guarjileños of incoming 
soldiers, with the refuge of tatús, and with regular communication with the FMLN.  
International support was crucial after the resettlement. Resources and materials 
were garnered through international support from the Lutheran and Catholic churches as 
well as other organizations acting in solidarity with the resettled communities. But the 
Salvadoran military and government placed impediments to their ability to seize the 
outside resources and assistance they were offered by denying them national identity 
cards and permission to bring new construction material to the community as a method of 
control. When the military personnel arrived in the communities in an effort to capture 
community members on the pretext that they were FMLN combatants, the warning bell 
would be sounded and the entire community would come to the scene and offer 
protection to community members through their presence as a crowd. Similarly, the 
communities used the power of collective action to bring in building materials, 
medicines, food, and other resources by going to pick up materials as an entire 
community. 
One story that has been told time and again in Guarjila is that of the construction 
of the community’s clinic, led by two religious figures that were influential and continue 
to be revered in the community: Sister Ann Manganaro and Fr. Jon Cortina. Sister Ann, 
an American Catholic nun and pediatrician, came to live and work with people in 
Guarjila until her death from cancer in 1993. She began by practicing and teaching 
backpack medicine, and she was instrumental in coordinating the popular health 
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movement in Chalatenango. Fr. Jon, a Basque Jesuit priest affiliated with the Universidad 
Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas (Central American University, or UCA) and an 
engineer by training, was influential in organizing and building Guarjila, both in its 
infrastructure and in its spirit.  He first met the returning refugees at the El 
Salvador/Honduran border and accompanied them in their repatriation and then continued 
to base his outreach efforts in Guarjila. He immediately became a well-loved member of 
the community who was regularly present there until his cancer-related death in 2005. In 
the early 1990s, out of a desire for some basic laboratory and medical equipment in a 
clinic in Guarjila, Sister Ann worked with Fr. Cortina to put together a proposal for a 
community clinic. They were able to secure twenty-five thousand dollars in donations for 
its construction. In a book that documents Guarjileños’ stories about Jon Cortina, a 
community member recalled the way in which Fr. Cortina used to tell the story: 
“That’s when it occurred to Father Jon that they could build a clinic and also a 
little hospital. They sat down and made the design. The one pending thing was 
that they had to ask for permission from the Fourth Brigade [where there was a 
military checkpoint on the road]. So, in 1991, Ann and Fr. Jon and others from the 
directiva went to speak to the Fourth Brigade. They said to them: ‘we cannot give 
you that approval. You have to go the Major State of the Armed Forces in San 
Salvador. Here we can’t do that.’ 
 
They didn’t wait any longer and they went. When they arrived the Colonel 
received them, and they presented the request they brought along and what they 
wanted: ‘we want to bring construction material to Guarjila and we need your 
permission to be able to do so, because without that they will not let us pass 
through with it.’ The colonel asked them: ‘and how are you going to do this big 
construction project if you don’t have an engineer?’ Fr. Jon quickly responded: ‘I 
am an engineer, and I’m the one who is going to direct the construction.’ And the 
man added a different question in rebuttal: ‘and why do you want this big clinic if 
you don’t have a doctor? Even worse still, where you live!’ ‘Well look, I am a 
pediatrician and a doctor. I will work there,’ answered Sister Ann. Then, the man 
had no other choice but to say that he accepted, but that he was going to mail 
them the approval. In the end, they kept waiting about two weeks and the 
approval never arrived. 
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Since the roadblock would not let them pass through with the material, Fr. Jon, 
Sister Ann and all of us, the people, went to bring the wood, the lamina [sheets of 
corrugated metal] and everything from there, carrying them on our heads and on 
our shoulders, to be able to transfer it to Guarjila. We had no other way, at 
midnight, at one or two in the morning, when the roadblock wasn’t there, to pass 
through with the material. 
 
When the approval finally arrived in Guarjila, the clinic was finished. The 
inauguration of the clinic was in 1992.” (Aparicio 2006: 76) 
 
The clinic was named in honor of Sister Ann. In 1987, she immediately 
recognized that the community, having arrived from Honduras with very little, and 
injured FMLN combatants from the surrounding hills who were often relatives of 
resettled community members, needed health care services. She began training and 
working with nurses, some of whom already had popular health care experience in Mesa 
Grande and others who had worked with the clandestine hospitals organized through the 
FPL to serve FMLN combatants. Between 1987 and 1989, she had helped to coordinate 
and train a network of more than 200 health promoters working throughout 
Chalatenango.
32
 After the war, Guarjila’s popular health clinic expanded to include 
physical therapy and other services, benefiting from international donations and doctors. 
People regularly came to the clinic from surrounding communities and Honduras.  As 
was the case with its popular school as well, Guarjila’s clinic was the last in the region to 
transition to become integrated into the national system, allowing for government 
oversight, resources, and regulations. It was only agreed to after the 2009 FMLN-elected 
government conceded to allow community-trained medical practitioners to keep their 
jobs at the clinic, rather than being replaced by a completely new set of government-
certified medical professionals. The health clinic expanded to include services such as 
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 Based on interview with community health clinic practitioner and promoter in Guarjila in July 2010. 
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gynecological and psychological care once national resources were accepted.
33
 
The popular health care model, with roots in Guarjila and in the network of 
community-based and FMLN encampment-based health promoters, has been influential 
on the national scale. As Smith-Nonini (2010) documents in her rich ethnography, the 
community-infused logic and practice of popular health care inspired the 2001 “white 
marches” against privatized health care services throughout El Salvador. When the 2009 
presidential election went to El Salvador’s first-ever FMLN president, Mauricio Funes, 
he named a native of the eastern Chalatenango community of Arcatao to serve as his 
Minister of Health.
34
 Selected to working most closely under her leadership: a doctor who 
spent years in FMLN encampments, and a Guarjileña who spent years working in 
Guarjila’s clinic and was also instrumental in leading the popular health movement. The 
new FMLN leaders referred to some of their proposed health policy reforms as part of the 
“Guarjilanization” of El Salvador’s health care system. 
Fr. Jon Cortina’s long-range engagement made him perhaps the most iconic figure 
of Guarjila. Beyond acting as a spiritual guide in solidarity with the community, he 
helped introduce resources, knowledge, and organization for several valuable community 
projects. Among these, the community’s two main colonias, or housing developments, 
were constructed with his support. He helped design and find resources to build a system 
that channeled potable water to the community from distant hilltops. On the first full day 
I spent in Guarjila, in July 1999, I was assigned to join a 4am voluntarily rotated work 
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 The community’s political dilemma over whether or not to allow for Ministry of Health’s proposed 
oversight and resources was an ongoing and highly contentious issue. I witnessed how it played out in 
debates of community meetings during fieldwork in July and August 2007 and between 2008 and 2010. 
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  Minister of Health Violeta Menjivar was also a former mayor of San Salvador, representing the FMLN. 
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crew that was working on expanding the water system. I followed along in the line of 
women, men, adolescents, and elderly who trotted up and down the hillsides in sandals 
on an hour-long trek that humid morning, through the inversion of clouds sitting in 
between the lush green hills. I spent the day up there hauling buckets to make concrete, 
with a mid-day reward of wood-fired pupusas. (This was my first, and perhaps most well-
remembered, pupusa: the delicious stuffed thick tortillas that are a national pride of 
Salvadorans. In rural Chalatenango, they are typically made with tortillas from local 
maize and filled with the local red beans and soft white cheese.) 
In November 1989, the FMLN launched the Final Offensive, an attempt to end 
and win the war through a sudden, clandestinely organized, and large-scale attack that 
closed in on San Salvador targeting particular officials from the opposition. 
Chalatenango-based FPL combatants were part of the offensive, some of whom were 
recruited to join or rejoin the FMLN for the operation. The attack failed to win the FMLN 
the war, but resulted in several days of brutal combat in city streets, the wide-scale 
bombing of poor areas on San Salvador’s periphery, and the notorious murder of six 
Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and her daughter at the UCA. Fr. Jon was not among 
those martyred priests only because on that day he was in Guarjila. The murder of the 
Jesuits brought a new level of international attention to the atrocities and human rights 
violations in El Salvador’s war. Fr. Jon’s continued presence in Guarjila, as someone who 
embodied martyrdom of his colleagues and carried on their work, translated to particular 
significance and meaning for Guarjileños and their own sense of community as 
emblematic of the collective struggle of marginalized and oppressed Salvadorans. 
In the final years of the war, violence intensified as a series of vicious reprisals 
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followed the Final Offensive. Neither side could see a win on the horizon, and the 
violence was producing a growing sense of fatigue and discouragement on all fronts. The 
Chapultepec Peace Accords, signed in Mexico City in January 1992, brought a much 
awaited peace to El Salvador through a cease-fire. It reduced the size of the military 
drastically, established a civilian police force, and recognized the FMLN as a political 
party upon the demobilization of guerilla forces. Among the several reforms was a land 
reform mandate. This meant that families in Guarjila were each parceled about three 
manzanas (about five acres) of land they could use for agricultural cultivation.  
As Lara Martinez (2011) remarks, the acquisition of private property for 
Guarjileños was one factor in the transition away from a more communal system of life 
toward integration into what he terms “the dominant national capitalist system.” In his 
view, the communities are becoming further integrated into the dominant national 
capitalist system through the opening of small family businesses (tienditas and chalets) in 
the communities, the use of migrants’ remittances, and as proposed large-scale 
development projects affect the region (including a Canadian corporation’s proposal to 
mineral mine in the area and the construction of an international highway through 
Chalatenango). Nevertheless, he argues that Guarjila and Los Ranchos, networked among 
other communities in the region, continue to maintain a strong affinity to community-
based work that stands in contrast to the dominant national system.  
In the chapter that follows, I present my own reading of some of the changes and 
dilemmas that Guarjila and other communities in the region face in the postwar condition, 
and how they are entangled with Guarjileños’ continued struggle to make meaning of 
place, community, and a collective history to which they are attached.  This chapter has 
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offered a long-range history of collectivism, communal systems, and community-making 
present among Chalatecos, which linked to particular practices and logics they used to 
navigate conditions not of their choosing from contexts of rural organizing, mobility and 
displacement, and resettlement. Even as they transitioned to a postwar period 
characterized in large part by the effects of state-sponsored neoliberalism and of 
international migration, this collective history held high value in the identity-making 
work of building community, and these practices and logics continued to condition how 
they went about constructing and building a rooted community-in-place. 
  
CHAPTER 4 
Postwar Dilemmas 
A photograph recently arrived in my Facebook News Feed of the Longitudinal del 
Norte, the new, modern highway that now crosses the length of El Salvador’s historically 
marginalized northern region and is set to serve as a new trade corridor for Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. I was immediately reminded of my final days of 
dissertation fieldwork in Guarjila in May 2011, when I realized that the sense of peace 
one feels there in the evenings — something I have always appreciated in the more than 
thirteen years I have known the place — would soon be disrupted by the sound of trucks 
now that there was a highway being constructed through the middle of town. The 
photograph was taken from atop el cerro la Mesa where one can still find bullet shells in 
the grass from the civil war. The hill, which overlooks Guarjila, served as a key lookout 
point to warn the community if the military was approaching. The photographer took the 
picture peering down on the dots of red tile and corrugated metal roofs nestled in the 
landscape of green hills, now with a brown line running between them, to update 
Guarjileños living in the United States and other parts of the world, along with the 
community’s many international visitors, about the advancements of the highway 
project.
35
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networks established with internationals from solidarity and humanitarian groups who have worked in the 
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Clearly, during the two decades that followed the ending of civil war in 1992, 
circumstances had changed for Guarjileños and other Chalatecos. In the postwar period, 
even after Peace Accord agreements established land reform and granted the FMLN a 
political party status, eastern Chalatenango continued to be a marginalized region. The 
right-wing national government barreled on with free market reforms that deepened 
inequalities and further disenfranchised rural smallholders. Many of those who had 
resettled communities in eastern Chalatenango were now resettled in new destinations: all 
over the United States and elsewhere. Motivated to leave in pursuit of better living 
conditions, they remained connected to “home” through remittances, phone calls, and 
social media. Far beyond the end of bombings and military invasions of the war, these 
communities were now resisting new sorts of invasions: a foreign corporation determined 
to embark on mineral mining extraction in the area; an international highway that would 
permanently change the region’s landscape, geography, and economic dynamics; and the 
flood of migrants’ remittances, which had already changed community economics to the 
extent that many felt it had pacified local interest in community organizing and 
mobilizing resistance to such perceived “threats” to community. 
This chapter explores some of these changes, with a focus on migration and the 
implications it has had for postwar community-building. The 1992 Peace Accords 
marked a significant moment of change, one that is widely interpreted of as a breakage 
point after which the sense of meaning that came from a collective struggle during times 
of war was suddenly translated to little more than a distant past, a mythicized and 
politicized memory in a neoliberal present. Certainly, Guarjileños have been feeling the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
region, have also led Chalatecos to migrate to several countries other than the United States, such as 
Sweden, Germany, and Spain. 
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effects of neoliberal economic policies and of wide-scale undocumented emigration, as 
the forces of global capitalism have reshaped community life. They became largely 
disillusioned with NGOs, so-called grassroots leadership, and the FMLN, who many felt 
had given in to selfish interests. They became concerned about the divisive consequences 
of emigration and remittances. Along with these changes, they became intimately in 
touch with various forms of globalization, and political imaginaries were shifting. 
 Yet even amid changing conditions and new sets of dilemmas, I emphasize that 
the (re)making of the community and place of Guarjila – of carving out a place and 
forming a community laden with meaning and identity – was a constant political project 
linked to a longer-range struggle. A sense of collective identity was in the making that 
was strongly rooted in a history of struggle and in an attachment to a territorialized place 
that they had been (re)constructing since its resettlement, even as Guarjila’s conditions 
and identity were increasingly “transnational.”  Although the work of community-making 
changes in form, Guarjileños continue to draw upon practices and logics that have 
developed out of their trajectory of collective struggle to navigate postwar conditions and 
dilemmas. For Guarjileños and others of Chalatenango, community making has been a 
mobile and cross-border experience, and an experience linked to social movement 
organizing. It is an experience that has shaped varying subjectivities across time and 
space that engage with a range of meanings, identities, and discourses of community in 
different ways. 
In this chapter, I will first elaborate on this theoretical perspective which centers 
on the idea that communities (in this case tied to a particular place) and the meanings 
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associated with them are relational, changing, and made in practice.
36
 I stress that 
international flows, attachments to territory, and a shared experience of struggle can all 
powerfully condition the many ways people invest in this political work of making 
community.  
I then begin to explore the question of meaning and identity in the postwar 
context by reflecting on the way Chalatenango is perceived today in national 
imaginations as emblematizing either Leftist nostalgia, backwardness, or the 
traditionalism of countryside peasantry. I juxtapose these images against an acute 
ethnographic situation that ensued in Guarjila surrounding the 2009 elections, which 
lends evidence to Guarjileños shifting political subjectivities and their own relation to 
both globalization (mainly through migration) and to the weighted past that so much 
defines outsiders’ impressions of the place where they live.  
In the section that follows, I discuss the growth and practices of international 
emigration, primarily to the United States, during the late 1990s and early to mid-2000s, 
based on my long-range engagement with the community and its migrants. In this 
discussion, I suggest that postwar emigration is not only motivated by inequality, 
violence, and social networks, but that it is also another form of mobility tied to 
collective and community-based practices, making it part of the region’s much longer 
trajectory of collective struggle and community-building.  
I then turn to an analysis of the kinds of local dilemmas, tensions, and the cultural 
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emphasize relationality to highlight how these logics and practices, although multiple, varying, and always 
being reconstructed, persist even in a changing postwar context. 
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politics that developed as conditions were reshaped through migration, remittances, and 
neoliberal globalization. I discuss the real and perceived effects of migration and 
remittances, which are framed in grassroots narratives as detrimental to community 
organizing.  
In the final part of the chapter, I explore how these dilemmas and debates played 
out by examining the community’s reaction to the proposed construction of a highway 
through the middle of Guarjila. By bringing to light local tensions and discontent with 
local leadership, the FMLN, and the social consequences of migration and remittances, I 
argue that what was viewed as a “failure” to organize against the highway’s intrusion 
nonetheless elucidates the tremendous value that Guarjileños’ place on their rooted 
project of building community and identity, even within a transnational context, 
something that was rendered invisible and undervalued in the logic of development and 
progress that guided the state sanctioned highway project. 
Conceptualizing Postwar Community-Building 
The conceptualization of postwar community-building among Guarjileños and 
other resettled communities that I present here builds on the idea that this work is 
relational and crosses borders, but that it has also entailed the work of rooting, especially 
as the community has become increasingly engaged with migration and various forms of 
globalization. After the resettlement of Guarjila, Guarjileños continued to build 
community and to build a place through its (re)construction. This work of connecting 
community to a territorial place and the shared history of collective struggle, I argue, 
gave particular meaning to postwar community-building. As political work, community-
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building took on new significance and meaning as the community confronted new 
postwar “threats” (or changes) from migration, remittances, and other forms of 
globalization. Yet, even as postwar migration was understood as a “threat” to community, 
it also involved collectivist practices and gave meaning to Guarjileños’ longer collective 
struggle to make community. 
Conventional anthropological analysis used to treat communities and places, and 
the identities assigned to them, as rather fixed and bounded. Following the influence of 
post-structuralist theoretical approaches and the discipline’s “reflexive turn” by the 
1970s, the discipline began to emphasize the relationality and fluidity of communities, 
places, and identities. By the 1990s, a new focus on transnational connections, in part 
through migration research, further destabilized earlier assumptions by emphasizing the 
unbounded and cross-border characteristics of places and groups of people (Basch et al. 
1994; Kearney 1995; Levitt 2001). These theories emphasized that migration itself, and 
the spaces and flows in between “deterritorialized” places, were making new sorts of 
fluid and hybrid identities (Appadurai 1991; Gupta & Ferguson 1992).  
Guarjileños’ practices of making community are in part tied to the experiences 
and hybridized identities linked to migration and transnationalism. But they are also 
importantly linked to the meaningful territorial place of Guarjila itself. Geographers, 
especially, have emphasized that “place,” like “community,” should be understood as a 
relational and fluid category that is not bounded in territory or by a singular meaning. 
Rather, places can represent any convergence of time and space, and they are always 
being made and remade in practice. In this view, places are “open-ended” processes that 
are provisional and contested. They are works-in-progress that are being produced in 
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relation to work, narratives, movement, history, memory, landscapes, other places, and so 
forth (Massey 1994, 2005). The work of “place making” (Gupta & Ferguson 1997) — the 
active practice of building place and constructing the identities and meanings associated 
with place — represents a particularly valued political struggle for Guarjileños, 
considering that, as a group of displaced refugees from other parts of Chalatenango and 
northern El Salvador, they chose to resettle the abandoned place in 1987. The (re)making 
of Guarjila necessarily entailed communal practices and logics for survival during five 
more years of civil war. These practices and logics continued to condition the work of 
community-building, by then tied to a particular territory, in the postwar context. After 
years of mobility and displacement, those of resettled communities were partaking in the 
active work of rooting community in place.  
Following the 1992 Peace Accords, the struggle to make the place of Guarjila 
continued but took on new meanings and strategies in a context of postwar 
reconstruction, marginalization, and growing international emigration. The attached 
political (and practical) struggles of making community and making place held particular 
value in coping with, and working with, migration and globalization. The concerns that 
emerged in the community with “defending” community-in-place through collective 
action and organizing as it was being “threatened” by the pacifying consequences of 
migration and remittances, and the invasion of a large-scale development project, 
resonates with experiences elsewhere in Latin America where people in particular places 
have developed strategies to resist globalizing processes that they perceive to be 
threatening to local livelihoods, autonomy, and ecology. The discussion in this chapter 
contributes to these studies of the “politics of place” (Prazniak & Dirlik 2001; Harcourt & 
105 
Escobar 2005; Keith & Pile 1993; Oliver-Smith 2010), and it helps to broaden this lens 
by highlighting how migration and globalization are both resisted and engaged in the 
project of making meaningful community in a local and transnational context. 
The postwar period of neoliberal peace and migration introduced a whole new set 
of dilemmas, polemics, and transformations around the meanings and practices of 
community that were yet to be sorted out. Coping with old and new forms of 
marginalization conditioned by the slew of state-led neoliberal reforms, and with a 
significant part of the community abroad but involved in community life through cross-
border economic and social exchanges, Guarjileños came to be deeply in touch with how 
globalizing processes were shaping their own lives and their community’s 
transformations. 
Out of necessity, community strategies were developed to cope with the 
conditions of marginalization shaped by the effects of neoliberalism and what I would 
call an “active absence” of state-led development in communities known for attempting a 
revolutionary movement against the state. One important community strategy, as this 
chapter discusses, was to advantageously garner resources from those organizations and 
groups that were sympathetic to the FMLN’s side of the conflict and from international 
NGOs generally concerned with aiding in postwar reconstruction. This strategy built on 
tactics they had used as refugees in Mesa Grande, discussed in the previous chapter. 
Communal logics and practices continued to condition the ways in which postwar 
reconstruction (and more broadly, community-building) were understood and practiced, 
even as Guarjileños grappled with how to make community organizing and collective 
action work in the shifting postwar context.  
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Even as its fragmenting consequences were a source of community discontent that 
evolved into the intensifying local cultural politics that I discuss in this chapter, postwar 
migration was also worked into the collective project of community-making. Migration 
became a community-based strategy, a form of mobility that also drew upon the kinds of 
communal and collectivist logics and practices cultivated in prior contexts of prewar and 
wartime mobility.  
As one part of a longer trajectory of collective struggle, postwar migration 
therefore also gave meaning to the community and place of Guarjila. Like communities 
and places, the collective identities and meanings attached to them should not be 
conceived of as bounded or fixed, singular, or assigned. Extending social practice 
theories, identities can be understood as dialogically constructed through people’s 
engagement with enduring struggles in local contentious practice (Bourdieu 1977; 
Bakhtin 1981; Holland & Lave 2001). The experience of collective social struggle, (in 
and for community, place, and mobility in contexts of repression and later neoliberal 
marginalization and migration), I suggest, has an especially meaningful role in the 
making of the identities to which Guarjileños, and others of the region who share a 
similar historical experience, are attached.  
However, not everyone engages with the meanings, discourses, and practices 
linked to a collective sense of struggle in the same way. Rather, individuals engage with 
shared collective discourses and practices linked to collective struggle, pulling some in 
and pushing others away, according to diverse subjectivities and experiences. Through 
this work, identity is made and remade in shifting contexts and in diverse ways. As with 
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the projects of place-making and community-making, identity-making is always a work 
in progress.  
Despite the relational, shifting, and unbounded characteristics of identity-making, 
it is clear that a collective experience of social struggle, which came to be linked to the 
work of building community-in-place, conditioned the making of a rooted sense of 
collective identity in a powerful way. As Prazniak & Dirlik (2001) suggest, collective 
identities are often rooted in real places and place-based experiences, and they are 
important to political and economic projects.  
More often than not, someone from Guarjila, in the United States or in El 
Salvador, will identify themselves as “guarjileño” before acknowledging that they are 
indeed also “salvadoreño.” This makes sense, given that a history of struggle that gives 
meaning to their lives was largely a struggle against and without the state, which had its 
own imbued national discourses on patriotism that may feel more distant or less valued 
than Guarjileños’ sense of history and place. As I will discuss in this chapter, the 
construction of a highway project through Guarjila, aimed at serving neoliberal interests 
while also solving the economic problems of countryside people imagined to belong to a 
homogenized sea of poverty, emblematized the way Guarjileños’ strong sense of 
community identity was erased from view according to a particular logic of development 
and progress advanced by the state. 
I am thus presenting a relational but political perspective around the making of 
community, in a place-based but increasingly cross-border context. This perspective, I 
suggest, helps to reconcile a rather dualistic view that sees the work of building a rooted 
sense of “community” in the postwar present as a throwback to a romantic past and an 
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impoverished endeavor. From this view, communities like Guarjila at present are 
dominated by the forces of neoliberal globalization and marginalization, and 
undocumented emigration in the wake of a “failed” social movement is the manifestation 
of a resounding disillusionment and hopelessness with the promise of politics, resistance, 
and community. On these terms, capitalist flows constitute the primary force that shapes 
community activity, and the migration of those who have been forced to search for a 
better economic future elsewhere further fragments community and the potential for 
collective action. As Silber (2010) suggests, grassroots actors in Chalatenango employed 
a discourse that reflected a rather monolithic, mythical, and romanticized history of 
revolutionary struggle to impose new neoliberal duties and responsibilities on community 
members to become active participants in postwar reconstruction. She highlights how this 
reproduced various forms of violence and disillusionment in a fraught neoliberal present 
characterized by “broken promises” and displacement. In the aftermath of war, she 
suggests, locals were expected to translate their faded hopes for a revolution into a spirit 
of community organizing and to become active participants in postwar reconstruction and 
development. 
Migration and globalization have indeed had fragmenting effects on community, 
and this chapter contributes to discussions of the politics that grows out of concern with 
those effects. But the chapter also explores how even in these conditions, the making of 
community perseveres. As a project that changes in form across varying contexts, today 
this work engages migration and other forms of globalization even as it works against 
them. As much as postwar emigration became a source of public preoccupation and has 
had real, fragmenting effects on community dynamics, it was also a source of meaning 
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for the place and community of Guarjila.  Practices and logics that come from a long-
range trajectory of collective struggle continue to condition the work of making 
community, even as this struggle is understood and practiced in a plurality of ways and 
according to diverse subjectivities. The collective work of making community was, after 
all, perhaps the most powerful and enduring political project to emerge from Chalatecos’ 
prewar and wartime experience. It is a project tied to a longer story of community 
struggle that can be narrated in multiple ways. 
Identities and Imaginations of “Revolutionary” Chalatenango 
Guarjila and neighboring communities in eastern Chalatenango, at the heart of the 
civil war, today are regarded by FMLN-sympathetic nationals as an iconic place 
representative of revolutionary struggle. Non-Chalateco urbanites continue to embrace 
the region’s revolutionary roots. They seek out opportunities to emplace themselves in 
Guarjila and the neighboring communities and mountains as a sort of pilgrimage. In 
recent years, more and more San Salvador dwellers I knew were adventuring the two 
hour drive to la montañona, where they could sleep in recently constructed rustic cabins, 
enjoy stunning views, and take home remnants from the war. The mountaintop was an 
important site for the guerrilla army.  
Known internationally as a key site of FMLN insurrection, Guarjila itself is 
sometimes a destination for those who feel a desire to rekindle, reconnect, or perform 
their alliance with an “authentic” Left. For some, economic globalization reproduces a 
sense disconnect with a revolutionary spirit that has past. Swarms of FMLN- sympathetic 
visitors from other areas would come to Guarjila and neighboring communities for 
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festivals and commemorative events, some of which featured performances from invited 
local, national, or international “revolutionary music” bands. Two San Salvador 
acquaintances (cousins in their early twenties), regularly asserted their “FMLN identity” 
in conversation and in the political party’s street demonstrations, and they would 
frequently ask to come with me to visit Guarjila. But they only knew of the war from a 
sprinkling of incomplete stories from one’s father who led a clandestine life as a key 
player in the movement’s urban operations. Employed in sales and in a bilingual call 
center and with their family now living in a middle class suburb, they wanted to meet 
former revolutionaries, to sleep on a cot in an empty house and drink beer and tell stories; 
they simply wanted to be in Guarjila and fulfill a sense of authentication. Another 
acquaintance, an anthropology student at the University of El Salvador (an institution that 
maintains its ties to the militant Left), recently made the pilgrimage to Guarjila with his 
anarchist friends for their self-invented “Guarjila Punkie Fest”, where they spent the 
night playing their punk music alongside a local band that mixes punk and ska sounds 
with revolutionary lyrics.  
Right-wing counterparts who are sympathetic to the ARENA political party and 
deeply opposed the Leftist movement have a different view. From their view, the 
devastating conflict was the consequence of a terrorizing insurgent uprising in their 
country’s northern hills, and these communities are backward and brutish. The 
department of Chalatenango, decades before the civil war broke out, was referred to as 
the tierra olvidada (forgotten land) for its isolation and marginalization. Its eastern 
region, in which Guarjila is located, as a traditionally marginalized area that was at the 
heart of the twelve year long civil war, particularly conjures images of a violent 
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battleground between guerrilla insurgents and the Salvadoran military. For many 
Salvadorans, this part of Chalatenango evinces backwardness in a country that longs to 
move forward and to forget troubled times. In their view, the region is a reminder of the 
persistent presence of poverty and underdevelopment and of people that held El Salvador 
back by propagating more than a decade of violence with their insurgent activity. Many 
people avoid this part of the country out of feelings of resentment or the fear they will not 
be welcomed, or because they feel it simply doesn’t have anything to offer visitors. 
Yet more recently, Chalatenango has taken on a new kind of interest and 
popularity in the national sphere. Through the lens of national tourism, a sense of 
exoticism has been reconstructed. The region sparks a sense of fascination in touring 
nationals who are curious to explore its hard-to-come by cool breezes amid its pined 
mountainous landscape and to spot the mysteriously light-skinned people with green eyes 
and blond hair who are known to populate them.  
The mountain village of La Palma exemplifies the quintessential Chalatenango 
imagined by most Salvadoran visitors. Once home to the artist Fernando Lloyt, the town 
hosts a number of artisan cooperatives and businesses that replicate the artists’ technique 
of etching colorful country scenes onto pine wood-crafting, a style now understood as El 
Salvador’s most tipico or exemplary art. The site of unsuccessful peace talks in 1984, La 
Palma emanates a sense of peace to its visitors through its pristine distance from the 
bustle of El Salvador’s crowded lowlands and urban centers. One feels the courtesy, 
formality, and conservatism coming from the town’s local residents.  
Telling folks I worked in Chalatenango almost always elicited the same series of 
responses from non-Chalateco Salvadorans: “Está fresco alli, verdad?” (the air is nice 
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and cool there, isn’t it?), “Dicen que las chalatecas son bonitas, son cheles” (they say 
that Chalatecas are beautiful, they’re white), and finally, they would suggest 
(humorously, but every now and then, out of confusion) that I was Chalateco. After a 
certain point, out of a feeling that I was crushing romantic imaginations that were a 
source of pride in El Salvador’s ecological and human diversity, I cut back on efforts to 
explain that the eastern region where I worked was often hotter than San Salvador when 
heat got trapped in the basin of surrounding hills, that much of the area was deforested 
during the war, and that only some people had the prized blondish or reddish hair and 
hazel eyes. Nonetheless, Chalatenango is imagined to be a uniquely beautiful and 
mystical place that has recently garnered an increased appreciation in the national 
imagination. 
Shifting Political Imaginaries 
  Seen through the lens of outsiders from elsewhere in El Salvador, there is clearly 
something unique about Chalatenango.  It is a place that conjures images of iconic 
Salvadoran folklore, natural beauty, and diversity. It invokes deep seated sentiments 
around El Salvador’s turbulent history and around the country’s promise – or failure – to 
make “progress.” Whether perceived as El Salvador’s “purist” revolutionaries, as its most 
barbaric and backward, or as its most tranquil and traditional, Chalatecos’ own far more 
complex and rapidly changing reality was contributing to the constant reshaping of their 
own sense(s) of collective identity.  
Despite urban outsiders’ imaginations that the region could be characterized as 
poor and “backward” or as representing the “traditionalism” of campesino folklore, 
113 
Chalatecos could be considered to be quite cosmopolitan and worldly relative to many 
urbanites. The growth of migration in the 1990s and 2000s gave new meaning to their 
engagement with globalization and the United States. This much different reality of 
globalization and migration shifted political imaginaries, transformed identities, and 
presented new dilemmas. In what follows, I describe a situation that unfolded 
surrounding the 2009 presidential election which revealed the way historical political 
commitments that continue to give meaning to Guarjila were renegotiated and reconciled 
with a new sort of politics in the changing postwar present.  
The FMLN’s presidential nomination of Mauricio Funes was well-supported in 
Guarjila. An outspoken journalist critical of the government and national politics, Funes 
was more centrist than other FMLN candidates who had mixed support in Guarjila. 
Shafik Handal, the FMLN’s prior candidate who came from the party’s urban-led 
traditionally more communist ideological faction, represented a more militant Left and 
lost to ARENA’s Tony Saca. Guarjileños and others concurred that Funes’s ability to 
appeal to businesspeople and maintain positive relations with the United States, while 
hopefully pushing for new social reforms and policies, made him a candidate that could 
realistically lead the FMLN to win the presidency for the first time. 
In the months leading up to the March 2009 election during campaign time, a new 
and rather peculiar character who I had never met appeared in Guarjila.  Pedro, a Swiss 
man somewhere near the age of 60 who sported a ponytail, a green beret, and backpack, 
could be spotted moving about quickly on foot around the community, responding to 
local hellos with his signature “ah huh.” A foreigner who roamed the hills with the 
FMLN during the civil war, Pedro was said to have been deported from El Salvador in 
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the past but was known to return from time to time, getting involved with community and 
national politics, despite the illegality of his presence. He was a man well-known to 
community members and respected for his sympathetic stance toward the FMLN and the 
communities in the region, and so a few locals helped to harbor him in their homes.  
With his arrival timed to the presidential campaign, Pedro took on a set of 
responsibilities and tasks that he assigned to himself while living in the community, with 
the assistance of a young twenty-something protégé who shadowed him and also wore a 
beret and a backpack. His counterpart was from the eastern department of Santa Ana and 
had seen a video about the war that featured Pedro. Following his own political 
inclinations, he chose to find and meet Pedro and work with him on whatever he 
happened to be up to.  
Pedro proceeded to make a number of political murals and banners on display 
around the community with revolutionary messages in support of the FMLN’s campaign. 
One such banner, which hung on the wall of a tiendita on the main street for several 
months, depicted Funes alongside the faces of other recent and iconic Leftist presidents in 
Latin America, including Rafael Correa, Ignacio Lula, Fernando Lugo, and Daniel 
Ortega. Evo Morales and Fidel Castro were positioned on each side of Hugo Chavez, 
who was in the middle of the line of presidential leaders. 
Pedro attended community meetings and was quick to jump in to loudly voice his 
opinions. He would often call for more radical responses to issues the community was 
dealing with through biting, critical comments, and sometimes, by simply heckling. After 
Sunday church service at the community chapel, he would hand out the latest Página de 
Maíz, a two-page piece of Leftist political propaganda with cartoons and short 
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commentaries produced by a San Salvador-based activist group.  
One of Pedro’s biggest projects in the months leading up to the election was his 
retén popular, a community-supported roadside checkpoint. Election fraud has long been 
an issue for Salvadoran national elections, and FMLN-sympathizers complained that, 
among other tactics, foreigners were consistently offered false identification cards and 
cash payments to vote for ARENA’s candidates. Pedro took it to himself, his young 
protégé, and crews of community volunteers he could round up to keep watch over a 
chain hung across the road through Guarjila. Without legal permission, he stopped traffic 
and buses coming from the direction of Honduras to check the IDs of those passing 
through. At one point, he caught eleven Hondurans who admitted to being on their way to 
accept fifty dollar payments to receive false voting cards. Pedro had them detained for a 
day in the community’s casa comunal (communal building) while they underwent 
questioning. 
The retén popular required all night vigilance. Pedro would recruit a crew of 
community volunteers to rotate in and hold down the fort each night, who would make a 
huge pot of coffee and sit in plastic chairs in the middle of town, chatting all night long. 
Others would come by for a while to be entertained. A few nights prior to the election, I 
attended the nightly vigil. That night, he read a letter of solidarity with the Salvadoran 
election sent from a Cuban political activist living in Venezuela. As he had been doing 
for several nights, he had a sheet up on which to project movies. “Which one would you 
like to see tonight: one about Romero or one about the war?” he asked. Indifferent, no 
one responded to his question, and he chose one himself. The options he provided were 
limited to those about wartime historical memory; perhaps people were just tired of 
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seeing movies about Archbishop Romero and about the civil war. Maybe the young 
people who gathered there at night to have “algo que hacer” (something to do) wanted to 
see a Hollywood flick this time? 
For many Guarjileños, Pedro personified a political identity that no longer made 
sense. Wearing his beret and backpack, calling for the kind of spontaneous collective 
action (as with the retén popular) that had been so important against wartime repression, 
and refusing to back down from radical activism and a revolutionary imaginary, he was a 
relic of the 1980s war. Even as community members appreciated his intentions and 
looked out for him (a handful harbored him in their homes when the city of 
Chalatenango’s police came looking for him), he was often the brunt of jokes and his 
activities were a source of local humor and entertainment, if not of irritation. At one 
point, a quarrel manifested in the main street around the réten popular. Pedro had a run-
in with local authorities, and one part of the crowd backed him up and the other part 
argued against his work and presence in the community. 
Even though the community was considered to be part of the cradle of the 
revolution, Guarjileños were now intimately engaged with the realities and challenges of 
their increasingly transnational and globalized lives. Although they expressed discontent 
with what they felt were social and economic injustices coming from neoliberal 
globalization, Guarjileños were nevertheless in touch with various forms of globalization 
(most prevalently, migration and remittances) on which they were dependent and 
entangled. They saw a more measured approach to politics as the most viable future for 
improved well-being for Guarjileños in El Salvador and abroad; they had moved on from 
a wartime revolutionary imaginary that no longer seemed viable. 
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Funes was elected president in March 2009, and Guarjileños celebrated the night 
in the streets in red shirts with dancing, bonfires, drinking, and tears. Not only did Funes 
represent a more moderate Left that they saw as important to their country and 
community’s globalized economy and to maintaining positive relations with the United 
States (the country where their family members resided), but he offered a moment of 
hope and an oasis from certain disillusionments and frustrations with the FMLN, which 
they had come to view during the postwar period as being characterized by power 
struggles and political drama between its five internal factions. Many Guarjileños felt that 
the FMLN was dominated by its urban-based leadership that left rural interests from view 
and from those committed to communist roots whose ideological dogma did not respond 
appropriately to the realities of globalization with which Guarjileños were now coping.  
They believed that the party’s prominent politicians and the select group of leaders that 
formed its cúpula were most interested in controlling and rising to the top of the party. In 
pursuing selfish political interests, they had further fragmented and weakened the party, 
failing these communities and the fight they had endured. Even the elected Vice 
President, Salvador Sanchez Cerén, who led the FPL (the faction of the FMLN that was 
dominant in Chalatenango) and was known in the region as Comandante Leonel during 
the war, was frequently criticized by community members for his militant Leftism and his 
hard-line rhetoric. (Sanchez Cerén is the FMLN’s presidential candidate for the 2014 
election). 
Months after his inauguration, Funes came to Guarjila to speak to the community. 
The community eagerly and warmly received him. But Pedro used the moment to voice 
his discontent with the President for not pursuing more radical initiatives by heckling and 
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interrupting his talk. With loud interjections that were not representative of the status 
quo, his actions embarrassed and irritated many community members and leaders. This 
was the last straw. Pedro was asked to leave the community and work elsewhere, only 
allowed to return for weekend visits. 
The Growth of Migration 
As evidenced in the response to Pedro and to the national elections, Guarjila’s 
politics had shifted from wartime imaginaries, even as much of the FMLN’s urban-based 
contingent and leaders were holding steadfast to the party’s most rooted ideologies. 
Consistent with other communities in the region, a neoliberal postwar experience of 
marginalization motivated a wave of international migration and posed new dilemmas 
around how to cope and engage with new sorts of encounters with globalization and 
development.  
The wave of migrants from Chalatenango who fled the civil war during the 1980s 
paved the way for future migrants from the region. The wartime emigrants, settled and 
actively investing in a future in the United States, thus established important social 
networks for later, postwar migrants. Settlement did not occur evenly, however. Earlier 
migrants carved out paths to integration in the United States with the help of solidarity 
networks and immigrant legalization measures, and often desired to be detached from the 
violence in El Salvador they had directly fled. A later wave of migrants, particularly 
those arriving in the early to mid-2000s, were more likely to encounter conditions of 
illegality and often had some degree of attachment to “home” communities in El 
Salvador. 
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Many wartime migrants were eventually able to settle and build relatively 
established lives in the United States with legal immigration status. Some of them 
received settlement assistance from Sanctuary Movement participants, who were a part of 
and worked with local churches throughout the United States to help find housing and 
work for Salvadorans. Sympathetic to other Central American Solidarity Movement 
initiatives at the time, their reception of Salvadorans, who they considered to be 
“unrecognized refugees” but were legally classified as undocumented immigrants, was 
also a gesture of protest against U.S. support for a war in El Salvador that was becoming 
notorious for atrocities and human rights violations. Many who arrived during the 1980s 
and early 1990s eventually benefited from U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s 1986 
amnesty, NACARA, the settlement of the American Baptist Churches vs. Thornburgh 
case (ABC), and the granting of TPS to others who arrived in the early and late 1990s.
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 In response to the U.S. government’s prosecution of Sanctuary workers, in 1985, religious organizations 
filed a lawsuit, known as ABC. The suit called for an end to prosecutions and to the further deportation of 
Guatemalans and Salvadorans, and it argued that the asylum process was biased against these two 
nationalities. In 1990, after continued pressure by advocates – and at a time when the Salvadoran 
government’s role in the civil war was receiving more attention and criticism – ABC reached a settlement 
agreement, marking a new turn in U.S. policy toward allowing provisional legalization for many 
Salvadorans. The agreement meant that Salvadorans and Guatemalans who arrived prior to September 1990 
could for the first time apply for political asylum. In the same year, the 1990 Immigration Act was signed 
by U.S. President George H. Bush in the same year, which granted a “Temporary Protected Status” (TPS) 
to Salvadorans who arrived prior to September 1991. ABC cases would not be opened for another six 
years, and so activists encouraged Salvadorans eligible for ABC case review to apply for TPS in the 
meantime. The U.S. government did not renew TPS, but instead arbitrarily created an executive measure 
called Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) to extend the legal stay of Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees 
without need for reissuing TPS. By 1997, U.S. immigration authorities began reviewing ABC asylum 
cases, but the year before U.S. president Bill Clinton had just signed into law the Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which placed more restrictions on undocumented and temporary 
immigrants in the U.S. and made it likely that ABC class and DED Salvadorans would soon face 
deportation. After U.S. President Clinton’s 1997 visit to Central America, he signed the Nicaraguan 
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA). The legislation favored many Salvadorans in the 
U.S. because it made provisions to IIRIA that guaranteed a path to permanent legal residency for the vast 
majority of ABC class members with pending asylum applications. In 1998, following Hurricane Mitch, 
and in 2001, following the earthquakes in El Salvador, TPS was granted to recently arrived Salvadorans 
and the U.S. government has since extended eligibility of re-registration, meaning that more than 200,000 
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The U.S. Latino immigration climate during the 1990s was becoming more 
restrictive, as immigration enforcement measures were implemented under U.S. President 
Bill Clinton including the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act in 1996, 
and in California, Operation Gatekeeper in 1984 and Proposition 187 in 1994. By the 
2000s, a new set of compounded restrictions and anti-immigrant initiatives took effect, 
several of which were inspired by national security concerns following the September 11, 
2001 attacks.
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 With the displacing effects of NAFTA and neoliberalism, the influx of 
undocumented Latino immigrants to the U.S. continued to grow during the late 1990s and 
2000s. 
While Salvadorans fleeing the civil war during the 1980s in no way arrived to an 
“inviting” immigration climate in the United States, the growth in  hostile anti-immigrant 
enforcement measures, and the sheer number of immigrant arrivals throughout the 1990s 
and 2000s drastically shifted the context of immigrant integration. Chalatecos who settled 
in the United States during the mid-1980s were more likely to be able to obtain legal 
immigration status. This facilitated integration and, in theory, the possibility to pursue 
their “American dream.” Those arriving more recently encountered few opportunities to 
obtain a legal status, impeding the potential for integration.  
Furthermore, many from this earlier wave held a sense of resentment toward and 
alienation from El Salvador. They knew little more than an environment of violence and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Salvadorans continue to be eligible for this legal status. See Coutin (2007) for a detailed account of this 
recent history of political advocacy (by Salvadoran immigrant activists and by the Salvadoran government) 
for legalization of Salvadoran immigrants in the United States. 
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 These include, for example, reinforcement of the U.S. Border Patrol, new deportation proceedings, 
initiatives to facilitate local enforcement of federal immigration law, sanctions on employers of 
undocumented labor, and a range of measures implemented by local and state governments. 
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war at the time they migrated. Indeed, Chalatecos were at the heart of the conflict, and 
those who fled the region during the early 1980s – to the United States, to countries 
offering asylum, and in guindas to the United States –  did so out of necessity as these 
years marked the height of the war’s most intensive and repressive violence.  
Earlier migrants’ subjective experience of emigration is much different than a 
more recent wave of postwar migrants. As with migrants from other repopulated 
communities, postwar migrants from Guarjila developed a stronger attachment and 
identification with the community since it was now a resettled place. They were already a 
part of the collective and grounded project of rebuilding it in the aftermath of war. Those 
who left in the midst of war, displaced by violence prior to resettlement, did not feel as 
much of a drive to divide their commitments across borders. Rather, they invested much 
more so in the communities abroad that provided them refuge and where they eventually 
settled and found paths to integration.  
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Guarjila’s stream of emigrants continued 
to grow, reflecting a national trend. As described above, international migrant social 
networks continued to solidify, facilitating migration. Also, the growth of Mexican 
migration as a consequence of the 1994 implementation of NAFTA, which displaced 
millions of rural smallholders, meant that transit networks and routes became more 
established. These were drawn upon by Salvadorans, Central Americans, and migrants 
from other parts of the world as an interconnected chain continued to develop that linked 
migrant transporters across regions and borders. 
The growth in migration was also driven by the pursuit among Salvadorans to 
find more livable, often safer, conditions. The mid-1990s were an unsettling time marked 
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by violence throughout El Salvador. Retaliations surged in the years following the cease-
fire mandated by the 1992 Peace Accords and the general amnesty granted just after the 
Truth Commission released its report on war crimes and atrocities. Homicide rates grew 
with the proliferation of gang activity in the region from the 1990s deportations of gang 
members mostly based in Los Angeles. Dealing with entangled experiences of political 
and street violence, Salvadorans commonly referred to the conditions of postwar violence 
as “worse than the war” (Moodie 2010). Even after the end of the civil war itself, 
physical violence thus continued to push people out. 
Smith-Nonini (2010) reminds us that despite the end of the war, the time of 
“neoliberal peace” that followed was characterized by multiple forms of structural 
violence. Her account of protests against the privatization of health care is a reminder that 
Salvadorans clearly understood that neoliberal reforms that excluded vulnerable 
populations from needed services could ultimately determine who in society is allowed to 
live and who is subject to dying. The legacy of neoliberal reforms that followed the 
conclusion of the civil war in 1992 thus contributed to new forms of structural violence 
that can be considered an extension of physical violence, driving people to flee El 
Salvador in increasing numbers. 
Beyond being a mere effect of the physical and structural violence experienced 
during and well beyond the civil war, by the late 1990s and early 2000s undocumented 
international migration to the United States became an increasingly naturalized practice 
among Guarjileños. By the time I first arrived to the community in June 1999, migration 
was already becoming a rite of passage among young people in the community. Youth, 
mostly adolescents and young men from around fifteen to twenty years of age, were 
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expected to emigrate to the United States. Many would do so around the eighth grade 
after having completed or nearly completed the most accessible schooling at the local 
school.
39
 By the time I returned to Guarjila in November 2001, a handful of young people 
were leaving the community each month, of the total population of around 200 families.  
Emigration continued to grow between 2001 and 2003. During those years, I was 
living in the community, working with a community youth group and teaching. I was 
asked to teach English class at a high school that had just been built a year earlier to serve 
both Guarjila and the neighboring community of Los Ranchos. I was pleased to be 
invited to be involved in the new school and to fill the teaching post because it responded 
to the call for an affordable and local secondary education that fit part-time schedules, 
making it a desirable opportunity for locals with few resources. I vividly recall the first 
day of class when I asked students about why they were interested in learning English. 
When asked if they had intentions to go to the United States, nearly every single one of 
one hundred or so students, save two or three, raised their hand. As my two year tenure 
there progressed, my initial cohort gradually disappeared. Looking back years later, just 
about all of the students had fulfilled their initial intention to leave the country for the 
United States.  
About half of these students were young women, and by the early 2000s the 
gender imbalance of emigration was becoming increasingly balanced.  Collectives of 
family members were becoming increasingly established abroad, enabling networks for 
sharing households and finding employment for new arrivals. As these groups of family 
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 The closest available high school was in the neighboring city of Chalatenango, of which Guarjila is a 
cantón (a hamlet, a rather unfitting classification today considering that its post-resettlement population of 
more than 200 families is relatively large). Travel and tuition was an expense that not all could, or would 
choose to, afford. 
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members settled in the United States — often comprised of siblings, aunts, uncles, nieces 
and nephews, with older generations of parents and grandparents staying behind — more 
children also began traveling alongside adults in the small groups that would depart 
Guarjila (sometimes with familiar peer and immediate or extended family members from 
other communities in the region) to make the dangerous journey together. For the most 
part, however, younger children and older people were those who were likely to stay in 
Guarjila. Adolescents, younger adults, and some middle aged adults were more likely to 
migrate during this time.  
Reflecting on these patterns, it is important to point out that the experience of 
Salvadoran migration stands in contrast to the experience of migration witnessed in many 
parts of Mexico, in which men (fathers) are assumed to be those who migrate to the 
United States, sometimes cyclically, in search of work to support women, children, and 
grandparents “back home.”  The experience of Guarjileños demonstrates a much more 
balanced gendered flow of emigrants, and an abundance of youth migrants, and family 
settlements. The fact that migrants must endure a costly, long, and risky trip from El 
Salvador to the United States means that many migrants did not view cyclical back-and-
forth migrations to and from El Salvador as a viable possibility. And, the conditions of 
structural and physical violence that in some cases made life in El Salvador untenable 
further destabilize common assumptions behind a familiar narrative of undocumented 
“labor migration” that tends to homogenize the way Latino immigration is understood in 
mainstream U.S. public debates. 
Emigration came to be linked to a set of locally shared meanings and intertwined 
social practices. It became increasingly customary and took on particular ritualized 
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dimensions. Secrecy was one important part of the ritual. Upon departure, few, if any, 
people would learn of someone’s intent to leave. Often, the news would be revealed to 
family members the night before departure or even through a note left with them the 
following morning.  
Guarjileños said there were several possible reasons for keeping migration plans 
private. For one, it helped to avoid a sense of embarrassment if one “failed” to make it to 
the United States and returned shortly thereafter. The practice also helped one to avoid 
being asked for favors, and sometimes it conveniently helped one escape local debts to 
others. Perhaps most important, secrecy helped one avoid becoming the subject of local 
chambre (gossip) for weeks on end in the time leading up to departure as travel groups, 
dates, and payments were being solidified.
40
 From 2001-2003, on a couple occasions 
young men went around shaking hands with friends the night prior to departure, and on 
one occasion I was invited to a word of mouth “going away party” for a few close friends 
and family, but these instances were unusual.  
Clandestine departures add to the emotional burden already carried by migrants’ 
family and friends. Such culturally embedded migration practices also challenge the 
notion that migration can be easily studied through pragmatic and quantitative 
approaches. How do you assess the intentions and activities of people who must hide 
them? I vividly recall the day I stopped by the community radio station in July 2007 to 
ask the 18 year old DJ (and former student of mine) if he would share the details of his 
experience of travel, detention, and deportation a few weeks earlier. His girlfriend was 
working there instead, who without smiling let me know that he had left for the United 
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 Based on interviews conducted with migrants from Guarjila and Los Ranchos in Virginia July 2011 
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States that morning. It wasn’t until I caught up to him in Maryland, a year later, that I was 
able to hear his account of being “dusted” by helicopters of the U.S. Border Patrol, of 
being locked in a detention center’s “cold room” for 24 hours, and of being fed spoiled 
food, encountering a chicken pox breakout, and finally having his tent collapse one night 
in the provisional prison for thousands of migrants in Willacy County, Texas (which he 
jokingly referred to as a “four star hotel.”)41 
By the late 2000s, emigration had subsided. Stories of the hostile immigration 
climate, of more unsuccessful border crossings, and of escalated violence endured by 
migrants traveling north were reaching the community. In my return to the community 
for dissertation research between November 2008 and June 2011, hardly anyone was 
migrating, unlike my initial years living in Guarjila. Of those who did choose to leave, 
many would hide travel plans, but in general, a younger generation more candidly shared 
with me their contemplations of whether or not they intended to migrate. Their 
forerunners’ remittances, and a sense that El Salvador was changing, made them feel that 
the future had a wider field of possibilities.  
Collectivist Practices of Mobility 
I have just described how migration became, at a particular historical moment, a 
ritualized “rite of passage” that was laden with culturally nuanced customs, practices and 
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 This account of the migrant’s experience based on author’s interview with him in Maryland on March 30, 
2008. “Dusting” is an aggressive tactic employed by the U.S. Border Patrol in which helicopters are tilted 
as they hover low to the ground to stir up ground dirt where migrants are sited. The practice tends to cause 
migrants to scatter in panic as dust gets blown into their eyes. This tactic is widely considered to be one of 
several human rights abuses against migrants that has not been corrected through a systematic 
implementation of the Department of Homeland Security’s procedural guidelines and policies. The 
organization No More Deaths offers various resources that document U.S. Border Patrol abuses on its 
website: http://www.nomoredeathsvolunteers.org/borderpatrolabuse.htm (last accessed June 20, 2013). 
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tactics. In what follows, I focus on how, similar to the experience of the guindas during 
the 1970s and 1980s, these practices of mobility took on collectivist and tactical forms 
that were honed over time through the accumulation of community-based experience and 
knowledge with migration. 
As emerged in numerous conversations over the years, the actual mechanics of 
migration usually work in this way: the small groups of migrants regularly departing 
from Guarjila carefully arranged their trip with illicit transporters, or coyotes. They would 
then typically begin their trip in San Salvador where they would unite with other groups 
of migrants from other parts of the country to travel in a larger group. Having paid the 
first half of the hefty fee of about seven thousand dollars for “door to door” service (the 
second half to be paid upon arrival), they would begin the trip in bus rides to the 
Guatemala-Mexico border, carrying a backpack and dressed in the dark colored clothes 
they would use for the entire trip, which could last anywhere from ten days to several 
months. From there, they would generally be handed off to a new, Mexican guide, the 
first of a chain link that would work to get them across Mexico by bus, tractor trailer, and 
by foot, to eventually reach and (with some luck) cross the Mexico-US border and hop 
into personal vehicles that would take them to their destination address. 
This means of transit stands in contrast to the much more familiar image now 
linked to Central American migration through Mexico of migrants riding atop trains 
moving northward. This image has emerged over the last several years from news 
reports, documentary and feature films, photography, research, and policy reports. This 
coverage has brought to light an otherwise largely invisible story of these migrants who 
risk injury, death, and the abuses of authorities and criminal bands. Many of the migrants 
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I met during fieldwork in Mexico’s migrant shelters (over the summers of 2006-2008 and 
in April 2009) traveled on trains, caught rides from strangers, and kept a low profile on 
public buses. They made their mobility work with few resources and networks. They 
would await small money transfers from immediate family members to make the next leg 
of the journey possible. The trip typically took several months. Migrants would wait and 
even work at the northern border until the money to cross over was in hand, which so 
often ended in failure. Many of these Central American migrants came from areas of 
rural Honduras with relatively new migration streams. Of the Salvadorans, these migrants 
included many coming from urban and semi-urban communities in western and coastal El 
Salvador with relatively new migration streams. In other cases, they included those 
forced to suddenly flee violent threats, or those who had been recently deported and were 
again moving northward having found themselves feeling alienated and with few 
opportunities in their place of origin. 
The collective strategies around international migration in Guarjila, among other 
communities in the region, should be understood as highly developed and organized 
compared to other “sending” communities throughout El Salvador and Central America. 
With the exception of two stories I encountered, there are no cases of migrants from 
Guarjila journeying northward by hopping trains. There are a couple of reasons for this. 
For one, even as Chalatenango is in many ways a marginalized region that has 
experienced an absence of local democratic participation and access to state-led 
development and services, its alternative local history of autonomous development, with 
a trajectory of communal system formation and community organizing, has paved the 
way for the emergence of powerful community networks through which resources are 
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shared and migration strategies are accumulated and refined. And second, marginalized 
rural and urban communities with a newer stream of emigrants see first-time “pioneers” 
departing with few resources in hand, have fewer migrant social networks to aid in transit 
and settlement, and are more likely to suffer from a harsh U.S. climate of immigrant 
illegalization. While not considered to be as “old” a migration stream as communities 
such as Intipucá and other communities of the eastern department of San Miguel where 
significant international emigration to the United States began in the 1960s, eastern 
Chalatenango’s regional emigration that took off during the 1980s and became more 
substantial by the late 1990s. This history makes it a more established stream than other 
regions that did not experience earlier migration strains or heavy wartime displacement. 
This is not to say that migrants traveling with coyotes are invulnerable to abuses 
and dangerous threats while in transit or are guaranteed a successful arrival to their 
destination. In fact, unlike the often tragic stories revealed recently of migrants traveling 
on trains, this other migration story remains highly clandestine and invisible from the 
public eye. Contracting a coyote to (with plenty of luck) ensure safe passage is costly and 
the guided trip is risky. Rape and sexual abuse of migrants by guides are commonplace, 
and Central Americans particularly complain that they experience discriminatory 
treatment once under the auspices of Mexican guides. My earliest encounter with these 
abuses was when I heard of 16-year old Beto’s story in 2001. He was beaten by his guide 
during the journey, and after enduring several weeks of travel in horrific conditions (at 
one point in the hidden compartment of a tractor trailer taking in the vehicle’s exhaust 
fumes), he was caught by authorities and returned to El Salvador. His tale was 
representative of several other travel testimonies I collected in the early 2000s. 
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Through experience, community migration strategies became more refined.  First, 
as the wave of postwar migrants arriving in the late 1990s and early 2000s settled (many 
of whom arrived in the wake of Hurricane Mitch and the 2001 earthquake and thus were 
eligible for TPS), cross-border networks and resources were strengthened, which also 
facilitated migration. Small collectives of migrants would pool money to finance 
migrants’ expensive trips north and family-community networks facilitated employment 
and homes for new arrivals in the United States in places across several states where 
settlements of Guarjileños and other Chalatecos were growing. And, by the mid to late 
2000s, stories of a migrant who reported the sorts of abuses and conditions that Beto 
described were no longer prevalent, though sexual and other forms of mistreatment have 
in no way disappeared. When stories of unsuccessful and abusive conditions circulated 
within the community, the coyotes linked to them were weeded out and others were 
sought out, until after some time only a small handful had earned the trust and respect of 
the community.  
I have come to know Beto’s family closely since my first arrival to Guarjila in 
1999. During my time there from 2008-2011, the family saw several relatives leave with 
a coyote who had earned their respect. Beto’s mother, eager to receive word of safe 
crossings, would await regular reports from their favored coyote, and would sigh in relief 
once she received word that each had made it to Houston. With consistently successful 
crossings, transit time of only about ten days, and much less worry and anguish about the 
travel conditions than with her first two sons’ trips, she had confidence in and 
recommended this coyote to neighbors, family, and friends, and invited him to her home 
for meals. 
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Migration and (Hi)stories of Struggle 
Migration thus became increasingly tied to collectivist-based tactical practices 
and community networks cultivated through the accumulation of community-based 
knowledge and experience. As we have seen, particular practices also became customary 
and naturalized. Similarly, the tales and stories of relatively recent emigration during the 
1990s and 2000s are now a part of local folklore, and in Guarjila, they get worked into 
popular narratives of community struggle. My ensuing discussion builds on these ideas to 
explore how migration, through the making of these practices, meanings, and identities, 
can be understood in relation to a longer trajectory of community-making.  
The stories, practices, and characters linked to international migration become 
part of various genres of storytelling that are worked into the folklore and interpretations 
of everyday life. The coyote, for example, is historically characterized in El Salvador and 
around Central America and Mexico to be a legendary, sometimes heroic figure (though 
the tragic stories of migrants in transit who are subject to violence of various kinds of 
“traffickers” has challenged this characterization). Familiar, sometimes funny, tales of 
migration are evidence of people’s comfort and intimate familiarity with a part of life that 
to others may seem distant and peculiar. A local Chalatenango mechanic, for example, 
engaged me with his repertoire of funny, mythical but believable tales of migrants who 
left Chalatenango while we waited for parts to arrive for a repair. The migrants each had 
the misfortune of not making it successfully to their destination and having to return 
home. In each story, the returned migrant had to own up to personal debts and to 
reencounter with family feuds they had expected to be able to dodge for good, which 
made for hysterical post-migration scenarios. The man could not hold back the tears from 
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laughing at his own humor. 
In Guarjila, a particular narrative of the community’s postwar migration is told 
through a genre that is also rife with humor in a vernacular genre of community theater. 
The local community-based youth theater group called Tiempos Nuevos Teatro (or TNT) 
grew out of the repopulated communities’ rebuilding efforts after the 1992 Peace Accords 
and was considered to be a part of popular education efforts. The actors and actresses, 
young people from Guarjila and neighboring communities, use dramatizations to convey 
messages that address issues of social concern and to represent community narratives of 
local history in an effort to cultivate local historical memory. The group uses scenes that 
intertwine serious representations of historical events with slap-stick comedy that 
caricaturize local customs, familiar figures, and quotidian life. In the theatrical group’s 
narratives of community history, the caricature of the migrant, representing the pattern of 
emigration that developed during the postwar period, is just one of a series of scenes that 
make up the community’s longer local history of social struggle. It follows a longer 
narrative that tends to begin during the military repression of the late 1970s, to guindas, 
to refugee camps, to community repopulations, to the postwar reconstruction efforts.  
This narrative, which is very familiar to communities in the region, is also 
represented in a recently painted community mural. It was painted in 2010 on a wall 
along the road from Guarjila to the neighboring community of Los Ranchos by a group of 
local youth with the help of a visiting American mural artist. A young woman from Los 
Ranchos had the idea to make the mural and led the effort. The mural starts with 
symbolic representations of El Salvador’s long-range attachment to maize cultivation and 
a rather hazy ancient indigenous history. The story soon jumps to the recent civil war. At 
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the end of the mural, and the story, are those waiting to get aboard a bus with a sign that 
reads el extranjero (abroad). 
Figure 3: Community Mural in Los Ranchos, Chalatenango 
Photographed by Joel Bergner. (Each photograph, in order from top to bottom, captures 
one piece of this long mural as it extends from left to right.) 
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From one perspective, the narrative presented by this mural presents postwar 
migration, and the wartime migrations of displacement and resettlement, as integral parts 
of a longer history of struggle that is linked to the identity-making and place-making 
work of Guarjileños and those communities that share a similar experience in the region. 
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Bringing community together, the active work of carving out a place to live even amid a 
series of displacements, as well as the practice of migration itself, are all tied into a 
widely-accepted narrative about what it means to be from the resettled communities of 
Chalatenango.  
Interestingly, the mural jumps from an abstract representation of iconic identity 
more than a thousand years ago to the relatively recent history of wartime resistance and 
community-making and onto the postwar period of reconstruction and migration. Why is 
the longer range history prior to the civil war hardly represented in the mural, and hardly 
a part of local efforts to recapture local “historical memory?” How does this particular 
narrative of “local” history shape the meanings and identities with which Guarjileños 
engage? My point is that, aside from a broad recognition that structural injustices are 
largely rooted in the colonial encounter, the rupture in historical memory prior to the late 
1970s is evidence that this recent history carries a profound value for people of Guarjila 
and neighboring communities. What it means to be Guarjileño and from other 
repopulated communities in Chalatenango, according to popular narratives and 
understandings, gets tied to three relatively recent projects or processes: the local history 
of communal (and mobile) struggle in the face of military repression since the 1970s, the 
work of resettlement and constructing place since the mass repatriations of the late 1980s, 
and finally, even to postwar migration, as a strategic practice in and of itself, since 
mobility has been wrapped up in and an integral part of both of the aforementioned 
projects. 
Emigration, according the argument presented above, might be conceptualized as 
an integral dimension of the identity-making that gives meaning to Guarjila as a place 
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and as a (transnational) community. From another perspective, the story of Guarjila and 
the communities of eastern Chalatenango could be told in a much different way. The 
popular narrative depicted in the mural posits that emigration constitutes abandonment of 
the important community-building and place-making work that was underway since the 
war and of a longer-range commitment to social change through revolutionary and 
community-based struggle. Both sides are part of the way the community and the place 
itself of Guarjila are understood and imagined.  
The Cultural Politics of Migration and Community 
This critical discourse on migration, which came about as emigration took off in 
the postwar period, has shaped a cultural politics on the community scale that positions 
grassroots community-organizing/development on one pole and emigration seen as 
abandonment on an opposing pole. According to this trope, not only is emigration seen as 
an abandonment of community, but the remittances that migrants send back have 
negative consequences. The influx of money generates new class divisions within the 
community that disrupts a cohesive social fabric, changes the dynamics of community 
organizing, and shifts priorities and values in such a way that the ambition to engage in 
ground-up social change is pacified and diluted. One community member put it like this: 
“Everyone has at least, a brother, a son, someone immediate in the United States, 
at least. Which is to say that a small, moderate amount of money is entering the 
community… and once I no longer need something, I believe that someone else 
doesn’t either. And that’s where we begin to lose the sense of community. And 
before long I keep getting things for myself. I build my house, I want to have a 
TV for myself. I want to have a car, a TV, a sound system, a fridge, I want a — I 
no longer care about others and when I no longer need something I think that 
someone else doesn’t either. And that’s when we begin to have fear, that I don’t 
want to leave the house alone because they are going to steal what I have. And we 
no longer think about organization, we think of ourselves, you know what I 
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mean? And so I no longer care about everyone else, and when something happens 
to someone else, since it doesn’t affect me, I don’t even lift my hand. This is the 
point that Guarjila has reached. There have to be critical circumstances 
confronting the community so that the people revive again, on the contrary no one 
lifts a chair.”42 
 
The foundation of this discourse comes from the real tradition of communal work 
and organizing with which people of the resettled communities of Chalatenango have 
engaged with in varied ways before, during, and after the war. Particularly, the work of 
postwar reconstruction that went on in the immediate years following the 1992 Peace 
Accords was part of an important and valued project of (re)building Guarjila and other 
resettled communities. This work was part of the larger project of carving out a place and 
making identity for Guarjila. It was also a time when community organizing took on new 
and contentious meanings and dynamics.  
All sorts of community development projects were funded with the support of 
NGOs, solidarity groups, churches, foreign governments, and multilateral agencies, 
which in part shaped and reshaped how these projects could be pursued. Chalatenango 
became a landscape of organizations with endless acronyms (Van der Borgh 2003). The 
NGOization of the region, with a new set of expectations placed on community members, 
lent itself to the neoliberal interests of the government. Silber (2010) argues that NGOs 
and local leaders, in attempting to shape local subjectivities by calling for participation in 
community development using a particular narrative that sought to transform past 
legacies into a neoliberal-postwar present, contributed to the reproduction of various 
forms of social, economic, and gendered inequalities.  
One of the most significant actors was the CCR (after the war, renamed 
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 Author’s interview in Guarjila in April 2011. 
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Coordinadora de Comunidades en Desarrollo de Chalatenango, or the Association of 
Communities for the Development of Chalatenango), which has overseen much of the 
postwar reconstruction of the resettled communities. The CCR was formed in 1988 after 
the resettlements, and today much of its membership still comes from repopulated 
communities. Since then, it has established more than 100 directivas comunales in 
communities in Chalatenango and in other regions. These directivas continue to look to 
the CCR to promote their interests and to seek funding for proposed projects. During the 
late years of the war, the CCR was an organization born from and directly linked to the 
FPL (the faction of the FMLN prominent in the region), and as it grew in the postwar 
period it became well-known for helping to pave the way for community organizing and 
for its activism on behalf of the interests of these communities.  
Despite the valuable activist, organizing, and development work advanced by the 
CCR, many Guarjileños, among other Chalatecos, complain that its leadership now acts 
out of selfish interests and that its work had changed in nature since its initial years when 
the communities saw it as the principal conduit for advancing local political and 
development interests. The critique maintains that the CCR, in recent years, has shifted 
its priorities toward garnering international funding for a slew of “NGO-style” projects. 
At the time of its 2009 annual review meeting, which I attended, the CCR’s funding 
amounted to hundreds of thousands of dollars. A large portion of the funds were being 
directed to projects that fit NGO schemes and would appeal to international funders 
(micro-lending, environment, health, women’s rights, and so forth). That year, the CCR 
was involved in activism against mineral mining in the region and in solidarity protests in 
support of Manuel Zelaya, Honduras’s ousted president, but these efforts (as is often the 
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case for activist work) were able to bring in only a few thousand dollars from church and 
solidarity groups, which was a small fraction of their yearly funding compared to other 
projects.  
There were a number of performative rituals during the annual meeting, which 
was held in the neighboring community of Los Ranchos under the roof of the 
community’s recently constructed amphitheater in its well-renovated park. The crowd sat 
in lines of plastic chairs. During parts of the meeting, CCR and community leaders on 
stage led a series of chants: Que vivan las comunidades repobladadas! (Live the 
repopulated communities!) Que vivan las comunidades organizadas! (Live the organized 
communities!) Que viva la CCR! (Live the CCR!). They also led the crowd in several 
songs: first, El Salvador’s national anthem, and later, a song about the repopulations and 
one about the strength of Salvadoran women. The meeting concluded with El Sombero 
Azul, a song about El Salvador’s revolutionary struggle that has been performed by 
musicians around the world and is arguably the most well-known Leftist nationalist tune 
among Salvadorans.   
The performative aspects of the meeting reflect the larger and strategic narrative 
that the CCR advances. Evidenced in the messages of the meeting’s speeches, music, and 
banner imagery, the CCR and other local community leaders emphasize that these 
communities uniquely draw from their historical experience of revolutionary struggle to 
effectively organize and execute community development projects. The region’s 
“organized communities” are indeed known throughout El Salvador for their organization 
and trajectory of autonomous development, but this has not come without the assistance 
of international organizations. Since the war, Chalatecos became skilled in securing 
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international support to meet their own interests. The performative work that this entails 
also contributes to the construction of meanings and identities linked to place and 
community. In the crowd at the 2009 annual meeting sat a delegation of gringas, young 
white women from a church in the U.S. Midwest, wearing long dresses and carrying 
Nalgene water bottles. One of dozens of delegations to visit Guarjila each year, this group 
was spending a week learning of community history, touring projects, and moving from 
meeting to meeting with directiva community leaders. They endured the several hours 
long CCR annual meeting, looking a bit dazed over, with their limited knowledge of 
Spanish. 
The particular narrative that is performed by the CCR, NGOs, and other leaders 
includes some elements of community-building work while excluding others. One matter 
that tends to go unspoken is how migration and remittances are intimately wrapped up in 
the lives of community leaders themselves, even as they preach about the negative 
impacts that migration and remittances have on community life and the potential for 
grounded, grassroots organizing.  
Understandably, many people view the “grassroots” critique of migration and 
remittances, even as “grassroots” leaders themselves depend on them, as hypocritical. 
This has added to a sense of resentment on the part of some toward NGO practitioners 
and community leaders who are viewed as relatively privileged by “working the system.” 
One Salvadoran I interviewed once referred those who work for NGOs as “NGOers” to 
critically and typologically define their role in society. His critique was built on the 
impression that those who work for NGOs hold a hard-to-come-by professional career in 
El Salvador by learning to strategically play into narratives of the “grassroots” and 
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community organizing, but have the privilege of going about their work with little 
accountability. “NGOers” have to be savvy: they learn to speak the language of 
community organizing, development, and even “solidarity,” they sport typical NGO attire 
(for women, the embroidered white “peasant” shirt and for men, jeans and a tucked-in 
shirt). But they can show up to their meetings hours late. Along the same vein, they can 
speak critically of the “problem” of migration and remittances, but supplement the steady 
income they receive from agencies with income from the remittance payments of family 
members abroad, and not make mention of it. The “unspoken” side of migration and 
remittances is not so surprising, given that even though migration and remittances are 
now framed as an area of public concern in the community, just how much income 
individuals and families receive in remittances is rarely disclosed and remains inside the 
black box of local “family economies.” 
The surge in remittances has changed life in Guarjila significantly, especially 
since the early 2000s, as a more recent wave of migrants took off and got their footing in 
the United States. For many families in Guarjila, remittances became the primary source 
of income, and communities throughout the region increasingly came to depend on 
remittances. The tradition of local agricultural production declined, and by the early 
2000s the Saturday morning line to receive remittances at Banco Cuscatlán in the city of 
Chalatenango was usually so long it went out the door and wrapped around the corners of 
the small city’s hilly blocks. Several local teachers and the primary and secondary 
schools’ directors suggested to me that some students who received regular remittance 
payments and expected to migrate to the United States had little interest in learning and 
came to school only to fill time or to fulfill a family obligation. 
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Aside from the way these patterns add weight to the national concern over 
wasteful consumption and the development of a “welfare state” in El Salvador, concerns 
around the negative impacts of remittances were laden with particular meaning for 
Chalatenango’s formerly “revolutionary” communities, where community members 
were, in the postwar period, then being called upon to be active participants in carrying 
on a new (neoliberal) commitment to grassroots community organizing. The neighboring 
community of Los Ranchos was often used as a reference point by Guarjileños to show 
how migration and remittances came into conflict with the potential for effective 
community-building and transformed the community into a place that bragged of its 
“revolutionary” roots but did not effectively organize as well as Guarjila.  
Los Ranchos’s outflow of migrant youth, adolescents, and young and middle-aged 
men was more abundant than that of Guarjila. Like its migrants, remittances picked up 
rapidly. Well-improved homes and chrome-detailed pickup trucks quickly became a 
trend. They complemented the paved roads, renovated park, and the generally better 
infrastructure it boasted over that of Guarjila, made possible from municipal funds from 
its FMLN mayor. Guarjileños were quick to point out how those from Los Ranchos lived 
in excess and that the community was full of delinquent hoodlums. According to 
Guarjileños, youth from Los Ranchos were known for carrying cell phones, wearing 
baggy clothes like their migrant siblings and parents abroad, skipping out on school, 
showing up at local bars, doing drugs, and picking fights.  
Unlike Los Ranchos, which had better access to municipal funding for local 
projects and infrastructure and had visibly used remittances for home improvements and 
particular kinds of “luxuries,” Guarjila had to count more on its community organizing. 
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Guarjila was on the fringes of receiving municipal-level resources as an FMLN-
sympathetic cantón belonging to the municipality of Chalatenango, especially at the 
times when the mayor in office was part of the ARENA political party. And local leaders 
had to speak highly of community organizing in order to court international organizations 
to get funding for community projects. Community infrastructure and projects thus 
entailed resourceful uses of local funds from organizations and community members 
themselves (abroad and in Guarjila itself), voluntary labor, and appeals to funders on the 
part of the community’s directiva. 
Also, even though in recent years, as I explained above, the CCR has undergone 
criticism from locals who believe the organization is failing to fulfill its promises to 
advance their interests in the way it initially did, the CCR nevertheless faces new sets of 
challenges amid community dynamics shaped by the consequences of neoliberalism and 
migration. One CCR activist, for example, pointed out to me that the organization had to 
advocate even for basic municipal services in Guarjila, such as regular trash removal. 
These sorts of efforts, she commented, went underappreciated by critical community 
members. She elaborated by saying that she felt that those Guarjileños who complained 
about the CCR rarely engaged in community organizing and activist efforts themselves.
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Aside from whether or not Guarjila could be understood as more or less organized 
than Los Ranchos, and whether or not it even merits the label of an “organized 
community”, my point is that the work of building and constructing community, since 
resettlement and well into peacetime neoliberalism and migration, has nevertheless 
entailed a lot of hard work, organization, planning, and resourcefulness.  
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The Highway 
The local politics of organizing and migration are a reminder that communities 
are neither pure artifacts of the state and global capitalist forces nor do they exist 
according to entirely endogenous or autonomous communal logics and practices. Rather, 
these logics and practices, and their distinction from the developmentalist and neoliberal 
logics advanced by the state, vary in form and in degree. This local politics around 
concern for community organizing in a context of migration surfaced in a local 
controversy that developed around the construction of a major highway to run through 
Guarjila. In what follows, I describe the situation. The community’s response to the 
highway, of course, cannot and does not represent any sort of uniform, singular, or “pure” 
form of communal logic and practice against the state’s neoliberal development project. 
Nonetheless, the controversy and tensions developed precisely because of the value that 
Guarjileños apply to a rooted sense of community identity and collectivist practices, 
which were not valued in the logic of development guiding the state-led highway project. 
For miles on the road leading up to the edge of Guarjila, the ground was being 
cleared to make way for a modern highway, soon to divide the community down the 
middle, to create a new corridor to facilitate travel through the length of northern El 
Salvador and connect Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. An army of yellow-shirted 
construction workers, equipped with shovels and a few back-hoes, were busy digging up 
the clay, dynamiting hillsides, taking out trees, and demolishing roadside buildings and 
homes.  
Highways have always been a symbol of progress for El Salvador, much like they 
are in other parts of the world. The country prides itself on having the best highways of 
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any country in Central America; the Ministry of Tourism boasts that tourists can get from 
volcanoes to lakes to the ocean all in a day, in contrast to the distance and rough roads of 
Costa Rica. The new highway was El Salvador’s hallmark project funded by the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), an international development agency funded 
by the United States that seeks to reduce poverty in the Global South. The highway was 
allocated the largest portion of funds from the FOMILENIO (the entity created by the 
Salvadoran government to receive and allocate MCC’s funds and implement the projects 
it supports), accounting for 248 million of the 460 million total destined for anti-poverty 
projects in northern El Salvador. As a “Connectivity Project,” it had by far the largest 
budget of three components of a larger government plan supported by MCC for poverty 
alleviation in northern El Salvador.
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 The other two components, “human development” 
and “productive development”, were categories that specified improvements to 
infrastructure, vocational and small business training, and a university campus in 
Chalatenango. Complementing these other development initiatives, the highway was 
expected to spur entrepreneurship, make it easier for locals to travel between markets, 
and introduce new industries to generate employment in the region. 
The Longitudinal would also facilitate international trade and commerce. 
CAFTA-DR, signed in 2004, had cut back regulations on trade between the United States 
and Central America. The recent alliance of CA-4 countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua) meant that the transit of goods, capital, and people faced fewer 
restrictions across their regional borders. But the project was never billed as being about 
free trade. When former El Salvador President Tony Saca, of the ARENA party and the 
                                                          
44 These components were budgeted at 101 million and 71 million dollars, respectively. 
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project’s biggest advocate, was there to break ground on the project in 2009, he reiterated 
on the radio waves his message that “development had finally arrived to the northern 
zone of El Salvador.”  
For Guarjileños, the highway proposal at the outset looked like a mixed bag. 
Some opposed it and some supported it, but most seemed apathetic. Those who opposed 
it complained that it would introduce noise and traffic, bring drugs, crime, and 
prostitution, and that the only local businesses that it would spark would be watering 
holes for truckers. In any case, they conceded to the belief that it was a done deal. No one 
was going to stop a major project sponsored by the United States and the state; it was 
going to be constructed regardless of their community’s wishes, so the many felt the best 
they could do is make the most out of the inevitable. After all, ever since they lived in 
Mesa Grande and began working with international aid and solidarity groups, Guarjileños 
were skilled in advantageously getting what they wanted from international funders and 
assistance. When the directiva signed onto it, they were able to negotiate $70,000 in 
supplemental projects designated to support employment, training, education, and 
infrastructure. When they agreed to allow for the highway to come through Guarjila, the 
possibility that there would be a bypass around the perimeter of the community was on 
the table but that was not yet settled.  
FOMILENIO had good publicity and made a lot of promises. Pamphlets about the 
benefits of the project were distributed to community members. Locals could apply to 
work on the construction work (though those who proposed lower salaries tended to win 
the bid). Houses that would have to be demolished were promised to be rebuilt elsewhere. 
FOMILENIO’s website showed off a video of its director and a team of blue-shirted 
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agency workers handing an elderly woman the keys to her new two-room cinder block 
home, equipped with a wash basin and a young palm tree plant, as the director reminded 
her that her former home, demolished for highway construction, had a leaky roof and no 
electricity. Other videos about the highway project offered aerial shots of the region’s 
new, modern highway landscape as bridges and segments get constructed; of female 
construction workers waving traffic through with flags; and of uniformed representatives’ 
presentations in local communities to help them make development work. Another video 
boasted that this would be the first Latin American highway project to offer HIV-AIDS 
prevention training for construction workers and local communities.
45
 
Yet even as MCC and FOMILENIO promise transparency and a commitment to 
consultation and participatory development with local communities, Guarjileños 
complained that in meetings with the directiva and in community assemblies, agency 
representatives were vague about construction details, emphasized the highway’s benefits 
and underplayed its potential side effects (there wouldn’t be much traffic, and no tractor 
trailers, they were told), and didn’t offer to conduct a feasibility study for the bypass 
option beyond a general estimate of the cost, which they said was over the budget given 
that the community was nestled in its surrounding hills.  
Once the highway construction was moving closer to the edge of the community, 
Guarjileños began witnessing the environmental destruction and the idea of having to 
cross the proposed pedestrian overpass to get from one side of the community to the other 
suddenly became very real and more worrisome. By then more than a year after the 
directiva had agreed to the highway, resistance and discontent suddenly surged. 
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Community assembly meetings that typically drew only a few attendees (mainly elderly 
women) were suddenly jam packed with hundreds of upset community members. They 
formed a new community committee to petition for the bypass option in a series of 
meetings with FOMILENIO representatives and the Minister of Public Works (who by 
then was of the FMLN). But those petitions were dismissed on the pretext that the 
community’s leadership had already signed onto the agreement. Samuel, who sat on the 
committee, recalled his frustration at the meetings: 
“It was at that point that we realized the type of people with whom we were 
negotiating — well, it wasn’t negotiating, Joe, because to negotiate is to arrive to 
an agreement that is accessible to everyone. ‘But what you all are bringing,’ he 
said, ‘this proposal, it’s as though you are asking us to go to the moon’, he said, 
‘and I can’t.’ And the guy was direct, and he said, ‘you know what, we don’t have 
to be tolerating such an ignorant community, who opposes such a good 
project.’… [This was] the Vice Minister of Public Works. And I was surprised 
because in the first meeting, he said, ‘for us, as Ministry of the Republic, we don’t 
have anything to do with FOMILENIO, we are just intermediaries.’ And by the 
third, it was he that said, ‘the road is going,’ he said, ‘through Guarjila because it 
is a government project, and you all are not going to stop it’…the man said to us 
‘the road will be built even though you all oppose it, and so there is nothing else 
to discuss, he said.”46 
 
By the end of 2011, the highway was indeed moving forward through the middle 
of Guarjila. The polemical situation surrounding the highway elucidates some of the 
underlying postwar tensions around the community’s migration, development, and 
politics discussed above in this chapter. Even though the FMLN-led government elected 
in 2009 was carrying out a project that had been initiated by the ARENA-led 
government, it is clear that Samuel felt slighted by the FMLN’s Vice Minister in the way 
he tells the story of their meetings. His sentiment reflects the broader sense of 
disillusionment and frustration with FMLN leadership that has brewed in the community 
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and in the region since the war. The sentiment has a particular potency in eastern 
Chalatenango, considering that Chalatecos fought for and supported the FMLN during 
twelve years of civil war, and that they were now cautiously testing out the hope that the 
new Funes administration would mark the first time the government would take their 
interests into account.  
The highway drama also brought out postwar disillusionment and distrust of local 
leadership. But community members were frustrated that the directiva was quick to sign 
onto the highway construction contract, and were suspicious that some of its members 
were assigned to oversee the community projects that were now to receive funding from 
FOMILENIO. Among other circulating rumors was the contention that another 
community leader — who had a track record of getting international agencies to source 
his income —  had been spotted privately negotiating with FOMILENIO representatives 
to purchase his land and direct the highway through it. 
One directiva member remarked to me that the community should have organized 
its opposition and alternative proposals long earlier. In Samuel’s words, the community’s 
reaction was “at the last second.” No matter how valid the critique, it is indicative of 
broader preoccupation that migration and remittances had quelled the potential for 
mobilization. Migration had split the community across international borders and 
“drained” it of young people who would have taken on leadership positions, and income 
from remittances had made people too “comfortable.” 
But how, and why, was a rural community to collectively organize against a 
transnational highway? Guarjileños were known for taking to the streets to make human 
roadblocks and throw rocks at the vehicles of campaigning ARENA politicians. People 
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from the “organized communities” had staged protests and successfully blocked a 
Canadian mining company from breaking ground in the region. (The resistance raised 
enough public concern that former President Tony Saca’s ARENA-led government 
actually revoked the license they had granted the company which then sued the 
Salvadoran government for hundreds of millions of dollars.) During the war, the “enemy” 
was clear, and following it, problems were most easily blamed on the neoliberal-minded 
government. But the highway project represented an encounter with a new kind of 
disorienting postwar development. Even as it was met with skepticism, there was no 
clarity about the target or the outcome. Samuel described how forms of collective action 
that had worked in times past were no longer operable: 
“As a national project, and one that has practically been imposed on us, which 
didn’t come from what the current government is doing — this was an agreement 
that was there before Funes came into office. People felt, well, practically tied 
down. And now we can’t say, ‘okay, if the highway isn’t rerouted where we want, 
we’re going to burn the construction vehicles, we’ll throw grenades, we’ll do this, 
we’ll do that,’ because now, if you do something like that the law will stop you, it 
individualizes things, you’ll get caught. And so, it’s no longer the community that 
corresponds. Let me tell you that in a protest, if someone, for example, throws a 
bottle of gas and a construction vehicle burns, do you think that the community is 
going to get involved and defend that guy? No, they’re going to catch him and 
take him to jail. So, even though the road was a big threat for Guarjila, there were 
people who were in agreement.” 
 
But whether or not they should have been able to effectively mobilize against the 
highway’s intrusion into their community is beside the point. As Samuel put it, a highway 
funded with hundreds of millions of dollars by the United States, a signed contract, and a 
bit of deception had them “tied down.”  The highway controversy brought to light the 
ongoing community politics around organization and migration at a shifting moment 
when globalization, development, and national leadership were going in new directions. 
Guarjileños were struggling to make their past make sense in a confusing and rapidly 
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changing present. Evidenced in the way the highway argument played out, at stake were 
also larger questions around how community, migration, and development were 
understood differently by the opposing actors. 
A particular kind of development logic guided the highway’s proponents. As a 
“connectivity project,” the highway was a metaphor and agent of transnationalist 
progress; it stood for the promise of (neo)liberal capitalist development by facilitating 
flows of capital and people. By prioritizing these flows and offering some training and 
incentives, the region’s economy would get a kick start. In the eyes of the developers, 
Guarjila looked like any other rural community in El Salvador’s marginalized north 
(except that it was a bit more troublesome than most): it was poor, in need of 
development, and locals did little more than count on the payments sent by their emigrant 
counterparts.  
What was invisibilized through this logic was a different view of community, one 
that valued a rooted sense of identity, non-economic assets, and prioritized community 
cohesiveness for a better future. Guarjileños felt that the more than two decades of work 
they had put into building and rebuilding community, and the collective history that made 
it unique, was being run over by a highway that would divide the community in half, 
passing just a few feet in front of their community radio station and forcing cooperative 
workshops they had built to be torn down. Competing logics on development — on what 
would be best for the community’s well-being and its future — were also tied to two 
distinct understandings of the question of migration. As Samuel conveys in his story, the 
idea that the promise of development could be a panacea to the migration “problem” did 
not make sense to him:   
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“I said to the director of FOMILENIO… ‘I would like to feel as optimistic as you 
all about this project, but I can’t.’ And the director said to me, ‘Let’s bet on it,’ he 
said, ‘we can bet as much as you want, that one day you will feel optimistic,’ he 
said, ‘because you are going to have a good road that goes through your 
community.” I said to him, ‘I doubt it, I doubt it.’ They, ironically, Joe, they have 
to talk about this project as if it were the eighth wonder of the world. Do you 
know what the director of FOMILENIO said on a TV program? He said, ‘I make 
the call to all of our compatriots who are in the United States, who left to lift their 
families out of poverty, that they no longer need to be there, that they can come 
back. Because with FOMILENIO, this northern zone will be so developed that 
your family won’t need your remittances. Come back, and recuperate the lost 
years alongside your family.’ That’s what he said, don’t you believe this guy is a 
hypocrite? …What kind of development do we have here, Joe? Everything that is 
here, people have made with their sweat, or with the communal projects and help 
of other countries.” 
 
As seen in Samuels’ contentious stance, as well as in the contentious stance of the 
community as a whole when outrage suddenly manifested in the form of resistance, 
distinct logics around what migration and development meant for community well-being 
were in competition. Even if the mobilization was at the “last second,” rife with internal 
divisions, tensions, and inward-oriented criticism, the rooted identities and practices of 
community mattered in a powerful way to Guarjileños.  
This chapter has emphasized that although neoliberalism and migration in the 
postwar context have introduced new dilemmas and challenges to community-building, 
Guarjileños continued to engage with collectivist and communal logics and practices to 
navigate changing conditions. These practices and logics represent a valued political 
project among resettled Chalatecos that is conditioned by a long-range trajectory of 
community-making and collectivism linked to place, networks, and mobility. These 
practices and logics vary, are constantly being relationally produced, and continue to 
change and adapt to new globalizing conditions, all the while working both with and 
against the state’s developmentalist and neoliberal projects. In the next chapter, I unearth 
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the way these logics and practices of community are at work and interwoven with 
Guarjila’s migration and cross-border networks, and how these challenge the kind of 
mainstream developmentalist logic on migration advanced by the state in El Salvador’s 
postwar nation-building project.
  
CHAPTER 5 
Rooted Community Networks 
This chapter explores the way people work to reconstitute and root community, 
through networks, across borders, and in place. Chapter 3 examined the collectivist 
communal logics and practices that were cultivated among Chalatecos in the prewar and 
wartime context, and Chapter 4 explored the postwar conditions of community-building 
within the place of Guarjila itself as it was reshaped by neoliberalism and migration. This 
chapter turns the focus to cross-border practices of community-making that involve 
Guarjileños both in the United States and in El Salvador, based on ethnographic analysis 
during the 2008 to 2011 fieldwork for this study. By exploring the cross-border practices 
and trajectories of migrants, it highlights how Guarjileños use mobility and networks to 
favor communal well-being and preferred futures, on their own terms. These networked 
rooting and communalizing practices are conditioned by a longer trajectory of collective 
action and communal systems, and by attachments to the active project of building 
community with meaning and dignity in Guarjila itself. They are activated as Guarjileños 
turn to community as a resource and a source of strength as they continue to navigate 
conditions of marginalization and exclusion in the United States and in El Salvador. 
Operating through rooted community networks, Guarjileños’ practices produce 
circulations, flows, and trajectories that destabilize key assumptions behind the particular 
logic of “migration and development” embraced by the Salvadoran state and some 
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multilateral development agencies. These social, economic, and political practices are 
evidence of a different kind of logic: one that partly places value on non-capitalist 
activity and on the constant work of making and rooting community, and one that 
conceptualizes well-being and the “development” of a better future on different terms.  
This chapter follows family-community networks of Guarjileños to weave 
together ethnographic stories that connect and move between the United States and El 
Salvador. I juxtapose these stories, and the windows to other ways of thinking that they 
open, against the schematics and logics bought into and advocated by San Salvador-based 
development specialists interested in making El Salvador’s undocumented emigration 
work for a particular version of “local” and “human” development. I chose stories with 
the goal of making visible situations, practices, networks, and trajectories that, due to 
their contingent, informal, or “against the flow” nature, might go unnoticed through a 
“mainstream” lens that privileges capitalist and developmentalist approaches to 
understanding the way people engage with migration and economic flows. These “other” 
kinds of practices and movements, I suggest, are abundant, contextually shaped, and 
remarkably powerful. 
First, I will discuss the theoretical contributions of this chapter, which I frame 
around the concept of rooted community networks. I then follow the logics, practices, and 
dilemmas of a wave of migrants who are voluntarily returning to Guarjila from the 
United States. Their decision, or struggle, to return is linked to an active project of 
rooting and investing in futures in Guarjila. I discuss how their trajectories are largely 
conditioned by a view that non-capitalist resources and community-based economic 
activity are also important contributors to living well. My analysis then turns to the way 
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remittances are used for non-capitalist ends and in ways that development specialists 
would regard as less than “productive”. I highlight how remittances contribute to the 
work of building Guarjila and giving it a meaningful sense of place, and how they are 
incorporated into collectivist, networked systems of taking care of others and favoring 
community well-being.  I close with a discussion of how remittances play a role in the 
work of superación (overcoming), particularly for a younger generation of Chalatecos 
whose personal-political life projects include struggles to build other viable options for 
their future than undocumented U.S. emigration. 
Theorizing Rooted Community Networks 
In this chapter, I return to the question of development. In the second chapter, I 
discussed how the conversations around “migration and development” that came into 
vogue recently in El Salvador among development specialists, the government, and other 
actors, have emphasized that migrants and their remittances can and should be key agents 
in development. This view was embraced by the neoliberal state, which had been 
establishing political and economic policies and a strategic discourse that engendered 
emigration and worked remittances into its neoliberal development strategy. It also was 
embraced by development specialists who stress that, despite some costs, migration and 
remittances can and should contribute to more equitable forms of development. 
According to this theory, this kind of development can occur when migrants and their 
families and communities commit to using remittances more appropriately for 
“productive” ends, including for the generation of local employment through small 
business creation in places of origin.  
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There is a particular developmentalist logic at work here. It purports that as 
migrants pursue their “American dream” and settle in the United States, the remittances 
they send back will help to bring the kind of progress they have now achieved in their 
own lives to their families and communities back “home”. It is a modernist/colonialist 
logic that generally assumes that a better quality of life will be found in the United States, 
that people from the Global South view their communities of origin as places in need of 
development, and that development can be achieved through capitalist activities and with 
the help of globalization. As we saw in Chapter 2, in El Salvador it is also linked to the 
postwar nation-state building project of destierro, one that uproots and erases troubled 
histories as it looks toward the appeal of transnationalist modernity in constructing the 
future. 
The practices I highlight in this chapter are evidence of a different kind of logic. 
Rather than erasing historical memory, these Guarjileños are constantly working to 
recultivate the history of collective struggle and rootedness that is meaningful to their 
community, no matter how troubling the memories. Rather than celebrating the potential 
“opportunities” for development lent through displacement and dispersion, they continue 
to work to root themselves in place, even as they use mobility and cross-border networks 
to meet needs and interests. And, rather than putting faith in the idea that “development” 
will be achieved through individual willpower as they engage with global capitalism, 
they work to count on and build collectivist, communal, and non-capitalist resources and 
activities to work toward collective well-being. As Lawson (1999) found in her research 
with Ecuadoran migrants, the practices, narratives, and trajectories of migrants 
themselves can contest assimilationist, modernist, and developmentalist assumptions.  
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To conceptualize the implications and dynamics of Chalatecos’ communal, 
rooting, and networking practices, I build on geographers Diane Rocheleau and Robin 
Roth’s (2007) proposed concept of rooted networks. They remind us that networks, like 
places and communities (as I have discussed), are relational and contingent. They are not 
equally fixed or equally mobile, and they are always being made and remade. They are 
also rooted; they do not simply exist in space and “float free from territory.” Just as they 
tie people to people (and many other actors and elements), they also connect people to 
territory and are created out of territory. They remind us that territory, as the terrain of 
ecology and places, cannot be conceptualized in a Cartesian sense. Relational and without 
set boundaries, territory becomes the “rooting zone” for networks.  
Their proposal is useful when considering how networks connect migrants and 
resources with family, community, and places. Guarjileños, as we will see, use cross-
border flows (including remittances, an important resource, and migration itself) along 
networks to make these connections to place and to others, in ways that are conditioned 
by a rooted experience of collective struggle and community-building, even as the 
meaning of rootedness is subjective, relational, varied, and changing. As geographers 
Rachel Silvey and Victoria Lawson (1999) remind us, even as migration theory tends to 
focus on flows in between places and laden with capitalist dynamics, we must remember 
that migrants are always moving between the real, meaningful, territorial places to which 
they are attached. In making visible this meaningful connection to rootedness and to 
place itself, we can identify non-capitalist and non-developmentalist activity. The 
intention here is to address the concern that “within developmentalist research, however, 
this central assumption—that migration processes are transparently economic in nature—
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has been subject to very little critical attention” since “the embeddedness of migration in 
modernization thinking has been so complete that it has gone largely unacknowledged.” 
(Silvey & Lawson 1999: 122-123) 
Furthermore, Rocheleau and Roth suggest that when thinking of rooted networks 
as a verb (rooting, networking), we can see how there exists an “infinite variety of 
rooting strategies” that connect the elements and actors in a network to territory. Migrants 
and other community members, to whom they are connected, therefore engage in rooting 
and networking practices and strategies. 
I introduce one more type of practice to the mix that is particularly important to 
Guarjileños: the work of communalizing, to use Zibechi’s (2010) term for the political 
and liberating work of building social bonds with a communitarian character. As we have 
seen, people of Guarjila and other communities have a long trajectory of communal 
systems and community making, which continued to change in form and adapt to new 
contexts. As Gutierrez Aguilar (2011) suggests, entramados comunitarios, or the 
meshworks of community and collectivity that favor collective care and well-being, are 
created and recreated through a multiplicity of groups, networks, sources, and contexts.  
In today’s context of migration and cross-border flows, the practices of rooting, 
communalizing, and networking – and the actors, elements, and resources that involve 
them – constitute what we can conceptualize as rooted community networks. 
The types of communitarian and rooting practices employed through these 
networks have important implications for rethinking the rather delimiting view that 
migration processes are almost exclusively driven by capitalist and developmentalist 
forces and interests. The proposals put forth in the work of geographers Katherine Gibson 
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and Julie Graham (J.K. Gibson-Graham 2006) are particularly helpful in identifying these 
practices and their implications. They encourage us to go beyond “capitalocentric” and 
developmentalist perspectives to be able to visibilize the non-capitalist and community 
economic activities that people are already putting into practice. 
Through the lens of community economies (Gudeman 2001; Gibson-Graham 
2006), we can see how Guarjilenos’ economic practices, networked across borders, can 
and do operate through a shared base of community resources, labor, and interests. 
Remittances are incorporated into community economic activities. Migrants and 
community members often must work with capitalist production and globalization to 
make ends meet and to satisfy immediate needs. However, as Gibson-Graham propose, 
by drawing attention to the way they use what’s left over, or the surplus, we can see how 
remittances, added to a larger pool of communal resources and assets from which they 
draw upon, are used for non-capitalist and collectivist ends. 
I identify how one such use of surplus is a contribution to the active work of 
taking care of others. Care, as Brazilian liberation theologian Leonardo Boff (2008) puts 
it, is an act and an attitude  “at the very root of the human being” that stands against the 
“attitude of neglect and abandonment of acts of kindness” that are “undermined by the 
current dominance of neoliberalism, with its individualism and its exaltation of private 
property” (2008: 3). 
These collectivist, yet cross-border, practices that value community economic and 
non-economic resources and the work of taking care broaden the scope of possibilities for 
conceptualizing “development”, well-being, and the building of better futures. To think 
beyond the mainstream boundaries of doing “development”, the notion of Buen Vivir – 
161 
living well, or collective well-being – is useful. As a concept that emerged out of the 
Andean Region but now being employed in contexts around the world, Buen Vivir has 
been critiqued by Western standards for representing a “romantic” or “utopian” vision, 
that without a clear set of guidelines, cannot be viably used to guide development, or as 
an alternative to development altogether (Gudynas 2011). However, I agree with Walsh 
(2010), that it offers a useful alternative principle by which the Western notion of 
“development” might be guided. As she points out, in the last decade in Latin America, 
development has shifted from being conceived of as being mainly measured by marks of 
economic “progress” toward a more humanistic view focused on the individual and 
quality of life. This shift, supported by multilaterals institutions such as the Inter-
American Development Bank, UNESCO, and the UNDP, has guided the idea of “human 
development”, which focuses on the principles of sustainability, democratic participation, 
and better living conditions. Nevertheless, human development assumes that reaching a 
better quality of life, for example, not only can be measured by quantifiable indicators but 
that, as Walsh (2010) states, it “depends on the manner in which people – particularly the 
poor – assume their life.” It assumes that “when individuals take control of their lives, 
acting on their life conditions, then social development and progress occur” (Walsh 2010: 
16). As we will see in this chapter, the practices of return migration and the valuation of 
non-capitalist activity lend evidence to the way that people conceptualize living well on 
more diverse terms.  
The identification of the potentialities and already-in-practice work of carving out 
other “development” trajectories, or futures, entails employing an analytical eye that is 
attuned to recognizing contingencies and experimentations.  This lens, in the words of 
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Katherine Gibson and Julie Graham, entails engaging with what they call “a politics of 
economic possibility,” or:  
“an enlarged space of decision and a vision that the world is not governed by 
some abstract, commanding force or global form of sovereignty. This does not 
preclude recognizing sedimentations of practice that have an aura of durability 
and the look of ‘structures’, or routinized rhythms that have an appearance of 
reliability and the feel of ‘reproductive dynamics’. It is, rather, to question the 
claims of truth and universality that accompany any ontological rigidity and to 
render these claims projects for empirical investigation and theoretical re-
visioning. Our practices of thinking widen the scope of possibility by opening up 
each observed relationship to examination of its contingencies and each 
theoretical analysis for its inherent vulnerability and act of commitment.” (J.K. 
Gibson-Graham 2006: xxxiii) 
 
The examination I present in this chapter therefore contributes to this effort by 
identifying practices that may be experimental and contingent, yet rooted in long-
standing communal systems and attachments to place. Using what Gibson-Graham 
identify as a “weak theory” approach that goes beyond a capitalocentric lens, I make 
visible practices that are understood as going against the (main)stream.   
Salvadoran Dreaming 
“Why should we invest in a future here?” Juliana asked me on a rainy July day in 
northern New Jersey, as I drove her and her two children to Sears to buy a dress for her 
daughter on her seventh birthday. With no driver’s license and with her partner, Beto 
(whose migration story I told in the last chapter) working hard in home construction 
seven days a week, Juliana was hardly ever able to escape their tiny apartment. The 
building was surrounded by parking lots on a busy main street, and the kids played on the 
kitchen floor because it had no living room. One oasis was the garden the family had 
planted on the grassy strip at the edge of the parking area, where, picking tomatoes with 
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the kids, she could feel and taste a bit of Guarjila.  
She asked the question that day because limitations on Beto’s and her 
immigration paperwork kept the future in a state of uncertainty and because she was so 
much invested in building Guarjila and its future, the community and place to which she 
was most closely attached. How can you build a future here in the United States, she 
asked me, when the government makes it impossible by refusing to grant you rights or 
even recognize your presence? Beto had Temporary Protected Status (TPS), a temporary, 
liminal immigration status granted by the United States. It instills a sense of “permanent 
temporariness” in many Salvadorans as it continues to be used as a means to manage 
flexible immigrant labor (Bailey et al. 2002). And Juliana experienced an everyday sense 
of volatility as she was forced to navigate illegality, and its associated stigma and reality 
of “deportability” (De Genova 2005). If forced to return to El Salvador, she would be 
displaced from their home in New Jersey, and possibly even from her U.S.-born children. 
Juliana, by then in her late twenties, was born just prior to her family’s guinda to Mesa 
Grande. She had been toughened by plenty of experiences of displacement and liminality 
in her life, and she wanted to be in a place where her family could plant roots and live 
with dignity. 
That day she spoke with me of her pride in being from Guarjila and of her 
longings to return there. It was a difficult decision to come to the United States in the first 
place. She did so because she loved Beto and so she followed him north. In Guarjila, she 
imagined reuniting with family, of stepping back to work at the community radio station 
where she had been for years up until she left, of being able to move about freely and 
again own a house and land, of being able to construct a future for her family in the place 
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to which she was most committed.  
But returning to El Salvador posed serious challenges, one of the most obvious 
being the loss of the steady income from Beto’s now well-established subcontracting 
business. They had contemplated the idea of Beto staying and continuing to work for a 
while longer while the rest of the family moved to El Salvador. It would be easier if Beto 
were allowed to travel freely, but TPS only gave permission to travel to El Salvador 
under special circumstances (commonly to see an ailing family member). She would have 
no hesitation about putting her children in Guarjila’s school, an idea that didn’t settle well 
with Beto’s older half-siblings who were from an earlier generation of migrants that had 
fled the war. They were since able to secure permanent residency and citizenship in the 
United States, and they now owned successful businesses and properties in both 
countries. When she brought up the idea at his house over lunch later that day, her half-
brother-in-law interjected in a baby voice directed at her two-year old son, “No, Gabriel 
wants to stay and study here!” 
Juliana’s desire to return to Guarjila was thus motivated on the one hand by a 
sense of uncertainty and alienation conditioned by immigration paperwork and 
discrimination in the United States, and on the other hand, by her strong and deeply 
rooted connection to Guarjila itself. Her brother, Ciro, returned to Guarjila that same day. 
He had been living for seven years in the United States. We talked with him on the phone 
the day before, when he told me he had sentimientos encontrados — conflicting feelings 
— about going back. It was not going to be easy leaving his stable job in Maryland but he 
had his partner and children in Guarjila, and a community that was important to him. 
Juliana talked with him on the phone every day, but that day she was too emotional to 
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bring herself to call. With her daughter’s birthday party coming to a close just before the 
New Jersey town’s Fourth of July fireworks show, she turned to me and said, “he must be 
there by now.” 
Juliana and her kids had just spent the week before with Ciro at the house in the 
Maryland suburb of Washington DC where he had lived. She loved the old house, in a 
depressed neighborhood southwest of the district, because it had a creek and a picket 
fence around its big yard. The family upstairs was from Guarjila. Ciro and others from 
Guarjila and its neighboring communities, unrelated to the family, shared rooms in the 
basement.  I stayed at the house the following week, and in many ways, it felt like 
Guarjila. Lili, the homeowner upstairs, had worked for years in Guarjila’s communal 
kitchen. Drawing wood from the creek’s thick foliage, she fired up homemade pupusas 
the traditional way, over a comal (a round griddle) by creatively using an old barrel as the 
stove. (She got the idea from Guarjileños she had visited in Indiana a few months earlier.)  
A dozen or so more Guarjileños who were family and close friends came in from 
the neighborhood for the pupusas and a barbecue. The hot Saturday was a day off from 
work for those who could come, and so they enjoyed spending it gathered together in 
community. Several of them worked in fast food restaurants and others worked cleaning 
services for the Census Bureau. Notably, a U.S. government agency that is only able to 
make an approximate estimate of the number of undocumented immigrants in the United 
States itself contracts an immigrant workforce to clean its offices. The U.S. government, 
after all, is assumed to be the largest contractor of undocumented and provisionally 
documented immigrants in the greater Washington DC area. What’s more, as I was 
routinely reminded, let’s not forget that Salvadorans, the vast majority of immigrants in 
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the metropolitan DC area, initially arrived in the United States fleeing a counter-
insurgency war funded by the very government that now employs them. 
For Ciro, going back to Guarjila meant giving up a good job, and a set of both 
conveniences and inconveniences associated with living in the United States. He had 
been working with other Guarjileños at a small printing shop that made signs and 
banners. A decorative banner he had made at the shop hung proudly in his room in 
Maryland.  It was red with white print, mimicking the color and font of the FMLN's flag. 
Instead of the acronym FMLN, it read “Guarjila.”  
A few days after his arrival to Guarjila, he posted a status update on Facebook 
with a picture of himself with his family at their house there with the caption:  “Ya soy 
pobre otra vez” (Now I am poor once again). It was received by Guarjileños in and 
outside of El Salvador who left a string of comments expressing joy and laughter, 
congratulating him on his homecoming and reunification with his family. 
Against the (Main)stream 
Ciro’s decision to voluntarily return to El Salvador went against the (main)stream. 
It was a difficult decision and it involved sacrifice. But Ciro was representative of a wave 
of postwar migrants who left eastern Chalatenango in the late 1990s and 2000s, many of 
whom had planned to return to their community in El Salvador since they left. Yet return 
migration, which just a few years earlier was unheard of and extremely unusual among 
Guarjileños, was becoming an increasingly normalized occurrence. The recent trend 
began to pick up in Guarjila by the late 2000s. During fieldwork in Guarjila from 
November 2008 to May 2011, more than a dozen migrants intentionally returned to the 
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community and resettled. Prior to 2008, very few, if any, migrants had voluntarily 
returned to the community. 
It is widely assumed that, like many other immigrant groups, Salvadorans who 
migrate to the United States, even with the fullest intentions to stay, rarely, if ever, return 
to resettle in El Salvador. Upon settlement in the United States, they are for some period 
of time, “trapped” as they work off the large debt accrued to pay for illicit travel to the 
United States. Many migrants start new families in the United States and places of 
destination and plant new roots and build new commitments in their destinations. And the 
majority of those who find stable employment find it impossible to give up wage earnings 
that they use to support themselves as well as family in both countries. Furthermore, 
Salvadorans and other Central American migrants face a perilous journey to arrive in the 
United States, and so returning to El Salvador and back again incurs an enormous risk 
and cost. Salvadorans and other Central Americans are less likely to engage in cyclical 
and return migration in comparison to migrant groups from central and northern Mexico, 
where undocumented migrants have a shorter and less costly journey and where other 
migrants have access to temporary work visas for seasonal U.S. labor. 
For the most part, these characteristics are well-founded and exemplary of the 
U.S. Salvadoran immigrant experience. But there were also changes that research on 
migration during the 1990s and 2000s did not foresee. The recent wave of returned 
migrants is in part an effect of the economic crisis that began in late 2008 and a sign that 
the immigration climate in the United States has become less welcoming in recent years. 
There is evidence of a larger trend throughout Mexico and Central America of a 
documented increase in non-deported return migration since the onset of the recession. 
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This trend suggests that many Latino migrants in the United States in general have been 
compelled to return to places of origin as they suddenly faced new economic challenges 
in the United States. Indeed, many sectors that typically employed immigrant labor, 
especially residential construction, were those most affected by the crisis. Economic 
motivations for return are compounded by the effects of increasingly tightened 
immigration and border security enforcement measures that haven taken shape especially 
since the mass protests of immigrants during the spring of 2006. 
Even so, the non-deported returned migrants that I spoke to in Guarjila who 
arrived between 2008 and 2011 did not suggest that their return was forced out of 
economic need. Like Ciro, they were generally men who had been maintaining a steady 
income from stable employment. And when the economic recession hit and took its toll 
on remittances, Guarjileños on both sides of the border were incredibly resourceful and 
developed strategies to weather the crisis. In Guarjila, as remittances declined, many 
families returned to farming a larger section of their agricultural land than they had been 
doing while receiving steady remittances. In some remarkable cases, remittances were 
sent in “reverse” — from El Salvador to the United States — to support migrants who 
had lost jobs so that they could get by in the interim while they searched for new 
employment. 
A number of deported migrants were also arriving to Guarjila, especially since 
deportations from the United States for minor legal infractions have increased in recent 
years.  As another form of displacement, deportation can uproot people suddenly from 
families and jobs to which they are committed in U.S. communities where they have 
settled. In spite of the assumption that deported migrants will be forced to find work and 
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resettle in El Salvador once deported from the United States, the vast majority of those 
who have arrived back in Guarjila have gone back to the United States. Their temporary 
stay usually lasts a few weeks and in a few cases for months.  
Community networks are an important source of support for deported migrants. 
Migrants from Guarjila will frequently pool funds to make an expedited return trip to the 
United States possible for a deported migrant. In a quick and improvisational but 
organized fashion, they communally finance the trip until the migrant is able to pay off 
the debt. 
For the select few deported migrants who have chosen to resettle in Guarjila, 
community networks, meaningful community-based activities and work, and the sense of 
welcoming and belonging that comes from community-in-place were also a source of 
strength. As more have been deported recently based on minor legal infractions, the 
community as a whole in Guarjila itself has grown more sympathetic to the plight of 
deported community members who years earlier would have been more stigmatized. As 
Juliana’s mother put it when, in passing through Guarjila one day, she encountered a 
young man who had left ten years earlier but now expressed his plans to resettle there: 
“Welcome back. Here is your community. Here no one is going to send you to China.” 
Shortly after his arrival, the young man got involved in local community groups, found 
work in masonry, fell in love, and built his own home from the ground up.  
Others who were deported, including those who only made a temporary stay in 
Guarjila, immediately dove back into roles they held in community-based activities and 
work that had long been important to them. While some individuals perhaps subjectively 
viewed them with more or less respect than they had before they migrated, on the whole, 
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they were received and reintegrated into these groups almost as though they had never 
left. Of those who were deported between 2008 and 2011, several rejoined the long-
standing community youth group that was initiated immediately after the Peace Accords 
in the wake of the violence. Another jumped back into his character role in the theatrical 
group that presents its narrations of community histories and social issues. One re-
assumed his position as a respected soccer coach. Another, whose story of deportation I 
mentioned in the last chapter, returned to voluntarily work at the community radio station 
in the interim while he awaited his trip back up north. 
Rooting 
The experiences and contemplations of return migration are exemplary of the 
powerful work of community, operating through rooted community networks. The 
struggle to make returning possible is, in the most literal sense, a struggle to return to 
one’s roots or to re-root oneself in place. But in a different way, community, now 
networked across borders but still rooted in place and in a shared history, was a valuable 
resource and an important source of strength for navigating difficult circumstances, just 
as it has been for people of Chalatenango in varying contexts: their long-range 
experiences of community organizing, organizing flight from the conflict region, 
organizing and working communally within refugee camps, and in coping with and 
working with postwar migration as they struggled to (re)build the region’s “organized 
communities”.  
Community networks, rooted in place and in a sense of shared history, make it 
possible for deported and non-deported returnees to reintegrate into community-based 
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activities that stem from a long trajectory of communal logics and practices that have 
contributed to the making of Guarjila. From the perspective of pragmatism, community 
networks of migrants in the United States, still committed to and tied to Guarjila, work to 
facilitate mobility and settlement. Community members collectively offer funds for 
travel, and as evident in Ciro’s situation, they share housing and help with job 
networking, working together whenever possible. The collective and communal care-
taking work that took shape in spaces where community was reconstituted in 
transnational geographies was a valuable resource. 
And in its most meaningful way, the sense of belonging and warmth from 
community both in Guarjila and in the United States was another resource, no matter how 
intangible. The yard around Lili’s house (with or without her delicious pupusas) became 
a space for reconstituting community, and a space where the place of Guarjila itself was 
reproduced. For Ciro and Juliana, who were constantly navigating the conditions and 
indignity of illegality, the sense of community in these sorts of spaces was a source of 
strength in its own right, in addition to the kinds of collective and networked community 
practices mentioned above. A sense of community played a similar role in Guarjila itself 
for those returned and deported migrants who were now navigating the challenges of 
reintegrating into a place they had left for some time.  
Ciro and Juliana’s deeply rooted and closely networked connection to Guarjila is 
in large part conditioned by their involvement in building the community of Guarjila in 
El Salvador and their sustained commitment to that work from afar, and even by 
continuing to invest in a future there. Like other recent returnees, they represent a wave 
of postwar migrants who departed during the 1990s and 2000s who share in this 
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experience. Most of them were either offered TPS or no legal immigration status, and so 
many of them question the plausibility of trying to invest in a future in the United States, 
where they continue to be regarded as an expendable labor force and face multiple forms 
of social and political exclusion. But for many of those from this generation of migrants, 
especially those with “mixed status” families like that of Beto and Juliana (who each 
have a different immigration status and whose children are U.S. citizens), the idea of 
returning to El Salvador after several years of working abroad poses a series of dilemmas 
as they take into account the interests of their children’s future, the needs of family 
members in El Salvador, and the feasibility of leaving stable jobs. They are constantly 
balancing commitments that are split on both sides of an international border. 
The contours of cross-border commitments are shaped by other kinds of 
subjectivities for an earlier wave of migrants, such as Beto’s half-siblings who emigrated 
from El Salvador during the 1980s civil war. Sentiments toward El Salvador are in part 
shaped by the memories of chaos and violence when they fled Chalatenango. 
Furthermore, their involvement in postwar community-building in the region has always 
been from a distance, and, having arrived in the United States in a different immigration 
climate, many of them were able to secure U.S. Green Cards and even citizenship. 
An “American dream” narrative generally resonates with their experience more 
strongly than it does with the experience of the later generation of migrants, some of 
whom can now be seen returning to Guarjila and other communities in eastern 
Chalatenango. Just as Juliana’s desire to return to Guarjila and place her children in the 
community’s school seemed insensible to Beto’s half siblings, their own subjective view 
that privileges life in the United States over El Salvador seems insensible to Juliana. In 
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her view, they tend to look down upon more recent migrants, flaunt their success from 
businesses and rental properties in both countries, and have “let go of their roots” in 
emphasizing the pursuit of an “American dream” over a “Salvadoran dream”.  
Nonetheless, earlier migrants have their own ties to El Salvador. Many of them, 
like Beto’s half-siblings, have plans to retire in El Salvador where there is a more 
accessible cost of living. The privilege of being able to continue to engage in 
transnational travel, business, and property ownership also makes retirement in El 
Salvador a sensible opportunity for them. For this generation of migrants, immigration 
paperwork has made it possible to engage in the (re)making of El Salvador’s future not 
only through mobility and transnational economic practices, but also through 
transnational involvement in political and cultural activities. 
Living Well 
These sorts of transnational engagements by migrants with paperwork are well 
received in the eyes of the postwar nation-state building project, which values migrants’ 
participation in El Salvador’s “human development.” Having successfully pursued the 
“American dream” while remaining transnationally-engaged, these migrants are 
understood to be introducing outside capital, knowledge, and development capacities 
(simply put, “progress”) to El Salvador from the United States. According to this same 
framework, the later wave of migrants, having been denied or only having been granted 
provisional immigration paperwork while holding onto firm attachments to communities 
of origin, are best able to contribute to “human development” through economic practices 
directed toward their “home” communities: preferably (to the Salvadoran government at 
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least), by using their remittances for employment-generating local development.  
The idea that migrants from this later generation should choose to return to their 
communities of origin — voluntarily, without being forced out by the economic recession 
or by deportation, and with few resources in hand (usually just a bit of savings) —  thus 
does not fit into this particular schematic of development. The latter assumes that 
migrants, once settled in the United States and pursuing their “American dream,” look 
back at a distant past in places of origin with nostalgia. Nostalgic sentiments and 
attachments to place become a source of pride and identity that continue to drive 
migrants’ desires to send remittances and buy “nostalgic” products from transnational 
entrepreneurial migrant businesses, which are each economic practices that support the 
economies in places of origin. By contrast, those who intended to return to El Salvador 
did not view their attachments to Guarjila as a nostalgic memory of the past. Rather, their 
attachment and networks were a source of strength as they coped with difficult conditions 
in the United States and as they actively worked to build futures for themselves and 
others in Guarjila. They envisioned a different kind of future, one that prioritized the 
constant work of (re)building community and rootedness in place over U.S.-based 
employment and a lasting stream of remittances. 
In the world of development agencies and experts back in San Salvador, these 
“reverse” migrant trajectories didn’t make logical sense. In February 2009, at a meeting 
from within the fogged glass doors of the United Nations building overlooking San 
Salvador’s wealthiest suburb, I spoke with the UNDP’s Program Coordinator on Human 
Development and Migration about how I had been hearing of more migrants that were 
returning to El Salvador since the onset of the economic crisis. In his view, this 
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observation wasn’t credible. He predicted that the economic turn would not stimulate any 
significant return migrations, since migrants are often forced to spend years working off 
the large debt incurred from illicit transit. He suggested that rather than returning to El 
Salvador, migrants would move to other parts of the United States, perhaps in states like 
Oklahoma, where migrants are increasingly employed for agricultural and meat packing 
labor. A well-respected Salvadoran economist, by June 2009 he was appointed to be the 
Vice Minister of the Economy under President Funes’s new administration. 
A year later, at a regional forum on migration and development held at the 
Radisson Plaza located next to San Salvador’s new Torre Futura building in the affluent 
neighborhood of Escalón, a UNDP representative presented findings from recent research 
about the effects of the economic crisis on El Salvador’s migration and remittances. In 
his talk, he first spoke to the formally dressed audience in the cold banquet room about 
how El Salvador was a top recipient of remittances, and that as a source of national 
income they made a sizable contribution to the tax base and had a multiplier effect. Even 
so, he reminded the group that day, migration had “some costs,” such as brain drain. The 
statistics yielded from the study showed that some migrants expressed fear they would be 
affected by the crisis, but that despite these fears, trends in overall national remittance 
flows had only declined slightly. According to the UNDP’s questionnaire, of the fears 
expressed by migrants, 36% were concerned they would make less money, 12% feared 
they would have to return to El Salvador, 5% were afraid they would lose their job, and 
3% were worried that another family member would have to migrate to the United States. 
Unfortunately, the results presented from the study did not account for the legal status of 
immigrants surveyed. And, curiously, when the presenter read the results of the survey on 
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the Power Point slide aloud to the public, he paraphrased the second statistical result to 
instead say that “12% feared they would be deported.”47 
According to a logic that privileges evidence from macro-economic data and puts 
faith in the idea that remittances can and should help to spark “human development”, the 
idea that migrants would return to El Salvador, even during the worst recession to hit the 
United States since the Great Depression, seemed unlikely, even unbelievable. Just as the 
knowledge produced from migration research lags behind the rapidly shifting political 
and economic conditions that shape the contours of migration flows and experiences, so 
do the understandings of migration that guide the paradigms and predictions used by 
international development agencies.  
By privileging macro-economic evidence, this perspective pushes to the margins 
contextual considerations and emergent contingencies. It reinforces the discursive 
dominance of capitalism as a whole as the main lens through which to seek out credible 
evidence. As a capitalocentric and developmentalist logic, the potentiality for other 
migrant trajectories, and thus other development trajectories, is discredited. 
For Guarjileños who were voluntarily returning, a different type of logic guided 
their decisions, one that was more rooted and communal, and conditioned by a long-
range collective experience. This logic challenges the state-led discourse that celebrates 
emigration and the “American dream,” as well as developmentalist assumptions that 
Salvadorans will generally find a better quality of life in the United States (with its much 
higher “human development” index ranking than El Salvador). According to a different 
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 Dialogo Migratorio de America Central, held in San Salvador June 9-10, 2010, sponsored by the United 
Nations Development Program, the International Orgnanization on Migration, and Ministerio de Relaciones 
Exteriores of the Salvadoran government, the Sistema de la Integración Salvadoreña.  
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logic, quality of life gets conceptualized in relation to a broader set of “indicators,” some 
of which are affective and place value on non-capitalist assets. 
In Sarah Mahler’s engaging (1995) ethnography, she recognizes the “workaholic” 
lifestyles led by many Salvadorans in the United States as she elucidates their 
disillusionments with the “American dream”. When I asked why they chose to return to 
Guarjila, many returnees simply said they had grown “tired” of life in the United States. 
Paco, who came back in 2010 after five years in the United States, much of which he 
spent working seven days a week at a steakhouse in New Jersey working shifts as long as 
seventeen hours, put it like this:  
“I wanted to return because I got tired of being in the United States. I was tired of 
just working. It doesn’t give you time for anything, just sleep and go to work. 
There is a threshold that you reach. After that I decided to return to El Salvador, 
to be with family, children and all of that, too, right? …I like it here because 
you’ve convivido [coexisted] here, you know, the time that you have had here, 
you know? I like everything here about this place.”48 
 
Clearly, it is exhausting to overwork far beyond legally allowable work shifts for 
immigrant wages that tend to be rarely classifiable as “dignified” wages (in some cases 
below the minimum wage), a large portion of which are then usually sent away to El 
Salvador to support family once immediate expenses are met in the United States. But 
there was more to the fatigue felt by migrants like Paco. For him, there was something 
deeply refreshing about reuniting with family, belonging to community, and having an 
affinity to a place. Like the kind of fatigue felt by refugees in Mesa Grande that activated 
their return to Chalatenango, the fatigue of migrants in the United States was also linked 
to an experience of displacement, temporariness, and estrangement. Adjusting to life in 
the United States, and navigating conditions of illegality, were exhausting in their own 
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 Author’s interview in Guarjila, January 2011 
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right. And outside of Guarjila itself, it takes work to reconnect with others from the 
community who were living there, in other parts of the United States, or elsewhere, 
through phone calls and more recently through social media. In some areas, migrants 
made consistent efforts to reconnect as community in the micro-spaces of neighborhoods, 
homes, and work environments, and in other situations, long work schedules meant that 
even Guarjileños who were living close to one another found it difficult to see each other 
in person. 
Javier, who returned to Guarjila in 2008 after eight years away, said life in the 
United States was generally pleasant. Granted TPS, he was able to own a car and move 
about freely, and work legally without trouble from immigration enforcement. He 
generally enjoyed his stable job at a barbecue restaurant, where he got along well with the 
English-speaking owner and coworkers. He chose to work long hours at the restaurant so 
that he could have savings to eventually return to Guarjila. As with other recent returnees 
I spoke with, even though he described his experience in the United States as generally 
positive, there was a particular sense of community and place in Guarjila that he missed:   
“A friend of mine, who was not my girlfriend, just a friend of mine, she always 
had wanted to try to help me in some way. So she used to tell me that if I wanted 
to, that she would marry me so that I could get my papers. She used to tell me that 
if I wanted her to she would even live with me for a while in my house, so that 
they would believe us more — so that they would believe us. Back then it wasn’t 
— it was easier. They didn’t ask a lot of questions. But I never planned to —  I 
always planned to go there, to make something, and return right here to be with 
my people, with the people who I know. There, you go out to the street, and one 
day you’ll see one person and the next day someone else. You walk down the 
street and even if you wanted them to, people don’t say hello or anything at all. I 
don’t know if you’ve realized that people don’t even bother to say hello. And so I 
never planned to stay living there. I always planned to leave here with a goal, 
work to make something, and before long come back here to be close to my 
family, the place where I was born, the people who I know.”49 
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Javier’s decision to return was not only conditioned by an affective sense of the 
warmth of community-in-place that he valued, but there was also a pragmatism to it. 
From a “rational” economic-oriented perspective, one might assume that pragmatism 
would lead him to remain in the United States and keep his stable income, with the hope 
that TPS would continue to be renewed or that a policy change would enable TPS holders 
to apply for residency (without having to seek out legal loopholes and special 
qualifications to do so, as some migrants currently do). But Javier’s decision was built on 
a community-based pragmatism. He recognized the value of Guarjila’s communal 
resources, which made it possible to return and give up the promise of a steady U.S. 
wage: 
“There is freedom here, you know, you can work if you want if you have a small 
job. You do it and you make a little bit of money, and you can rest on the 
weekend if you want. And you don’t have the worry about the electric bill, the gas 
bill, the phone, cable, insurance — that you have to buy food, that you have to 
buy this and that, clothes — lots of things. Here you pay a little bit for electric, 
just a little, and nothing for an entire month of water…Look, here, these 
communities — if you’ve realized — these are communities that have gone to the 
United States for a long time. And thank God the projects we have here are not 
projects that are things that belong to the government, but they are projects that 
were done by this very community which found the funds and carried them out. 
The government can’t come and put their hands in these things. And so that has 
given a lot of benefits to the community.”50 
 
Guarjila’s autonomous trajectory of developing communal resources and non-
capitalist assets contribute to community well-being. The communally constructed water 
system draws water from surrounding hilltops to offer virtually free of charge potable 
water to households and community buildings and areas. The local community clinic, 
built on the popular model and drawing from international support, holds to its initial 
commitment to offering accessible and affordable health care. Returned and deported 
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migrants have integrated into cooperative workshops in trades such as carpentry and 
welding, and have returned to actively play a role in community politics through the 
directiva model of participatory democracy. Javier valued these communal assets, along 
with the ability to own a plot of land and a house with yard space where he could plant 
fruit trees and grow his own food. Essentially, he returned with his partner and U.S.-born 
daughter because he was confident that they would be able to live well in Guarjila.  
Networked Community Economic Systems 
Javier knew he was assuming the risk of having to find a way to make a living 
upon arrival. But he considered himself to be a jack of many trades and a resourceful 
person.  Even though he had worked for several years in a barbecue restaurant, as a 
returning migrant, Javier was assumed to be a skilled mason since many of the 
community’s migrants worked in construction in the United States. The same was true for 
Paco, who had mainly worked in a steakhouse during his time in the United States. They 
were both actually skilled in masonry from years of work experience in Guarjila prior to 
their departure, but it was not a skill that they acquired in the United States. Almost 
immediately after their returns, Paco and Javier, like other returnees, were contracted to 
design and lead the construction of local home building projects. 
Many in Guarjila were expanding their homes with the remittances of family 
members, and migrants were ordering the construction of homes from afar for themselves 
to be able to return. What had developed out of this trend was a networked community 
economy around masonry projects. Connections through family-community networks 
won Javier and Paco the projects. They then employed local community members to 
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work on the construction with them. Remittances sent across borders by community 
members funded the construction projects, and provided a relatively sizable and livable 
wage to the workers. At the time, as project directors, they each earned around twenty 
dollars a day, which amounted to about 400 dollars a month. Take into consideration that 
a similar monthly earning would be made by many professionals in San Salvador, an 
amount that is hardly enough to make ends meet there where people must pay for 
privatized services, generally higher food prices, and much higher housing expenses 
(monthly rent for a small house in a working class area of the city would generally cost at 
a minimum 200 dollars, and in Guarjila, a much larger house might go for around 25 
dollars). 
Clearly, the masonry economy is dependent on the availability of remittances and 
the current demand for construction, and how sustainable it is or whether it can generate 
viable local employment over the long-range would be difficult to predict. But that is 
beside the point. What is important here is that these economic dynamics follow the logic 
and practice of a community economy, one that is networked across borders but still 
rooted in a particular place. And it is precisely these community dimensions of the 
masonry economy that foster livable wages, dignified working conditions, and a sense of 
contribution to a meaningful community and place.  
The existence of a networked community economy, a range of communal assets 
and resources, and the strong affective value of community-in-place were a powerful 
draw for returning migrants. They conditioned logics, practices, and trajectories of 
migration and development that went against the (main)stream, and made it possible to 
broaden conceptualizations of quality of life and visions of community well-being 
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beyond more narrowly focused capitalocentric and developmentalist perspectives. Even if 
Guarjila’s conditions are unique, it is a site to turn to in considering broader potentialities. 
The uniqueness of one context should not “weaken” its position in theory. Rather, it 
offers us a strong base for theorizing and recognizing the remarkable strength of rooted 
community-building, based in place and networked across borders. 
Investing in the Future 
From the perspective of development specialists concerned with how migration 
can contribute to local development, the investment of remittances in home construction 
projects tends to be viewed with criticism. The surge in interest recently in El Salvador 
about how migrants can most “productively” use remittances looks unfavorably on the 
tendency of hometown associations to contribute to local infrastructure (soccer fields, 
parks, roads) and of family-scale remittances to go toward the expansion of homes 
because they are not employment-generating ventures or more directly improving the 
“human development” in their communities of origin. The critique is linked to a broader 
concern that remittances get directed toward consumption and luxuries that do not 
contribute to economic growth and better living conditions. 
Rural communities with extensive emigration and remittances in other parts of El 
Salvador, Central America, and Mexico were critiqued for having American-influenced, 
often multi-story home designs that were critiqued by urban onlookers and development 
specialists as tacky, excessive, and non-functionalist. In rural Mexico, large homes stand 
empty or are inhabited by the handful of women, children, and elderly who remain in 
remittance-dependent communities that have seen an exodus of migrants over many 
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years. In El Salvador, the eastern region of San Miguel (home to the famous migrant-
sending town of Intipucá) most exemplifies this architectural shift.  One San Salvador-
based architect I spoke with explained that he found some design requests of rural 
remittance-receivers to be peculiar; for example, he couldn’t believe that one family 
wanted the front side of their home plated with ceramic bathroom tile.  
In Guarjila, the change has been less drastic. The rows of simple one or two-room 
cinder-block houses, built with the help of international funding after resettlement and in 
the initial years of postwar reconstruction, were expanded. Additional rooms were added 
onto homes, locked gates and fences popped up around them and floors were tiled. 
Appliances such as refrigerators and gas ranges (instead of the traditional wood-fired 
stoves) found their way into kitchens, while stereo sound systems and TVs came to seem 
obligatory in living rooms. In recent years, some driveways (sometimes with a truck 
parked in them) were added and more houses were painted to disguise the raw cinder-
block.  
A Central American NGO was awarded UNDP funding in 2009 to document what 
its proposal called the arquitectura de las remesas (architecture of remittances). The 
researcher, photographer, and architect that pursued the project visited communities in 
San Miguel, El Salvador (including Intipucá) and indigenous communities of Guatemala 
among others in Central America. They photographed homes and documented stories of 
community and architectural transformation, to be put on display in a blog and in an 
exhibit that traveled to El Museo de Arte de El Salvador, El Salvador’s national museum 
of art, in 2011 while I was in El Salvador. 
Reflecting on the family-scale experience of emigration and suggesting that these 
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architectural changes were material markers of migrants and their families’ “dreams of 
return” and “signs of success,” the project offered a valuable contribution that 
documented one remarkable and fascinating reality of the transformative effects of 
migration. However, by a different token, in putting on display the decisions and 
practices of rural people in the form of “gaudy” houses and in eliciting such external 
fascination, one could say the exhibit helped effectuate a form of othering and 
contributed to a (developmentalist) discourse that places blame on rural migrant-
communities for their supposedly wasteful consumption, poor decisions in using 
remittances, and general tastelessness.  
Through the lens of an arquitectura de las remesas, home improvements might be 
viewed as excessive and wasteful spending, especially given that fewer people tended to 
use the dwellings as family members emigrated and given that return migration might 
very well remain only a “dream” for many migrants. But I suggest that we need to be 
cautious of these assumptions. In Guarjila and neighboring communities, home 
construction is one step in fulfilling an intentional plan that many migrants have to 
actually return. Funding home construction from abroad is part of the active work of 
continuing to root oneself and one’s family in a community-in-place; it is an investment 
in the future. 
In Guarjila, home improvements were part of the active project of making place in 
a postwar resettled community. Since its resettlement, Guarjila has been under 
construction. Home construction after resettlement is one part of a larger project of 
building a community from the ground up. Much of the housing was haphazardly and 
quickly assembled with international funding and out of immediate need. With its simple, 
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unpainted cinder-block dwellings, the community continued to resemble the kind of 
refugee camp settlement that community members had abandoned prior to their 
repatriation. The houses trapped heat and did not fit the cool adobe architecture that 
traditionally characterized the region.  
Making Meaning out of Place 
The critique of home construction fits a broader developmentalist concern that 
remittances are not being used productively to contribute to local development by 
generating local employment through entrepreneurial activity and by aiming to improve 
living conditions. According to this view, family remittance uses tend to get wasted on 
simple luxuries, and hometown associations (groups of migrants who organize to fund 
community projects), lacking a long-range or broader development vision, tend to direct 
remittances toward infrastructure projects. 
In Guarjila, remittances first need to go to meet basic needs, and they have indeed 
gone toward some simple luxuries. J.K. Gibson-Graham (2006) showed how the surplus 
remittances from migrants from a community in the Philippines were involved to foster 
community economic activities. Drawing from J.K. Gibson Graham’s concept of surplus, 
let’s consider how Guarjileños use what’s left over of remittances are used to contribute 
to the meaning-making and well-being of community-in-place in non-capitalist ways.   
Remittances have contributed to community activities and construction that give 
meaning to Guarjila, cultivating its sense of community identity in place. This is part of 
the active project of making place out of an experience of displacement, and of 
cultivating a sense of historical memory that gives meaning to community. Remittances 
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have contributed to community projects to build material markers that commemorate 
events and figures that were key to the making of Guarjila. A local museum has been 
built in Fr. Jon Cortina’s honor, and pictures and engravings on the wall of the 
community’s renovated chapel commemorates Fr. Cortina, Sister Ann Manganaro, 
Archbishop Romero, and fallen combatants who were family members of Guarjileños. 
Beyond the patron saint day fiesta, community members (including migrants who 
send significant remittances to support them) hold in high regard the annual fiestas and 
rituals that commemorate historical events that were integral to building the community. 
Among these include the fiesta to commemorate the return from Mesa Grande, Jon 
Cortina’s death, and the annual pilgrimage to the site of the Sumpul River massacre. The 
neighboring community of Los Ranchos, with a combination of municipal funds and 
remittances, is able to draw in internationally renowned bands that play “revolutionary 
music” for its yearly fiestas.  
If one’s framework for seeing the value of remittance contributions for 
community development is limited to capitalist activity, then remittances contributed to 
fiestas and cultural activities, or to community infrastructure that does not appear to 
improve living conditions, seem like a waste. But by recultivating historical memory 
through commemorative power, these material markers and events may also be seen to 
serve as non-capitalist, but highly valued, contributions to community. 
Guarjileños are dispersed across several states in the United States and several 
countries. The community does not have a hometown association that conventionally 
functions as a group of migrants who can meet in person in a local area to organize 
community projects funded with the help of remittances. Surplus remittance contributions 
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to support the community tend to be improvisational with varying degrees of 
organization. Community leaders in Guarjila remind migrants abroad of community 
activities and projects that need funding and then appropriately direct and acknowledge 
the designated money transfers from those who are able to give. 
One large project that was carefully organized was the building of Guarjila’s first 
church, something that the community had been wanting for many years. A church is at 
the heart of many communities in Latin America; community members felt that a church 
was important to Guarjila’s sense of place and permanency. Since the war, they had been 
using their small, rustic open-air chapel for church services and community meetings. 
With piece by piece contributions of community members, the construction of the church 
moved ahead slowly and steadily over the course of several years since 2008. Each week 
at the end of the church service, the names of those who had donated that week and what 
they had donated were read aloud. Donations might include a few dollars earned from a 
local bake sale, a couple bags of cement, or fifty dollars from a migrant abroad. 
Benjamin, a Guarjileño who had been living in Virginia for several years, 
reminded me of the importance of the tedious accountability system. He said that one 
year he had donated to support activities for the community’s senior citizen group. His 
father was in the group, and he felt that it was important to support the small community 
of elderly people. He was delighted to receive a video at the end of the year with smiling 
old folks taking part in the regular activities at their designated communal building. He 
donated to the group again the following year, but when he did not receive a video in 
return that time around, he told the group coordinator that he would be putting his money 
toward something else the next time. 
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At other times, gathering surplus remittances to support meaningful activities and 
projects were much more spontaneous and improvisational. On another occasion at 
Benjamin’s house, he passed around a hat and asked if each of us in the room (myself and 
the others from Guarjila and nearby communities) to donate to the carerra de cincha, a 
fun competition at the annual fiesta in which men ride on horses and try to tag a piece of 
tape hanging on a line. This was one of Benjamin’s favorite activities at the annual fiesta 
when he lived in Guarjila, and he felt good knowing that his name would be 
acknowledged as the official sponsor of the event and that he was contributing to the 
community by helping to cover the costs of the annual fiesta. I was happy to contribute 
twenty dollars from my wallet to the effort (and moreover felt that it would look bad if I 
did not). 
Communal Care and Well-Being 
Migrants also spontaneously gather together funds to support community 
members in need and in moments of crisis. Let me offer one instance as an example: 
while I was visiting a Guarjileño in Virginia in 2009, he received a phone call from 
another community member asking if he could contribute to a pool of money being 
collected to support medical expenses of a recently arrived migrant who was pregnant 
and had not yet found employment. He responded that he would gladly help out the 
young woman (who was also from Guarjila but not from his family) by sending 100 
dollars right away. One might call these practices “random acts of kindness”, but they are 
not random. Even if spontaneous, I would suggest that they are actually quite systematic, 
as they are linked to a strong sense of community and belonging, and to a longer 
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trajectory of communal logics and practices.  
The economic practices of migrants can constitute cross-border systems and 
strategies, with varying degrees of organization, for taking care of community. By 
focusing on how remittances, along with other non-monetary resources, are circulated for 
taking care, we can move beyond exclusively developmentalist and capitalist frameworks 
to conceptualize how people collectively contribute to community well-being.  
Collectivist practices of taking care entail less than “productive” uses of remittances and 
migrant-community networks, since they get integrated into broader economic exchanges 
that do not prioritize development, or by extension, the production of migrant-
entrepreneurial subjects. They are based on communal practices and logics that favor 
community well-being on their own terms, according to their own priorities and values.  
One very common cross-border strategy of taking care — in its most direct form, 
capitalizing on the warmth of family care taking rather than the expenses of outsourced 
child care — happens when migrant parents, so often working more than full-time hours, 
send U.S.-born children to be taken care of by grandparents and extended family 
members for periods of time in El Salvador. Similarly, returned migrants, such as Javier, 
consider sending their U.S.-born children back to the United States for periods of time 
under the supervision of family members abroad to take advantage of schools, English-
language acquisition, and U.S. citizenship rights. While these practices tend to draw upon 
more closely-knit family networks than broader community networks, it is nevertheless a 
strategic and collectivist strategy of taking care, and it is important to mention for two 
reasons. First, either of the above scenarios is a product of failed U.S. immigration policy 
as migrants and their “mixed status” families are forced to face extremely difficult 
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decisions and to cope with the troublesome condition of bi-national division. It is 
therefore representative of the dilemmas and the cross-border coping practices of 
migrants’ families in many parts of Central America and Mexico. And second, in 
Guarjila and other communities in eastern Chalatenango, extended family networks and 
community networks tend to be connected and entangled. Some families have long been 
taking care of children in the community who are not family members since their parents 
and immediate family members fled or were killed or disappeared.  
The collectivist practices of care taking along community networks often operate 
in informal ways, as “ad-hoc” collectives come together to circulate remittances or non-
monetary resources to support individuals or the community as a whole in difficult 
circumstances. Just as families use mobility strategically to favor the well-being of their 
children, collectives of migrants will pool funds to finance the travel of community 
members across the border, working with the community’s well-established transit 
networks. Travel to the United States from Guarjila via coyote currently costs about 
7,000 dollars. While in other areas without a history of collectivist action, individual 
families might work with lenders to cover trip costs, among Guarjileños, it functions 
much differently. It is typical for migrants in the United States to contribute two hundred 
to five hundred dollars each toward the traveling migrant’s fund, meaning that anywhere 
from fifteen to thirty-five people might pool money to pay collectively cover the cost of 
the trip. Those who contribute tend to be the most trusted friends and community 
members of the migrant preparing planning travel to the United States. Unlike lending 
from banks and from informal local lenders, migrants do not pay interest on funds that 
are lent in this collectivist form. The migrant is expected to pay back each contributor 
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within reasonable time after finding employment in the United States. Because a number 
of people contributed a relatively small amount to the fund, the migrant should pay back 
the debt to avoid shaming or damaged trust within the community. Furthermore, should 
the migrant not (be able to) repay the debts, because they each contributed only a small 
fraction of the total cost, those who are collectively financing the trip are protected from 
what would have been a much more significant financial burden had the lending come 
only from one or a few individuals in the migrants’ immediate family.51 
As I mentioned in Chapter 4, collective funding for travel is common for deported 
migrants, who arriving to Guarjila, find themselves in the difficult situation of having 
been suddenly displaced from stable jobs, family, and homes established in the United 
States. In another example, migrants communally pooled remittances to fund a living 
stipend for a student from Guarjila who was studying at a Cuban university toward a 
degree in sports science under an FMLN-supported scholarship. Funding for his living 
stipend was suddenly no longer available shortly after he began the program. (The 
student later used the degree to work for El Salvador’s National Institute of Sports in an 
outreach post in Chalatenango communities.) The communal funding (by U.S.-based 
sources) of the return travel of deported migrants and of the education of someone 
studying in a country economically embargoed by the United States lends evidence to the 
powerful way community well-being becomes a political project that challenges 
(il)legality. In these scenarios, communal logics and practices trump concerns for 
adhering to U.S. legal frameworks. 
A highly organized system of resource pooling I encountered that regularly drew 
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 Based on author’s interviews in Maryland in July 2011 with migrants from Guarjila.  
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from migrants’ remittances was in the nearby community of Carasque. In this much 
smaller “organized community” in eastern Chalatenango, migrants were asked to transfer 
ten remittance dollars each month to the community’s colectivo comunal (communal 
fund), which used the pooled funds to support community resources. Each month, the 
community drew 50 dollars to be redistributed among elderly community members who 
most benefited from the income.  
The communal redistribution of pooled resources was a well-orchestrated system 
of collective care that fit into the community’s larger efforts to build cooperative activity 
and community-based assets with the help of its migrant networks.  With its small 
population, Carasque became highly organized and was effective in helping migrants be 
actively involved in community-building.  The community had its own library, park, and 
immaculately kept soccer field, communally resourced potable water, and several new 
cooperatives and a mercadito (small public market) were under construction. When I 
visited Carasque in 2009, its directiva’s president was a migrant who had voluntarily 
returned, and he was proactive in keeping migrants involved in community projects.  
When the economic recession hit, migrants’ contributions to Carasque’s colectivo 
comunal were put on hold. The stream of remittances reaching Guarjila was also affected 
by the recession. These changes, rather than weakening communal practices, actually 
reaffirmed the value Chalatecos place on communal resource sharing; times of crisis 
further activate efforts to reconstitute community. As I mentioned above, there were 
some instances in Guarjila in which families sent “reverse remittances” to migrants in the 
United States in an effort to help them weather tough times, and many families chose to 
again farm a larger portion of their land. Similar to Carasque and other “organized 
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communities,” Guarjila had its own long-standing system of pooling surplus resources. 
Sacks of corn, beans, and rice are gathered in the casa communal, donated after each 
growing season by local families. They are regularly redistributed to take care of elderly 
and marginalized community members (typically from the handful of families that do not 
receive remittances), and they collectively can be used as a reserve should community 
members encounter unusually difficult circumstances or a moment of crisis. Similar to 
Carasque, the redistribution of surplus (in Guarjila’s case, non-monetary) resources 
functions as a redistribution system to favor more equitable conditions and well-being on 
the community scale.  
 In November 2009, when Salvadorans in the United States and in El Salvador 
were fully feeling the effects of the economic recession that began a year earlier, El 
Salvador was hit by severe flooding from Hurricane Ida. Guarjileños were among the 
least affected, and marginalized communities that sit on the banks of Lake Ilopango, an 
enormous crater lake 20 miles east of San Salvador, were among the most affected. The 
downpour produced landslides that pummeled homes, destroyed crops, and killed several 
hundred people. The humanitarian aid that poured in was poorly organized and unevenly 
distributed. The varying levels of geographic isolation and accessibility of the lakeside 
communities, the interests of local politicians, and the politics of humanitarian aid 
practitioning itself all conditioned how and where aid was distributed. And contrary to 
the hypotheses of international aid, remittances played a remarkably insignificant role in 
subsidizing international aid, given the conditions of economic crisis and the 
marginalization of many of the communities (Tellman 2011). 
Guarjileños who traveled to the communities to offer them surplus sacks of staple 
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crops were struck not only by the ineffectiveness of humanitarian aid, but also by the 
challenges these communities faced in organizing post-disaster reconstruction efforts. 
They felt that Guarjila, should it encounter a similar disaster or a sudden drop in 
remittances, was comparatively “privileged” because of its strong knowledge of 
organization, its commitment to pooling resources, its consistent support from NGOs, and 
its local practice of maintaining some degree of local agricultural production—even 
though for most families, remittances could typically now supply enough income to cover 
food costs. 
This sentiment was shared by Pablito, a twenty year-old from Guarjila who was 
attending college in San Salvador, when we had a conversation over pupusas on a rainy 
night in the city in October 2012. It had been raining steadily for weeks, re-inundating 
communities that had suffered devastation three years earlier during Hurricane Ida. 
Pablito was leading an outreach group of San Salvador-based university students who 
were offering a helping hand to a now flooded hillside community in the southern 
department of La Libertad. Upon seeing what he perceived to be extreme conditions of 
marginality, a problematic dependency on remittances, and a need for better community 
organization, he felt compelled to return again and again to the community, investing 
much more than his required university community service hours and taking on an active 
role in organizing the community as he continued to coordinate the outreach group. 
Superación 
Pablito belonged to a younger generation of Guarjileños who had sought out other 
options than emigration, setting them apart from older siblings and relatives who saw no 
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choice but to leave El Salvador. Pablito is the youngest of four brothers, the rest of whom 
had emigrated to Virginia and New Jersey in the late 1990s and early 2000s when they 
were teenagers. (Beto, whose story I have been telling, is the second oldest bother in this 
family.) By the late 2000s, migration from the community had slowed down to a trickle 
as the overwhelming majority of young people in their teens and twenties were working 
toward a personal future other than undocumented U.S. emigration. Remarkably, just a 
few years earlier, most young adults were migrating to the United States.  
The growth of remittances has played a significant role in the community’s turn 
away from widespread emigration. A stream of income from the remittances of family 
members abroad has reduced the need for other family members to have to migrate. 
Remittances have helped to introduce a wider range of possibilities for a younger 
generation interested in pursuing other options. In the 1990s, it was not uncommon for 
parents to pressure their children to leave the country to help make ends meet. Today, it is 
common to hear parents speak of their desire to see distant family members come home, 
or of their wishes to see those of their children who still remain in El Salvador, who may 
be contemplating migration, to choose to stay in the country. This change is largely 
linked to growing concerns over worsening conditions for immigrants in the United 
States and of travel for undocumented migrants in transit, a shift that also weighs heavily 
on the life choices of those of a younger generation who have not followed the migration 
path of other family members.  
When used as a means to support the wishes of young people seeking out other 
futures than undocumented U.S. emigration, remittances most commonly get directed to 
finance their college education. Beto, working long hours six to seven days a week to 
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raise his family in New Jersey and committed to supporting his mother and Pablito’s 
college fund back in El Salvador, repeatedly put it like this when he spoke of his vision 
for Pablito’s future: “the decision to migrate or not should be his choice.” His emphasis 
that Pablito should have a choice is a reminder that Beto himself did not. Migrating from 
El Salvador when he was Pablito’s age, ten years earlier in 2002, because he had an 
immediate need to support his family and saw no means to do so in El Salvador. He 
understood migration to be his only viable option. 
The directing of remittances to build other possible futures for a younger 
generation extends the concept of taking care toward the goal of superación 
(overcoming). Superarse is a verb that Chalatecos have uttered throughout time; there 
really is nothing new to it. It is a word of choice employed by Chalatecos to express 
individual and collective intentions to overcome structural constraints and barriers, to rise 
above past struggles and setbacks, to get ahead in life, to build a better future. Indeed, the 
long trajectory of collective action among Chalatecos have constituted a constant effort 
toward superación. 
From the perspective of many of those from the younger generation of 
Guarjileños, the most promising form of superación entailed aspiring to professional 
careers. A 2009 study led by El Salvador’s Universidad Panamericana used discussion 
groups and poetic and artistic expression to explore the “attitudes and understandings” 
that condition the “life projects” or “cosmovisions” of young people in two CCR-
affiliated communities with high remittance levels in eastern Chalatenango. The 
participants, who represented the general heterogeneity of young people in the 
communities, all expressed that they aspired to professional careers with university or 
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technical education (Quintana Salazar & Winship 2009).  
The professional aspirations of young people in the region challenges the rather 
delimiting developmentalist assumption that people of rural communities with high 
emigration and remittances, if not destined for low-skilled immigrant labor abroad, 
should capitalize on the remittances they currently receive to open micro-businesses in 
their “home” communities. This assumption that has guided the logic of some 
development specialists who continue to have a rather one-dimensional and 
presumptuous view of the “capacities” or “responsibilities” of “rural poor” people from a 
homogeneously imagined campo.  
Many young Guarjileños wanted something different out of their future than to 
work selling food at family-run tienditas, comedores and pupuserias. And the feasibility 
of more creative entrepreneurial endeavors was uncertain and entailed significant risk 
that many did not want to assume in a regional economy dependent on remittances. Many 
efforts led by the CCR and local NGOs to start new sorts of small-scale cooperatives had 
flopped shortly after opening. For those who were not pursuing professional degrees, 
some of the most promising local economic options were community-based: they found 
viable work in the community masonry economy or in cooperatively-run welding and 
carpentry workshops that were not overseen by NGOs. The community-based clinic, 
schools, and regionally operating NGOs were another minor source of employment for 
some who had acquired a degree or some level of professional training. 
Recent national migration and development discussions around how rural people 
should invest their remittances “productively” have acknowledged that directing them 
toward college education in El Salvador is one form of “investment,” though it may not 
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be the best. Part of the reasoning behind this critique is because El Salvador’s respected 
universities are located in San Salvador, and most offered the same set of long-standing 
majors that destined their students for well-saturated professional job markets. Tens of 
thousands of students were studying to be lawyers, doctors, business administrators, with 
the hope that they could put their education to work even for low salaries. The two-hour 
bus ride from Guarjila, and the significant investment in city living expenses meant that 
young people and their families were betting on uncertain futures. 
The government has taken a few small steps recently toward expanding 
professional and education options in rural areas.  FOMILENIO had made the first effort 
to bring a respected regional higher education option to Chalatenango. Its promising new 
campus built in 2009 offered new technical degrees aimed at spurring local development. 
Unfortunately, paying for its cost of attendance, for many Chalatecos, necessitated 
getting accepted to its scholarship program or counting on migrants’ remittances. Even 
so, community members seemed to have a hard time imagining that Guarjila would 
someday be a place that would see regular employment from thriving local businesses 
and industry. As was the case with FOMILENIO’s highway, they had long received 
economic and human development initiatives with skepticism, whether supported by the 
state, by international agencies, or by local and regional community leaders. After all, 
they had already developed and honed their own tactics of superación, one of which was 
migration itself.  Two young men who worked in construction and welding, as they 
meandered through the resettled community’s roads in the evenings, would often joke 
that one day it would have tall buildings, large supermarkets, and banks. They would 
sarcastically refer to their home (in English) as “Guarjila City.” 
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No matter the potential impediments coming from failed regional and national 
development (and education) policies and planning, Chalatecos from communities in the 
eastern region were long known by nationals and internationals for being savvy and for 
being fighters. What is important here is that these young people, who did not see 
viability in solely working the land the way their parents had, or in migrating as their 
older siblings had, were taking on an active personal-political life project to find other 
future paths, to resist displacement. Many expressed a desire to travel to the United States 
to visit family, or to work and live, but legally.  
Some were explicit about the politics of their struggle to follow a different life 
trajectory than undocumented emigration, particularly those from a slightly earlier 
generation who were most evidently going against the stream of migrants in the 2000s. 
Among the few who went against the stream of emigrants their age in the early 2000s, 
three young men were able to secure student scholarships. After doing so, they made it a 
clear political intention to put their degrees to work in Chalatenango.  One returned to 
teach at a school in a neighboring community, two others earned degrees in Cuba where 
one became a doctor and has recently returned to work in the community clinic, and the 
other studied sports science and runs regional recreational programs. As a pioneering 
cohort of community members to earn professional degrees who were old enough to have 
experienced the civil war and who saw nearly all of their peers migrate, they were 
arguably the most intentional and explicitly political of any whom I have met about 
articulating the “rooting” of their work and their futures in place.  
Furthermore, the efforts of a younger generation toward superación by building 
an option to not migrate, enabled through rooted community networks, also constitute 
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personal-political projects. Although those pursuing professional degrees knew that 
viable employment may very well be far away from Guarjila, a sense of rootedness and 
an attachment to community continued to shape commitments and subjectivities. On the 
weekdays, they were in San Salvador studying for degrees including journalism, civil 
engineering, international relations, social work, education, law, or business. On the 
weekends, they would typically return to Guarjila, staying involved in a range of 
community activities (teaching an art class to members of the youth group, working at the 
community radio station, organizing cultural activities, assuming a leadership role on a 
community project). Juan (the 20-year-old whose entire family lives in the United States, 
whose story I told to open this dissertation), is still contemplating whether or not to 
pursue a university degree and has been working as the ambulance driver for the 
community clinic, offering local rides, and playing in his local band. In 2013, he was 
elected to serve as the president of the community’s directiva.  
The practices and trajectories interlinking migrants and other community 
members discussed in this chapter shed light on the diverse ways that people work to 
reconstitute community and build paths to preferred futures and well-being on their own 
terms. For Guarjileños, who are from a community with strong cross-border ties, rooted 
community networks play a significant role in this work. By following the social, 
economic, and political practices and the life projects of migrants and non-migrants, we 
are able to broaden our conceptualizations of development and transnational activity 
beyond dominant versions advocated by the Salvadoran state and international 
development specialists. In the next chapter, I further explore the emerging shift toward 
building “an option to not migrate” in El Salvador more broadly by discussing how cross-
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border networks of migrant-community activists and political actors are working to shift 
the state’s development framework away from its neoliberal legacy of advocating for 
emigration and remittances.
  
CHAPTER 6 
Beyond Remittances 
“We cannot continue to indiscriminately export our most valuable asset, our 
human capital. The objective of the new focus that we are implementing aims to 
make migration a choice in the lives of Salvadorans, a voluntary decision, not a 
survival option or the fruit of desperation…as I said in my inaugural address: a 
country that is incapable of housing its children cannot live in happiness.” 
 
Mauricio Funes, President of El Salvador, addressing the public at the 
annual convention of Salvadoreños en el Mundo, San Salvador, December 
8, 2009 
 
 
The words of President Funes, directed to a cross-border association of 
Salvadorans that aims to represent the interests of the country’s diaspora, were delivered 
at a moment of political change, rising disillusionment with neoliberal development, and 
heightened concern over the conditions of international migration. An unsympathetic 
climate marked by shifting practices of immigration enforcement, record-level 
deportations, anti-Latino sentiment, and economic recession have made life increasingly 
difficult for marginalized migrants. Undocumented Salvadorans en route through 
Mexico, among other migrants, are now targeted by drug smuggling organizations that 
subject them to new conditions of vulnerability and violence, aggravated by the U.S.-
driven “war on drugs.” And in El Salvador itself, the persistent and deepening 
dependence on migration and remittances as a livelihood strategy for so many Salvadoran 
families has become a source of growing preoccupation, breeding disillusionment with 
neoliberal promises that the state’s political and economic strategies have been building a 
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viable future. 
This chapter explores how, at the current conjuncture, national and cross-border 
networks of activists are intentionally challenging the state’s developmentalist discourse 
and its neoliberal political-economic project that looks favorably on emigration and 
harnessing remittances as a key resource in development. Since the ending of the civil 
war, the neoliberal state has encouraged migration and remittances in favor of a particular 
developmentalist imaginary of “progress” and well-being for a “transnational” El 
Salvador. By focusing on demands made by transnational migrant community activists at 
a series of events as El Salvador’s government took a leftward turn, this chapter examines 
the way developmentalist-centered politics, discourses, and logics on transnational 
migration are contested and re-imagined. The collective articulation of activists’ demands 
makes way for new political imaginaries of transnational state formations, migration, and 
development. 
The focus of the dissertation therefore returns to the migration landscape of El 
Salvador as a whole, the development of which was charted in Chapter 2. As a form of 
networked activism representing the interests of migrants and their communities, the push 
for the Salvadoran state to shift its politics of migration and development is evidence of 
the reality that the experience of Guarjileños, and other Chalatecos, is by no means one of 
isolation. Rather, the strategic practices they have developed to navigate conditions are a 
manifestation of a widely shared discontent with the conditions produced out of failed 
migration policies and development strategies coming from both El Salvador and the 
United States. In the previous chapter, we saw how people reconstitute and turn to 
community as a source of strength as they navigate the current terrain of U.S. 
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immigration and the double marginalization they experience in El Salvador in the wake 
of war and in a national state that, as Salvadoran economists and activists put it, “expels” 
its own people. Networked, rooted, and communal practices interlinking migrants and 
their communities introduce other possibilities for understanding how people use 
mobility and cross-border flows to make a better future. Guarjileños’ return trajectories, 
engagement with community economies and non-capitalist practices, and struggles to 
build other options than emigration all challenge the particular capitalist and 
developmentalist framework advocated by the Salvadoran state. This chapter highlights 
how this developmentalist framework is being challenged directly and reworked by 
activist and political actors in other ways at a historic moment of change. By broadening 
the lens, we can see how the contingent (yet powerful) practices of Chalatecos are also 
temporally conditioned. Diverse struggles that are just as contingent emerge, connect, and 
gain strength at conjunctural moments. One important struggle that has come out of these 
connections: that other viable options than undocumented emigration can and should be 
made possible for Salvadorans. 
Evidence for this chapter is based on my engagement in discussions at various 
events, presentations, forums, and meetings of migrant rights activists, organizations 
addressing the interests of migrants, development specialists, government officials, and 
scholars of migration. These took place between 2008 and 2011 and were mainly in San 
Salvador, but also include events that took place in Mexico City, Washington DC, and 
Los Angeles. I also draw from several interviews that came out of these engagements. 
Investigation into the meanings and discourses (re)constructed through the collective 
claims being made by these various political actors thus necessarily entailed networked 
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ethnography. Drawing from this evidence, this chapter offers a broad analysis of how the 
political discourse on emigration from El Salvador, and the policies that have engendered 
such emigration, have been recently contested and reframed in response to shifting 
migration conditions and out of emergent efforts to rearticulate state formations in ways 
that challenge conventional neoliberal development frameworks. 
One particularly interesting trend emerged over the course of my engagement 
with these actors and events during this period. Out of growing discontent with 
worsening migration conditions and with the state’s neoliberal development strategies, 
coupled with high expectations for El Salvador’s first ever FMLN-led government with 
the election of President Mauricio Funes in 2009, transnational Salvadoran activists and 
organizations working with migrants and their communities began pressuring for a 
reformulation of the state’s migration politics that would go, as they put it, “mas allá de 
las remesas” (beyond remittances). They contended that the government lacked “any 
clear and comprehensive migration policies” but instead pushed on with a tunnel vision 
strategy that prioritized garnering remittances and left from view urgent concerns and 
threatening conditions affecting Salvadorans within and outside of the national territory.
52
  
Going “beyond remittances” was first employed by leaders of the diaspora to refer 
to the state’s failure to recognize what migrants considered to be other, non-monetary 
contributions they were making to Salvadoran society. While I conducted research in El 
Salvador from the time of Funes’s presidential campaign in 2008 well into the first half 
of his term in 2011, the phrase was reiterated at a number of strategic meetings, public 
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 The “lack of a clear and comprehensive migration politics” was a salient phrase frequently used by 
activists and the new government at public events, where they planted alternative platforms and demands 
for policy reform. 
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presentations, conventions, and forums to discuss public policy and international 
migration, during which diverse organizations working in the interest of migrants and 
their cross-border communities (including networks of human rights activists, 
humanitarian organizations, legal advocates, various NGOs, and representatives of 
migrant organizations abroad), began making demands of the new government, calling 
for a closer engagement with their agendas. 
As migrant activists continued to confront a growing set of concerns linked to the 
rapidly changing conditions of Salvadoran migration, the idea of going “beyond 
remittances” came to encompass a broader critique of the state’s developmentalist 
politics on migration. Seizing the (perhaps momentary) political opportunity yielded 
during El Salvador’s own “turn to the Left”, activists pressured the government to 
address the transnational reality of hardship that Salvadoran migrants were currently 
facing. 
In what follows, I will first discuss the theoretical significance of the emergent 
push to shift the state’s politics on migration. Coming out of the conjuncture, as a whole, 
activists are pushing for a revaluing of the lives of migrants over capitalist development 
to shape a different kind of future for El Salvador. I will then discuss several of the 
claims being made on the state, coming from various strands of activists. They called 
upon the state to extend more services to migrants abroad, to provide services to the 
massive wave of deportees arriving to El Salvador, to reach out to undocumented 
migrants in transit who were now navigating what activists labeled “crisis” conditions, 
and to rework development strategies to focus on building other options than 
undocumented emigration for marginalized Salvadorans. These political claims 
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ultimately amounted to a remarkable contestation of the state’s developmentalist political 
strategy and discourse on migration, as activists were collectively, and quite urgently, 
calling on the state to stop “expelling migrants.”53 
Conceptualizing Networked Activism at the Conjuncture 
I suggest that activists’ pressures to make new sense of and respond to El 
Salvador’s migration experience “beyond remittances” are dynamized at the current 
conjuncture of aggravated migration conditions and a moment of growing disillusionment 
with neoliberal state formations in El Salvador and elsewhere in the region. The 
conjuncture, in this case, can be conceptualized in historical-political terms, as a critical 
moment of overdetermination out of which new political and social struggles are 
produced (Grossberg 2005). The conditions of Central American international migration 
today, in which undocumented migrants are prey to a range of both licit and illicit actors 
— from corporations, to governments, to drug cartels — did not naturally evolve but 
were produced in relation to sets of events linked to projects of state sovereignty, 
security, and global capitalism, including Central American counter-insurgency wars, 
free trade agreements, and the tightening of international border security. 
Amid what they viewed as a developing crisis and a key moment of political 
opportunity, transnational networks of migrant rights activists have worked to shift the 
predominant discourse that has governed subjectivities on the meaning and value of 
migration for Salvadoran well-being. As David Graeber reminds us, the coding and 
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organization of value does not operate on universal terms but is contextually conditioned, 
and political struggles arise not just over the unequal accumulation of value, but also over 
“how value itself is to be defined” (Graeber 2001: 115). Value is in itself historically and 
conjuncturally produced, and it is integral to the making of other possible futures 
(Graeber 2001; Grossberg 2005). Rather than valuing migrants as sacrificial actors to 
favor a particular (neoliberal) version of national progress, activists were revisioning El 
Salvador’s future by calling for a revaluing of human life and a much different concept of 
development and well-being in transnational terrain. 
As key players in the making of incipient or full-fledged social movements, 
activist networks and organizers are important political actors, whether they operate 
within or outside of institutional politics, and they are capable of collectively producing 
diverse political imaginaries (Alvarez et al. 1998; Edelman 2001). The state has long 
been a target point of contentions by activists and movement organizers (Tarrow 1998; 
Tarrow & Tilly 2007), with Latin America as no exception (Slater 1985). For migrant 
communities with transnational belongings (abroad and “at home”), contentious political 
demands get directed toward multiple and increasingly transnationally spatialized states 
(Ferguson & Gupta 2002) that only partially recognize migrants’ presence and confer 
incomplete forms of citizenship (Ong 1996, 1999; Rosaldo 1997; Coutin 2007). In the 
case of El Salvador, the denial of full citizenship is not in the name of sovereignty or 
multiculturalism; the “expulsion” of people from national territory and denial of full 
membership is in the name of a particular version of development, “progress”, and 
modernity. Activism in response to the developmentalist project of El Salvador’s 
“transnational” state draws attention to the reality that migrant struggles can no longer be 
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strictly conceptualized on national scales and according to individualist “immigrant 
rights” frameworks. Rather, the story of Salvadoran transnational activism represents a 
cross-border coalescence of political work by diverse actors that is increasingly 
networked, standing not only for migrant rights in places of destination (and in-between), 
but also favoring the collective sense of dignity and well-being of migrants’ communities 
in places of origin. 
Network trajectories of transnational migrant activism have followed the paths of 
the mobile subjects they represent to intervene in multiple geographies, forging novel 
cross-border connections. Long-standing and emergent associations of immigrant and 
diasporic communities have connected with human rights and legal advocacy 
organizations addressing the transitory circumstances of migrants, as well as with 
“grassroots” organizations hoping to empower people in places where emigration 
originates, and new dialogues have opened between governmental and non-governmental 
actors.  
In pursuit of developmentalist aspirations, the state has assumed little more than a 
regulatory role in the formation of a migration politics geared toward what the 
government phrases as “regularizing” flows of migrants and their remittances. This 
remittance-focused political strategy on migration has become a source of discontent, 
especially as marginalized migrants have faced new hardships recently in a hostile U.S. 
immigration climate and amid economic recession, and as the human toll of 
undocumented international migration continues to be felt by Salvadoran families, even 
more so in recent years. By crossing El Salvador’s transnational geography of migration, 
ethnographically and analytically, we can highlight how the range of interests pursued in 
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the demands of various political actors, within and outside of El Salvador, have contested 
the legacy of the neoliberal state’s developmentalist migration politics and introduced a 
new discursive framing that is shifting the way international migration is understood, 
experienced, and valued in El Salvador’s transnational imaginary. 
“Las vacas flacas siempre lecheras” 
In December 2008, just a few months before the national presidential election, 
Salvadoreños en el Mundo (Salvadorans in the World, or SEEM), an association that 
seeks to advance the interests of the Salvadoran diaspora, held its annual convention in 
San Salvador, an event aimed at fostering collective discussion and political advocacy 
efforts around issues of shared concern. The theme for the convention, “The human 
capital of the diaspora: Beyond Remittances”, was meant to highlight migrants’ non-
monetary contributions to the making of “transnational” El Salvador. As part of a 
continued effort to advance SEEM’s years-long campaign for political representation and 
voting rights in Salvadoran national elections, the thematic was chosen to underscore the 
idea that emigrants should be viewed as valued participants in Salvadoran society, rather 
than as an expendable labor force whose value was measured only in remittances (Hallett 
& Baker-Cristales 2010). 
Mauricio Funes, the critical journalist chosen to represent the FMLN who later 
won the election, was received with a roaring applause at the convention, where he talked 
about his campaign promises to please the diaspora with new public policies and 
initiatives on migration. (Consistent with other occasions, ARENA’s candidate declined 
his invitation to present a platform to migrant community advocates.) SEEM was not the 
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only network targeting the Left-leaning leadership. Networks and coalitions of 
organizations representing migrants had either been recently formed, reawakened from 
dormancy, or were growing in influence.
54
 By the time of Funes’ inauguration in June 
2009, they descended upon San Salvador and approached the new government with 
strategic proposals in a frenzy of luncheons, receptions, and meetings, mingling in suits 
and dresses with diplomats, legislators, and newly appointed cabinet members inside the 
city’s hotel banquet halls and cultural centers. 
As Beth Baker-Cristales (2008) suggests, leaders of organizations serving the 
diaspora were, in their view at least, considered to be real political actors that had come 
to represent a significant portion of El Salvador’s population better than the Salvadoran 
state. Yet these networks represented a relatively small cohort of migrant activists, many 
of whom were involved in the initial Salvadoran refugee activism of the 1980s, whose 
own experiences of immigration differed significantly from the more recent, illegalized 
wave of migrants that their organizations also represented. Their decades of work for 
migrant rights advocacy in the United States had in many ways now been co-opted by the 
state in favor of regulating subjectivities and garnering remittances, extending the state’s 
transnational governmentality (Baker-Cristales 2008). And, as the most eager sponsors of 
their work are corporations that profit from transnational migrant activism, another form 
of governmentality is reproduced that is driven by market interests and transnational 
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 Most notably, influential in representing interests of the U.S. Salvadoran community were Salvadoreños 
en el Mundo (SEEM), the Salvadoran American National Association (SANA), the Salvadoran American 
National Network (SANN), and Concilio Nacional Salvadoreno Americano (the Salvadoran American 
National Council, or CSAN) which was formed most recently. Leaders of these organizations were 
generally involved in the initial advocacy efforts for Salvadoran immigrant legality in the 1980s and many 
of them continue their activist work in various organizations today on behalf of Salvadorans or other U.S. 
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capitalism. At the 2009 SEEM convention, a young woman modeling in a cocktail dress 
handed me a free bright yellow hat and a coupon packet for American-chain fast food 
restaurants from a key sponsor: Western Union. 
Despite their entanglements with market and state efforts to advance remittance 
flows, these migrant activists viewed their organizations as part of a “transnational civil 
society” charged with the responsibility of advocating for social policies and resources to 
be extended to migrants. They understood their work as one of advocating for migrants’ 
civil rights, access to resources, opportunities for development, and a more inclusionary 
status not just within the United States, but also as Salvadoran citizens living abroad with 
the same entitlements from the state as those in El Salvador. With the recent turn in 
leadership, they wanted to have a more leveled playing field and closer engagement with 
the state to advance their interests, and some of them were hopeful they would be 
assigned posts in the new government. 
At a meeting of the Salvadoran American National Network (SANN), just prior to 
inauguration day, activists convened to strategize about how “to contribute to the 
construction of a transnational space” by building common objectives among 
governmental and a range of cross-border non-governmental actors, and by identifying 
and promoting the interests and expectations of the U.S. Salvadoran community to the 
new government. Of course, the state had long held common objectives with migrant 
rights activists. As discussion ensued at the meeting, one U.S.-based advocate 
commented that “the Right had done a lot in the way of immigrant rights,” including the 
former ARENA government’s opening of new consulates and campaigning for renewals 
of TPS (Temporary Protected Status, the provisional legal immigration status obtained by 
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a few hundred thousand eligible Salvadorans in the United States). A San Salvador-based 
activist elaborated that these initiatives were, however, tied to “the state’s strategy to 
relocate part of the population abroad.”55 In their view, a “transnational space” of 
political action did not exist if the state’s transnational political engagement was 
motivated purely out of economic interests. 
The other dimension of this construction of a different kind of transnational 
political space was hinged on the claim that the state disproportionately placed 
expectations on migrants to sacrifice and contribute for a better El Salvador, and that, if 
they were actually considered to be members of a transnational citizenry, as it was 
framed in state discourse, then they too had a set of claims on the state. As one 
Washington DC-based activist described it to me, “Somos las vacas flacas siempre 
lecheras” (we are the skinny cows always getting milked).56 His expression reflects a 
widely-held sentiment of the diaspora: that of being drained, of being taken advantage of 
by the state, with little in return. 
Demands of what the state “owed” to Salvadoran migrants became charged with 
frustration at the December 2009 SEEM convention in San Salvador, as high 
expectations and campaign promises of the new government, now well into its first year, 
were far from being met. The limits and possibilities of what could be expected of the 
state were up for debate at the convention, but as a starting point activists wanted the 
Vice Ministry for Salvadorans Abroad to be elevated to full status of Ministry to be able 
to offer extensive services and resources to the migrant community. Their demands were 
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built on cognizance of the strategic, remittance-motivated state discourse that aimed to 
remind emigrants of their affective attachment to patria. As one activist put it during a 
discussion panel, “we cannot continue with the political myth of the hermano lejano.”57 
The idea that more state resources should extend across “transnational” El Salvador to 
reach migrants in the United States was also a reminder that these migrants continued to 
struggle with new forms of marginalization and exclusion in their new geography, even 
as they had followed a path that would, according to the language and measurements of 
the discourse on migration and development favored by the state, presumably lead to 
conditions of “improved well-being”.58 
A Shifting Terrain of International Migration 
 In recent years, the terrain of international migration has rapidly shifted for 
Salvadorans. The United States began tightening immigration enforcement since the 
immigrant mega-marches of spring 2006, and by the end of 2008 the economy sank into a 
recession, leaving marginalized and undocumented migrants out of work. Leaders of the 
Salvadoran diaspora and immigrant rights organizations saw a new level of urgency in 
forging a coherent strategy and collective effort (with the help of the Salvadoran 
government) to push for legalization paths for Salvadorans.
59
 The last time Salvadorans 
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Development Report titled “Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development,” which was 
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arriving illegally to the United States were granted TPS status was just after El Salvador’s 
2001 earthquakes, meaning that more recent arrivals are often denied access to any legal 
immigration status, which has further scarred Salvadoran migrants with a status of 
“illegality” and “deportability” (De Genova 2002). Record-level deportations from the 
United States in recent years took on a new level of concern among transnational activists 
on both sides of El Salvador’s border. Activists in the United States interpreted new 
enforcement initiatives under George W. Bush and Barack Obama that streamlined 
deportations with the help of local authorities as a tactic that unfairly targeted Latino 
immigrants. And in El Salvador, receiving more than 20,000 deported migrants from the 
United States annually overwhelmed the minimally staffed government office in charge 
of processing their arrival and flooded the handful of temporary shelters that received 
them.
60
  
 Bienvenidos a Casa (Welcome Home, or BAC), El Salvador’s program since 
1999 to receive and assist deportees at the airport, was once viewed as a model for the 
region. But by 2004 when BAC was moved from the oversight of an NGO to Migración 
y Extranjería, the government’s agency for immigration and security, activists 
complained that the program was no longer outreach-motivated but instead became a 
processing site that extended the state’s hand as a manager of migration flows. With the 
growth of deported gang members from U.S. cities during the 1990s, deportees came to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
ever “Salvadoran American Leadership Summit”. Representatives of the Salvadoran government, Latino 
advocacy organizations, and U.S. Congress were invited to the event to cooperate in the push for U.S. 
immigration reform. 
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 According to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) reports (2010, 2011), the agency 
deported 21,049 Salvadorans from the United States in 2009 and 20,975 in 2008. During those two years 
combined, the number of all immigrant deportations from the United States reached a total of 757,011. 
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be treated by the state as a potential security threat, and BAC soon became a venue for 
authorities to profile for tattooed markings that signaled potential gang membership. 
Citing several wrongful incarcerations, Salvadoran human rights activists advocated 
against the tactic and drew attention to its stigmatizing effects. 
 Deportation has since come to be understood as an event that increasingly affects 
“ordinary” folks. Human rights advocates emphasize that the vast majority received from 
the United States were sent back just after crossing the border and for non-criminal 
infractions, or, as one activist phrased it, for “cultural misdemeanors.”61 The new tidal 
wave of deported migrants has posed a threat to the state’s developmentalist project, as 
the precarious status of forced returnees disrupts the expected flows of emigrants and 
remittances and produces the new problem of wide-scale reintegration. The state has 
treated deportees as problematized subjects, seeking to mitigate, though its managerial 
work, what could potentially develop into a social and economic mess. BAC, as deported 
migrants described it, had turned into little more than an interview, a plate of El 
Salvador’s traditional pupusas, a pep talk, and a job board. Returnees were encouraged to 
behave well and to try to find a job — if they had qualified English skills, they could seek 
work in the burgeoning industry of bilingual call centers, which employed a flexible and 
transient labor force that tends to draw a mix of college students and deportees. 
 When the government changed hands, the Red para las Migraciones (the Network 
for Migration), a recently-formed El Salvador-based activist network seeking to influence 
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 Translated by author from “delitos culturales” in Spanish and taken from author’s interview with a 
Salvadoran activist on November 5, 2008 in San Salvador. Enforcement programs including 287 (g) and 
Secure Communities have constructed new collaborations between ICE and local authorities to facilitate 
deportations. ICE reported that 29,922 of the 42,024 total deportations to El Salvador in 2008 and 2009 
(71%) were for non-criminal infractions.  
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migratory policies, along with human rights organizations, began pressuring the state to 
go beyond its managerial strategy on deportation to instead take seriously the question of 
labor reintegration and to address their concerns that deportees’ rights were being 
violated due to inconsistent processing standards both in El Salvador and in the United 
States. As a gesture that the state would no longer treat deportation as a security issue but 
as outreach to emigrants, BAC was moved in 2011 from the direction of Migración y 
Extranjería to the Vice Ministry for Salvadorans Abroad. Even so, the surge in 
deportations has become an overwhelming burden both for migrant rights advocates and 
for the state, a situation framed by activists as one limb of a larger “crisis” that had come 
to define the transitory milieu of Salvadoran migration. 
Of the most pressing concerns of migrant rights activists in El Salvador was what 
they now viewed as a catastrophic situation in Mexico. Central American undocumented 
migrants traveling through Mexico, whose clandestine status already made them long-
time subjects of a host of abuses and threats while en route, have been increasingly 
targeted by organized criminal bands that have proliferated in recent years (most notably, 
the Zetas). Horrific stories were now reaching El Salvador of migrants that were 
sequestered, abused, tortured, and found in mass graves. 
It was in November 2009, in a packed auditorium at the UCA (the university 
where six Jesuits, their housekeeper and her daughter were massacred exactly twenty 
years earlier), that I first heard the situation of migrants in transit referred to as “a 
humanitarian crisis”. It was assessed as such by a team of journalists of El Faro, El 
Salvador’s independent online newspaper rooted in the critical tradition of the UCA, who 
had just returned from a year of accompanying migrants in Mexico — jumping on trains 
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and staying in shelters — and were presenting the initial makings of a multi-media report 
from the experience. The images and stories shared that night were jarring and triggered 
emotional responses among the public. 
Their work fit within a growing amplitude of media reports, films, research, and 
activist publications that were shedding light on the situation. A partially hidden social 
reality of “clandestinity” (Coutin 2005), the troublesome story of migrants en route was 
now reaching the public eye. International human rights organizations, such as Amnesty 
International, also framed it as “a humanitarian crisis”, and, following the lead of El 
Faro, it came to be consistently labeled as such by Salvadorans in national presentations 
and forums on migration, including in the 2009 SEEM Convention where “the drama of 
migrants in transit” was chosen as that year’s theme. The El Faro journalists spent a year 
presenting the developing products of their investigation at national and international 
spaces of discussion on Central American migration. At one meeting, after I told one of 
the journalists that I was doing research around the question of migration and 
development, he snapped back with an unsolicited rebuttal that no more research on 
development or remittances was needed in El Salvador. Human rights issues and 
migration conditions, he stated, merited more attention.
62
 His comment was 
demonstrative of the recent push to broaden the national conversation on migration 
beyond remittances, to unearth missing stories. 
Like immigrant rights advocacy abroad, protecting migrants in transit from 
human rights violations and dangers had long been a convergent point of interest of both 
activists and the state. After all, ensuring the safe passage of undocumented emigrants 
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 Working group meeting with El Faro journalists, February 23, 2010, San Salvador.  
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served the state’s interest in “regularizing” flows of migrants and their remittances. The 
Salvadoran government increasingly showed its support for multilateral agencies that 
promoted policy research and initiatives to improve in-transit migration conditions, and it 
recently made agreements with the Mexican government to establish basic standards to 
prevent labor exploitation and to guide procedures for the detention, deportation, and 
repatriation of remains of undocumented migrants.
63
 
By framing the conditions as a “crisis”, activists were calling for the state to go 
beyond its tactic of steadying flows through risk minimization. As an initial engagement 
with their demands, shortly after shifting into the hands of the FMLN, the Vice Ministry 
for Salvadorans Abroad held a closed-door meeting with the El Faro journalists, instated 
well-established migrant rights activists in new posts at Salvadoran consulates in Mexico, 
and freed up UN funds (that had been indefinitely frozen by the former government) to 
build an international information database about disappeared migrants. But with 
unprecedented numbers of disappearances, activists wanted a more radical intervention.64 
COFAMID, a coalition of family members of disappeared migrants in search of their 
loved ones, had demanded of Mexican authorities more thorough investigations into 
disappearances, but their efforts produced futile results. Activists were skeptical that 
similar political advocacy and the opening of new consulates in Mexico, two proposals 
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 Based on publications distributed to the author by the Vice Ministry for Salvadorans Abroad and the 
author’s interview with a representative from the agency on March 2, 2009 in San Salvador. 
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 Estimates of violence and disappearances, especially against migrants, in Mexico are highly problematic. 
A recent special report from what is perhaps one of the most comprehensive sources available, Mexico’s 
National Commission on Human Rights, states that disappearances and violence against migrants continues 
to rise. From January to December 2010, for example, it documented 214 total kidnapping events of 
migrants, of which there were 11,333 victims. Migrants testimonies offered revealed that 16% of the 
victims were Salvadorans and another 60% hailed from elsewhere in Central America (CNDH 2011:26-
28). 
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on the table for the new government, would do much to improve conditions. 
The discovery in August 2010 of the mass grave of 72 Central and South 
American migrants in the state of Tamaulipas, Mexico, generated a new level of outcry in 
El Salvador, from which thirteen of the migrants hailed. According to investigators and 
the three lone survivors, the Zetas were responsible for killing the migrants, who were 
unable to pay for their kidnappings. Activists complained that the incident was not 
thoroughly investigated, and that it was depicted in news coverage as an extraordinary 
tragedy, when in reality, stories of mass exhumations in Mexico were becoming quite 
ordinary.
65
 The roused sense of urgency gave force to a critical discourse that had been 
emerging among migrant community activists: that beyond pushing for channels for legal 
migration, El Salvador must forge a new political economic strategy to counter its status 
as “a country that expels its people.” 
Toward Other Futures 
The emphasis that the human toll of emigration could no longer be ignored 
sparked a reassessment of El Salvador’s development strategies. In response to the 
humanitarian conditions they were addressing, organizations and networks representing 
migrants and their communities began employing the idea that Salvadorans needed “an 
option to not migrate”, which could, in theory, be realized through economic and social 
policies and programs that addressed undocumented emigration directly as an issue of 
concern. Already, critical views of the remittance-centered, open market economy had 
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 For example, the following year, 193 bodies were exhumed near the same site in Tamaulipas. Activists 
complain that stories of such killings are receiving trivial news coverage in Mexican and international news 
sources. 
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been building in the discussions of scholars and activists. Appealing to the migrant 
community activists, Mauricio Funes took up the language of “an option to not migrate” 
in his speeches by the time of his presidential campaign as part of his platform for a 
broad reform of El Salvador’s migration politics.  
According to Funes, mitigating the quotidian necessity of emigration would come 
through a long-range reworking of national economic development strategies. He argued 
that boosting domestic production could generate decent employment “at home” for 
Salvadorans, and would curb dependency on imports and remittances.
66
 The viability of 
Funes’ nationalist proposal for a small, densely populated country that is now so 
dependent upon migration, remittances, imports, and its low-wage labor force in the 
global market, is open to debate. His idea of focusing on boosting domestic production, 
something he claims is possible to do if his country follows a “Lula” model of 
development (despite the immense difference in size and resources comparing El 
Salvador and Brazil), on one hand, sounds like a hearkening back to earlier development 
orthodoxies like Import Substitution Industrialization. On the other hand, if in 
recognizing that a conventional neoliberal migration-development strategy is no longer 
viable, El Salvador should turn toward a more state-centered but globally-informed 
approach to development, his proposal resonates with the kind of modified neoliberalisms 
emerging elsewhere in the region under recent leftward leadership. But the extent to 
which Funes’s ideas can actually transform into comprehensive policy and a lasting 
political change is also in question, since it is not clear whether or not El Salvador’s 
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 Funes discussed this strategy in an August 2011 interview with Al Jazeera journalists: 
http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/talktojazeera/2011/08/201181582912837697.html (last accessed 
July 22, 2012). 
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leftward turn will even last beyond his term. Salvador Sanchez Cerén, the current Vice 
President known for his role as a comandante during the civil war, has been selected to 
be the party’s 2014 presidential candidate, a move that has generated fear among many 
Salvadorans who believe his more hardline anti-globalization stance could destabilize 
U.S. relations and put the Salvadoran population in the United States, their remittances, 
and the Salvadoran economy as a whole in a more precarious condition. Nonetheless, 
Funes’s echoing of the critical narratives of activists that El Salvador’s economic 
trajectory of “exporting people” has not been healthy for national social and economic 
well-being is a departure from prior leadership and evidence of recent efforts to shift state 
discourse on Salvadoran transnationalism and development. 
Some regional networks of organizations interested in rethinking remittances and 
development were also intersecting with the emerging critical discussions in El Salvador. 
Notably, the short-lived Red para las Migraciones Sustentables (the Network for 
Sustainable Migrations), a network of migrant community organizations spanning from 
Argentina to California, staged meetings in San Salvador before it collapsed due to a lack 
of funding for further forums and joint projects. Their discussions were illustrative of a 
more cautious assessment of the role of remittances in community development. El 
Salvador remained on the fringes of more radical dialogues emerging in the region, in 
which the widely-praised idea of remittance-driven “local development” was being tossed 
out altogether on the pretext that such models were unsustainable and contingent upon 
undocumented migrations. The People’s Global Action on Migration, Development and 
Human Rights, for example, was set up as a “grassroots” forum to counter what its 
organizers argued was a hegemonic and neoliberalist discourse on “migration and 
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development” being reproduced in sites like the Global Forum on Migration and 
Development, held during the same week and led by multilateral development agencies. 
The latter forum was held in 2010 in Puerto Vallarta, a city that is rather unexemplary of 
the conditions that instigate migration throughout other parts of Mexico (that country was 
represented by Banamex, a major bank, for its “civil society” seat at the event).67 Days 
later, over a thousand delegates were invited to gather in Mexico City for its “grassroots” 
counterpart, many of whom were members of international networks present in the 
region. 
Along a different vein, moving beyond dependency on migration and remittances, 
or building “an option to not migrate”, was considered to be a cultural project as much as 
it was economic, hinged on the possibility of developing positive subjectivities in which 
dignified futures in El Salvador could be imagined. According to this logic, 
undocumented emigration, now problematized in public discourse as a social pathology 
similar to the gang violence that plagues El Salvador, could be curbed not only through 
viable work, but also through community-based initiatives that targeted young people 
most “at risk” to emigration (and gangs). 
By placing a (perhaps unfair) moral obligation on youth to reconsider what may 
well be their most viable future, such “cultural” strategies can actually reproduce 
neoliberal developmentalism and regulatory discourses of the state in new and 
overlapping ways, as can the emerging calls for an alternative political economy on 
migration and development. Just after his March 2011 visit to El Salvador (a trip aimed at 
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reinforcing U.S.-El Salvador cooperation over security matters amid growing 
preoccupations with drug trafficking and violence in the Central American region), U.S. 
President Barack Obama appealed to Republicans by suggesting that such development 
proposals were “the best strategy” to curb illegal immigration (Calmes 2011), a proposal 
that rekindles a Cold War-infused logic that grassroots development as a means to 
poverty reduction would protect U.S security and economic interests. And what are the 
promises of other kinds of development and economic growth? However well-intended 
the idea, building an “option to not migrate” seems a monumental task in a country where 
migrants’ remittances patch together a precarious economy wrought by neoliberal 
reforms and where neighborhood gangs regularly charge unpayable rents to mom-and-
pop business owners or threaten to kill them, encumbering aspirations and real 
opportunities for viable local economic paths. 
Even as identifying just how building “an option to not migrate” might feasibly 
play out in the way of policy is not yet clear, it is a worthy pursuit, and one that is being 
taken up in local communities by migrants and non-migrants, as is evident in 
Chalatenango. The struggle to build an option to not migrate, as we have seen, is both 
individual and collective. Beyond the strategic uses of remittances and cross-border 
resources to advance educational and other opportunities for young people (described in 
Chapter 5), a number of community-based groups and organizations in the region direct 
their efforts toward engaging young people in meaningful recreational, cultural, and 
outreach activities. Combined with the constant effort to creatively construct viable 
present and future work opportunities that are appealing to young people (who today in 
rural areas like Chalatenango tend to see agricultural and “traditional” livelihoods as non-
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viable and unenticing, and who weigh work options in El Salvador against the option of 
wage labor in the United States), these sorts of community-based initiatives (including 
youth groups, theatre and artistic cooperatives that involve young people, sports teams 
and programs, organizations that encourage young leadership and outreach, and so forth), 
are part of the important and challenging project of connecting younger generations of 
Salvadorans to the value, hope, and real possibility of other options than undocumented 
migration.  
The emerging shift in discourse on migration, interestingly, marks an important 
turn in the imagination of El Salvador’s transnational and territorial future. 
Undocumented emigration and remittances are framed as a problem capable of being 
addressed, rather than as a naturalized, unwavering trajectory into the future. There is a 
destabilization of the embracement of the assumption that “progress” lay on the outside, 
of reminding not-yet emigrants that the heroic, monetary sacrifices of El Salvador’s 
hermanos lejanos were to be celebrated as the key to making a better El Salvador. Rather, 
new attention was directed toward rescuing value “at home” in order to break from the 
momentum of wide-scale emigration and remittance dependency. Perhaps drawing 
inspiration from other recent movements in Latin America that have worked toward 
reclaiming various forms of localism, autonomy, and territoriality (the Zapatistas, Via 
Campesina, and so forth), migrant community activists were pushing Salvadorans to 
imagine and make possible an alternative politics that would mitigate emigration rather 
than push people out, and that would diminish the need for remittances, rather than 
simply cultivate their accumulation. 
This other imaginary for the making of El Salvador’s future was produced at a 
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moment of urgency, disillusionment, and discontent. Transnational migrant activists were 
cognizant of the state’s discourse on migration, and were insisting on the formation of 
new political strategies that looked beyond their remittances to favor the well-being of 
Salvadorans abroad and in El Salvador itself. In what they now understood to be “crisis” 
conditions, they were demanding a revaluation of human life, insisting that migrants 
could no longer be commodified as money transfers, as economic indicators, and as 
agents of development; they were pushing the state to stop systematically “expelling” its 
people.
  
CHAPTER 7 
Conclusion 
International migration has come to characterize life for many communities of El 
Salvador and elsewhere, produced out of histories of various forms of inequality and 
violence. The Salvadoran state has recently embraced a project and discourse that frames 
migration and remittances as key to development and progress. This approach fits a 
global camp of interest in “migration and development” coming from multilateral 
development agencies, governments, and other actors, which is guided by a particular 
developmentalist and capitalist understanding of the meaning and dynamics of migration 
and transnational processes. This discourse emphasizes the idea that migrants and their 
communities follow a rational, individualist economic logic and should appropriately 
engage with global capitalist flows to benefit development, mainly through emigration 
and “productive” remittance investment in places of origin. This project of “expelling” 
migrants and harnessing remittances is linked to the Salvadoran state’s relatively recent 
engagement with (neo)liberal practices and logics and a postwar nation-state building 
project that emphasizes the value of migration and a transnationalism for progress and 
modernity. It is part of a longer history of exclusion, uprooting, and erasure in El 
Salvador that follows a long trajectory of modernity/coloniality. 
The stories told in this dissertation reveal the particularity, contingency, and 
limitations of the logics and practices underlying this state-led project, and of 
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capitalocentric and developmentalist ways of understanding the contemporary dynamics 
of community, migration, and cross-border practices as a whole.  The experience of 
Guarjila, along with other communities in Chalatenango and around El Salvador and 
Central America, could be read according to such a singular perspective. Such a 
standpoint emphasizes that global capitalist forces are shaping contemporary dynamics. 
They direct the future by pushing people to emigrate, by individualizing and fragmenting 
communities and collectivity, by uprooting people from territorial places and collectivist 
trajectories of struggle, and by acting as the primary, if not the only, driver of 
development for places and people understood to be impoverished, in need, and with 
limited capacities.  
By contrast, this study has emphasized the existence and potentiality of more 
diverse logics and practices, including those that take on non-capitalist, non-individualist, 
collectivist, and communal forms. By privileging a politics of economic possibility, it has 
shed light on the endurance, adaptability, and political promise of such logics and 
practices, even in — and especially in — contexts assumed to be primarily characterized 
by displacement, marginalization, a “loss” of community, and a singular future. 
People of Guarjila continue to turn to “community”, in practice and logic, as a 
resource and a source of strength to navigate conditions of marginalization and exclusion 
in the United States and in El Salvador, and to build a better future. The cross-border 
practices and logics of building and rooting community, I suggest, are evidence of a 
much different way of understanding and practicing migration and transnational 
processes than according to a widely accepted developmentalist framework. Through 
rooted community networks, Guarjileños’ practices produce flows and trajectories that 
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work to reconstitute community and build paths to preferred futures and well-being on 
their own terms. Even as this work is networked across borders and takes on multiple and 
changing forms, it is nevertheless rooted and communal work that functions politically to 
stand against the developmentalist project advanced by the state. The complex practices 
in which Guarjileños are engaged reveal the contingency of the state-led project of 
remittance-led development and the possibilities of envisioning and putting into practice 
collective well-being and the making of the future (or more precisely, futures) on 
different terms. 
Community, and by extension, place, should thus be conceptualized on more 
complex terms than in the traditional sense that assumes boundedness and fixed 
identities. But neither should they be assumed to be so unbounded and tied to 
globalization that they have “lost” the political drive that comes from a sense of 
rootedness and collectivist practice. I have stressed that community is made in logic and 
in practice, is tied to mobility and cross-border networks, is constantly changing, and is 
relationally constructed and understood. Nonetheless, as in the case of Guarjila, 
communities are rooted, in territorial places, in shared histories and struggles, and 
through other collective experiences that shape collective political imaginaries, projects, 
and practices. By conceptualizing community in this way, we can see how communal 
logics and practices endure in, along with, and against conditions of displacement and 
migration, global flows of capital, and the projects of the state and neoliberalism. 
Communities and the work of community-making are rooted and networked, connecting 
people and other actors to territories, meanings, histories, and experiences. The 
networked rooting and communalizing practices with which Guarjileños engage are 
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conditioned by a longer trajectory of collective action and communal systems, and by 
attachments to the active project of building community with meaning and dignity in 
Guarjila itself. Even in a postwar period characterized by neoliberalism, marginalization, 
and migration, the enduring practices and logics produced out of this long trajectory are 
adapted to these new circumstances and changing contexts in contingent and relational 
ways. 
The developmentalist logic which celebrates the promise of emigration and 
remittances and helps guide El Salvador’s postwar nation-state building project is thus 
also contingently, relationally, and historically produced. Coming from actors and 
institutions linked to positions of authority and “expertise,” this project is widely 
understood to be hegemonic and mainstream. But it is a project that is not all-
encompassing and cannot be understood to have the final say. The failure and 
unsustainability of this project, which has gained force over the last two decades, is 
evident in the other possibilities that are already in practice among Chalatecos and in the 
recent contestations coming from regional and cross-border migrant-community activist 
networks. At a historic moment of crisis and change, these actors are challenging and 
demanding possibilities other than the developmentalist-centered politics on transnational 
migration that have been advanced by the state. 
Change 
At the time of writing the conclusion to this dissertation, an immigration reform 
bill recently proposed by a bipartisan group of U.S. Senators is soon to be debated by the 
U.S. Congress. If it were to be passed into law in its current form, among other provisions 
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and policy changes, it would allow undocumented and TPS-holding immigrants that 
fulfill given requirements to apply for a new special provisional legal status that could 
eventually, after a ten-year period, make them eligible to apply for legal residency and 
then citizenship. The proposed law would be a significant change to immigration policy 
as it could potentially legalize millions of immigrants and it lifts some exclusionary 
provisions on immigrant visas and documentation eligibility. However, it also includes 
the introduction of a number of new exclusionary policies. For example, as it stands, the 
bill proposes billions of dollars more in funding toward border security enforcement and 
a mandate that employers electronically verify that their workforce has legal 
documentation. Those to be granted the new special status would have to meet English 
language requirements, pay hefty fines, prove that they have had continuous lawful 
presence and employment and that they arrived to the United States prior to 2012. They 
would be excluded from public benefits programs. 
The bill was a topic of discussion among Guarjileños in Maryland, Virginia, and 
New Jersey whom I visited in May 2013 (just prior to writing this conclusion chapter), 
some of whose stories were told in this dissertation. They expressed skepticism about the 
bill and were wary of the political motivations driving its creation. Still, here and there 
changes to the execution and implementation of certain immigration enforcement policies 
over the last couple of years were making a significant difference in their lives. In 
Maryland, for example, undocumented immigrants would again be eligible to renew 
driver’s licenses, a decision that would allow tens of thousands of people to be able to 
drive to their place of employment without fearing deportation for not having a driver’s 
license.  
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Lili (introduced in Chapter 5), who has held TPS and had never returned to 
Guarjila in the more than ten years she had lived in the United States, was making two 
trips there in 2013. Enforcement authorities had become more lenient on the 
interpretation of the special circumstances required for TPS-holders to be able to return. 
She no longer needed to furnish a doctor’s note or proof of a deceased family member to 
justify a trip. She returned to celebrate the community’s patron saint day fiesta where she 
reunited with long-missed family and community members. She was struck by the way 
migration had changed the community’s social dynamics and landscape. She had invested 
in a home in the United States and had not been building in El Salvador, waiting with the 
hope that TPS-holders like herself would eventually be granted the opportunity to apply 
for legal residency. If immigration reform passed that included the provision, the sense of 
being in a state of temporariness would be lifted and she could more fully invest in the 
Maryland community where she now resides.  
Lili’s oldest children, now in their late teens and early twenties, had dropped out 
of the U.S. high schools where they had been enrolled to start families and to begin full-
time jobs. Her youngest El Salvador-born daughter was now entering her sophomore year 
in high school. Lili, already in the United States, had her daughter brought there when she 
was seven years old. The trip north took her a month and half since she was abandoned 
by her guides and was lost near the border.  U.S. President Obama’s 2012 executive 
decision to suspend deportations of DREAM Act-eligible youth meant that she was able 
to apply for paperwork that could make it possible for her to be the first in her family to 
attend college in the United States. Even so, aside from the sheer cost of a college 
education in the United States even at public institutions, as a student attending a public 
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school with limited resources and who must work to support the family, she faces 
significant challenges to pursuing such a dream. 
Such executive and legislative decisions provisionally fill tiny voids in a severely 
punitive U.S. immigration system that excludes populations from basic citizenship rights 
and systematically subjects them to conditions of marginalization at the same time that it 
works to divide families and communities. But such decisions that change policy and 
enforcement, no matter how minor, can make a significant difference in people’s lives 
and condition the way they go about making their futures. In early 2013, several groups 
of young migrants, mostly young men in their late teens and early twenties, left Guarjila 
and arrived to the United States. It is true that while I was in El Salvador from 2008-
2011, some young people contemplating migration expressed a “wait and see” stance as 
they were attentive to potentially changing immigration conditions. It is not clear and 
perhaps worthy of examination as to whether or not these migrants, who departed after 
several years of relatively little migration from the community, came to the United States 
in part influenced by the hope that the hearsay around immigration reform would 
materialize into something beneficial to them and their family and community members. 
I cannot comment as to whether this is the beginning of a new wave of widespread 
migration from the community or a reflection of a broader regional trend, or if it is a 
more isolated surge of just a few groups of coming-of-age young people who departed 
from the community. I also cannot comment as to whether and or when these migrants 
might return to El Salvador.  
What we can say with some certainty is that this is a reminder that building other 
options than undocumented migration is indeed a struggle that necessitates remarkable 
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individual, collective, and cross-border efforts. The groups of young people that have just 
arrived are evidence of both the draw of reuniting with family and community members 
now based in the United States and the sense that, in their view, international migration 
may offer the most possibilities as they construct futures for themselves. These futures, as 
we have seen, may continue in El Salvador, in the United States, or somewhere else. 
The wave of recent arrivals is also a reminder that the story of migration 
involving people from this region of El Salvador has no conclusion. The intertwined 
work of mobility and community-making is an ever-unfolding (hi)story that continues in 
changing conditions and contexts. Today, as in the past, as young people join community 
members abroad, it is clear that the work of community continues to be linked to mobility 
in ways that transcend legal borders and boundaries. Collective strategies to navigate 
current conditions and to work across borders and in place to build a better future get 
adapted to a shifting terrain of U.S. immigration and to the economic, political, and social 
changes within El Salvador itself.  As this dissertation has revealed, mobility and cross-
border networks have long been part of the history of the community-making work for 
Chalatecos throughout which strategies of collective action have been adapted to varying 
contexts. One migrant who had voluntarily returned to Guarjila in 2010, having built his 
home there and worked in masonry, is now on his way back up north at the time of my 
writing. One might conclude that this is a sign that some returned migrants’ aspirations to 
build a future in El Salvador were not viable. Perhaps this is so. But this particular 
migrant has more U.S. travel experience than many U.S.-born natives; he spent years in 
the United States moving from state to state for temporary jobs in construction. Mobility 
has long been and will continue to be an important resource in the personal lives and 
  
235 
community-building work of Chalatecos, especially as the shifting conditions of the 
present make for uncertain futures. 
At the time of this writing, Juliana awaits the arrival to her home in New Jersey of 
her nephew, who left Guarjila a month earlier. He is a 23-year-old who is strongly 
involved in the community, and who attended two years of college at the University of El 
Salvador studying journalism, so it was a surprise to me to hear that he had migrated. He 
said he made his decision to leave on the expectation that working in the United States 
for a few years would be an opportunity to save earnings and later return to El Salvador. 
Juliana and Beto expressed their hesitations and concerns about his intentions in their 
discussion with him. They offered to put the seven thousand dollars it would cost to fund 
his trip toward a college fund instead. Her nephew responded to their offer: “But how 
would I ever pay you back?” Development specialists, urban business owners, and 
economists I have spoken with have at times suggested that the hefty price tag of 
sponsoring someone to go to the United States would be better spent on start-up costs for 
a small business in El Salvador, rather than on putting someone’s life at risk. The offer 
and her nephew’s response is a sign that everyone felt that the nephew was better fit for 
pursuing a professional degree than for starting a small local business, but that even so, 
there was no certainty around what opportunities would come from continuing his college 
education in El Salvador.  Believing that migration should be a choice, they offered him 
their support. 
During my visit to their home, Juliana had been anxiously calling the guides in 
Texas several times daily to see if her nephew was safe, but they had not answered her 
calls for several days. He had already entered Texas, but the trek of several hours on foot 
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to avoid roadside checkpoints and migration police was in an area where migrants were 
frequently targeted by drug traffickers and susceptible to kidnappings. As with the 
Sonoran desert in southern Arizona, one of the most dangerous points on the migrant 
journey is, curiously, in the United States itself, not in Mexico. Waiting for days for a 
response, her feeling of worry was overwhelming. Having just had her call ignored again 
as I was leaving, she said to me: “This is too frustrating. If anyone else asks for my help 
to come to the United States, I will say to them: ‘No, do not come.’ This is too 
frustrating.” 
The largely overlooked humanitarian crisis affecting undocumented migrants in 
transit through Mexico and across borders, as Salvadoran activists stressed, is of urgent 
concern. The clandestine endangerment and suffering of migrants en route are reproduced 
not only by the licit and illicit actors that prey on their vulnerability, but by the failure of 
neoliberal economic policies that have pushed migrants out of their places of origin to 
work as virtually “outsourced” undocumented labor in places of destination, and by the 
failure of U.S. immigration policies that do not humanely respond to the current reality of 
international human mobility in the Americas and elsewhere. In the way of policy reform, 
there should be a rethinking of the failed development strategies and the failed 
immigration policies that produce such a crisis. A rethinking of failed policies might 
benefit from multilateral agreements and strategies guided by a transnational perspective 
that goes beyond conventional neoliberal developmentalist frameworks and 
assimilationist assumptions, and recognizes the value of building an option to not migrate 
as much as an option to legally migrate in humane and dignified conditions. 
Chalatecos consistently turn to community as a valued resource, strategy, and 
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source of strength in navigating the conditions wrought by the failure of both neoliberal 
development policies in El Salvador and the failure of the U.S. immigration system, each 
of which are conditioned by a legacy of colonialist and imperialist involvements. Their 
communal and rooted practices are guided by logics that stand in contrast to hegemonic 
neoliberal frameworks for understanding the meaning of migration and development and 
the nexus of the two; they illuminate other ways of thinking and other possibilities.  
Sueños Salvadoreños 
Migration, therefore, will continue to be part of the story of El Salvador, but it is a 
story that is lived and told in diverse ways. One version of the story was told eloquently 
through a national educational art exhibit directed by Catalina, the artist mentioned at the 
beginning of this dissertation who was so inspired by young Juan’s struggle to build other 
possibilities than undocumented migration to the United States. Drawing from the 
creativity of several artists from El Salvador, the exhibit, titled Carta del Norte (Letter 
from the North), takes the public on a path that shows the way postwar migration has 
come to characterize Salvadoran life, its current conditions, and the realities of hardships 
and struggles that migrants and their families endure on both sides of the border. 
On display in this storyline was another piece that Catalina painted about Juan, 
called The Musician. The painting, which is of the drum set in Juan’s house, was inspired 
by his aspirations to stay in El Salvador and to further pursue his love for music. She said 
that meeting Juan and her trip to Guarjila marked a shift in the focus of her artwork on 
Salvadoran migration. Prior to the trip, her art had focused on the horrific conditions of 
Central American migration through Mexico. Using her trademark technique of 
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appropriating popular, cartoon-like images and re-piecing them together, her former 
works offered uncomfortable and in-your-face reminders of migrants’ clandestine trauma 
hidden from view: child trafficking, migrants loaded into the compartments of tractor-
tailors. Produced out of a personal and collective feeling of frustration, distress, and 
emergency, these discomforting representations were a form of activism to raise 
awareness, to provoke. But her turn toward representing realities of hope and other 
possibilities, as in The Musician, was provocative and political in a different way. 
Figure 4: The Musician 
Art by Catalina del Cid, on display in “Carta del Norte” exhibit. Photographed by 
author, May 2011, Museo Tecleño, Santa Tecla, La Libertad. 
 
 
Carta del Norte was inaugurated in May 2011 in a new museum and cultural 
center that was renovated from what was once a prison, a reminder of violence in times 
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past. The museum is located in Santa Tecla, a suburb up the hill from San Salvador that 
just a few years earlier was notorious for its street violence and crime but has recently 
seen an urban renewal with the help of its FMLN-affiliated mayor (currently the party’s 
Vice Presidential candidate). Santa Tecla is a community that now boasts participatory 
democracy-style governance in its local neighborhoods, a number of restored cultural 
centers and heritage sites, renovated parks, and new community spaces. In a span of just a 
few years, a pedestrian street came to be loaded with locally-owned shops and restaurants 
in Santa Tecla’s downtown area. The area is replacing what were considered to be among 
San Salvador’s few perceivably “safe” public social spaces in the neoliberal postwar 
period: its newly constructed private high-security shopping malls filled with foreign-
owned vendors. Now a lively place for Salvadoran families, a truly public common space 
has been reclaimed in Santa Tecla, reinvigorating a sense of community in a city known 
for the divisions produced through privatized basic resources, gated communities, and 
everyday violence. The exhibits opening here seemed very fitting. 
After one walks the length of the exhibit, tracing the path of El Salvador’s 
migration experience told in the narrative presented through various artistic and 
educational pieces, it finishes with the following words in between a collage of the 
diverse faces of Salvadorans within and outside of El Salvador’s borders: 
“WHAT IS THE GOAL? 
That the Salvadorans who stay in the country can, each day, improve their living 
conditions, and the Salvadorans who go can do so enjoying all of their rights. 
 
PROUD TO BE SALVADORANS 
We live in a beautiful country, we have the capacity, creativity, and will to create 
opportunities in our community. Will we stay to build this Salvadoran dream?”68 
                                                          
68
 See Figure 5. Author’s translation. “¿Nos quedamos a construir este sueño salvadoreño?”  might 
alternately be translated to “Will we commit to constructing this Salvadoran dream?” to imply that this 
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Figure 5: Final Image in Carta del Norte 
Final image on display in “Carta del Norte” exhibit. Photographed by author, May 
2011, Museo Tecleño, Santa Tecla, La Libertad.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
project of constructing a new El Salvador can involve actors from within and outside of El Salvador’s 
geographic borders. 
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